Perkins v. Meilicke

• Decision Date: 08 December 1896
• Docket Number: 10,190--(110)
• Citation: 69 N.W. 220,66 Minn. 409
• Parties: J. V. PERKINS and Another v. FRANK MEILICKE and Others
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

69 N.W. 220

66 Minn. 409

J. V. PERKINS and Another v. FRANK MEILICKE and Others

Nos. 10,190--(110)

Supreme Court of Minnesota

December 8, 1896

Appeal by plaintiffs from a judgment of the district court for Dakota county, in favor of defendants, entered in pursuance of the order of Crosby, J. Affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

W. H De Kay, for appellants.

John L Townley, for respondents.

OPINION

COLLINS, J.

1. The justice of the peace, who was a justice for, and holding his office in, Dakota county, could not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants, all of whom resided in Washington county, by issuing a writ of attachment in the form prescribed by G. S. 1894, § 5092, directed to the sheriff or any constable of said Washington county, by having such writ served by attaching defendants' property reading the writ to each, and then causing the return of the officer showing these facts to be filed in his office on the return day mentioned in the writ.

The jurisdiction of a justice of the peace is by law (G. S. § 4955) made co-extensive with the limits of the county in which he resides, except in certain cases; one being that he may issue writs of attachment, directed to the proper officer of any county, for the purpose of causing an attachment of property therein. A justice of the peace is an officer of limited jurisdiction, and he cannot assume power, authority, or jurisdiction not conferred by statute. It is entirely clear, from the language of section 4955, that the authority to issue writs of attachment, directed to an officer of a county other than that in which the justice resides is limited to the purpose of causing an attachment of property in such county. In words the statute so prescribes, and, the purpose of the writ being expressly stated, the idea or claim that it can be used for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, if he is a resident of the county to which the writ is issued, is wholly excluded.

Should we construe the language as contended for by counsel for appellants, the power would be conferred upon a justice for Houston county, in the southeast corner of the state, to issue a writ of attachment directed to the proper officer of the county of Kittson, in the northwest corner, and by attachment of property and the reading of the writ to a resident of and in the latter county, compel him to defend a suit in a justice's court about 500 miles distant from his place of residence. The language of a statute would have to be very clear and unambiguous before we would give it a construction which would permit such an iniquitous proceeding as the one just mentioned.

2. On the return day of the writ the defendants made a special appearance before the justice, and, objecting to his assuming or exercising any jurisdiction over their persons by reason of the pretended service in Washington county, moved to dismiss the action. This motion was denied, and an exception taken. The defendants then interposed a general denial, by way of answer, but expressly reserved all of their rights as set forth in their special appearance. The justice entered judgment in plaintiffs' favor, and on appeal to the district court on questions of law alone, this judgment was reversed.

It is argued by counsel for appellants (plaintiffs) that, when the defendants filed their...