Perkins v. Regents of University of Michigan

• Decision Date: 12 August 1996
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 94-40514.
• Citation: 934 F. Supp. 857
• Parties: Marvin PERKINS, Plaintiff, v. REGENTS OF the UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

934 F. Supp. 857

Marvin PERKINS, Plaintiff, v. REGENTS OF the UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 94-40514.

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division.

August 12, 1996.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Gregory v. Murray, Bernice M. Tatarelli, Vercruysse, Metz & Murray, P. C., Bingham Farms, MI, for defendant.

Gary A. Benjamin, Detroit, MI, Dennis C. Mitchenor, Grosse Pointe Farms, MI, for plaintiff.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

GADOLA, District Judge.

Before the court is the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the Title VII (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.) racial discrimination and discharge and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 procedural due process claims asserted in this action. The plaintiff, Marvin Perkins, filed his complaint in the present action on February 15, 1996, asserting various state and federal claims based upon his termination of employment as the General Services Foreman of the Transportation Services Department of the University of Michigan. This court declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the state law claims and dismissed those claims without prejudice on February 25, 1994. Perkins amended his complaint to assert a cause of action under Title VII in addition to his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based upon alleged violations of his right to procedural due process on January 6, 1995. The defendant brought the present motion for summary judgment on May 17, 1996, asserting that Perkins has failed to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination under Title VII, that such a claim is barred by principles of res judicata because the facts were litigated in a state court proceeding under Michigan's Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, MCLA § 37.2101 et seq., and that Perkins has failed to state a prima facie claim under section 1983 based on procedural due process.

It should be noted initially that, at the June 21, 1996 hearing conducted on this motion, Perkins conceded that the defendant's motion properly stated the applicable principles governing Perkins's section 1983 claim and that those principles militated in favor of granting the defendant's motion with respect to that claim. This court then granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the procedural due process claim contained in Perkins's complaint. For the reasons stated on the record at that hearing, this court will dismiss that claim. This court will consider the defendant's motion for summary judgment regarding Perkins's remaining Title VII claim after a summary of the relevant facts and a recitation of the applicable standard of review.

I. Factual Background

The facts underlying this matter are uncomplicated. In March of 1989, Perkins applied for a position as General Services Foreman of the Transportation Services Department for the University of Michigan. Perkins interviewed for the position along with at least five other white candidates and was hired by Patrick Cunningham, the Manager of the Department. Perkins replaced a white male who had retired from the Foreman position. According to Perkins's deposition testimony, Cunningham's decision to offer Perkins the Foreman position was not based on racial bias or otherwise.

When Perkins was hired, the Department was seeking to implement an inventory control system, to reduce excess stock and realize substantial cost savings. Perkins was assigned the task of designing a computerized maintenance control system for this purpose. Perkins was also responsible for policies and procedures pertaining to inventory control, including those which reduced the potential for theft in the Department.

In early December of 1993, Cunningham had learned that, over an 18 month period, Perkins had ordered and approved payment for a large number of van jump seats, a vast majority of which could not be found in inventory or accounted for. Cunningham summoned Perkins into his office, explained what he had learned and asked Perkins if he could explain what had happened to the van jump seats. Perkins indicated that he would investigate the matter and report to Cunningham the following day. Cunningham informed Perkins that, if Perkins could not provide a satisfactory explanation for the missing inventory, he would be compelled to turn the matter over to the University's security department.

The following day, Perkins met with Cunningham and reported that he had contacted the jump seat supplier and was told that the supplier would gladly deliver the seats if, indeed, it had failed to deliver them. Perkins admitted that there was no way to demonstrate or prove that the jump seats had not been delivered, however, because Perkins had signed forms stating that he had received the seats. According to the records, 193 jump seats reportedly received by Perkins could not be accounted for.

Cunningham turned the matter over to security and Perkins was suspended pending an investigation into the missing jump seats and other potential inventory control violations. As the investigation proceeded, other problems were discovered, such as the unauthorized approval of accident report repairs without estimates and charging of meal expenses in violation of the University's reimbursement policies.

Upon the conclusion of the investigation, the University conducted a Disciplinary Review Conference on February 16, 1994. Present at the hearing were various University personnel, Cunningham, a representative from the University's Human Resources Department, Perkins and his attorney, Dennis Mitchenor. The University again informed Perkins that he had failed to perform his duties as Foreman satisfactorily, relying on the evidence produced in the investigation. Perkins and his attorney were then permitted to present Perkins's side of the story.

Perkins admitted that he was not instructed by Cunningham to order 193 jump seats over an 18 month period and that he could not otherwise explain the need for ordering that many. The University records showed that only 36 of those seats were ever installed into University vans. Perkins admitted that he seldom checked to see if the Department already had jump seats in inventory before ordering additional seats. Finally, Perkins admitted that he often failed to ensure that the correct number of seats were delivered or placed into inventory. According to University estimates, Perkins's admitted conduct rendered the Department unable to account for over 100 jump seats, resulting in a total loss to the University of over $21,000.

Following the February hearing, Cunningham decided to terminate Perkins. Perkins was notified by a letter dated February 24, 1994, that his suspension was being converted into a discharge effective the date of his suspension, December 11, 1993. Cunningham's letter stated that Perkins was being terminated for "gross misfeasance" and detailed the various factors supporting that conclusion.

II. Standard of Review

Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Summary judgment is appropriate where the moving party demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of an essential element of the non-moving party's case on which the non-moving party would bear the burden of proof at trial. Martin v. Ohio Turnpike Commission, 968 F.2d 606, 608 (6th Cir.1992); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the facts and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. 60 Ivy Street Corporation v. Alexander, 822 F.2d 1432, 1435 (6th Cir.1987). The court is not required or permitted, however, to judge the evidence or make findings of fact. Id. at 1435-36. The moving party has the burden of showing conclusively that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Id. at 1435.

A fact is "material" for purposes of summary judgment where proof of that fact would have the effect of establishing or refuting an essential element of the cause of action or a defense advanced by the parties. Kendall v. Hoover Co., 751 F.2d 171, 174 (6th Cir.1984). In other words, the disputed fact must be one which might affect outcome of the suit under the substantive law controlling the issue. Henson v. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 14 F.3d 1143, 1148 (6th Cir.1994). A dispute over a material fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Id. Accordingly, where a reasonable jury could not find that the non-moving party is entitled to a verdict, there is no genuine issue for trial and summary judgment is appropriate. Feliciano v. City of Cleveland, 988 F.2d 649 (6th Cir. 1993).

Once the moving party carries its initial burden of demonstrating that no genuine issues of material fact are in dispute, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to present specific facts to prove that there is a genuine issue for trial. To create a genuine issue of material fact, the non-moving party must present more than just some evidence of a disputed issue. As the United States Supreme Court stated in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510-11, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986):

There is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. If the non-moving party's evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.

(Citations omitted); see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-53; Matsushita...