Perkins v. Rock-Tenn Servs., Inc.

• Decision Date: 06 June 2016
• Docket Number: File No. 1:15-cv-8
• Citation: 190 F.Supp.3d 720
• Parties: Robbin Perkins, Plaintiff, v. Rock-Tenn Services, Inc., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

190 F.Supp.3d 720

Robbin Perkins, Plaintiff,

v.Rock-Tenn Services, Inc., Defendant.

File No. 1:15-cv-8

United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division.

Signed June 6, 2016

William F. Piper, William F. Piper PLC, Portage, MI, for Plaintiff.

Brian Mark Schwartz, David Graham King, Richard William Warren, Miller Canfield Paddock & Stone PLC, Detroit, MI, for Defendant.

OPINION

ROBERT HOLMES BELL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Robbin Perkins brings this action against her former employer, Defendant Rock-Tenn Services, Inc. ("Rock-Tenn"), claiming that it paid her less than male employees in her position and that it failed to notify her of her right to continue her health insurance after she resigned from the company. Before the Court is Defendant's motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 42). For the reasons discussed herein, the motion will be granted.

I.

Defendant operates mills that produce merchandising displays, corrugated packaging, and consumer packaging. One of its mills is located in Battle Creek, Michigan. Plaintiff was hired by Rock-Tenn as a Shipping Superintendent in August 2010 with a starting salary of $70,000, the top end of the salary range for the job posting. (Pl.'s Dep. 125;¹ Job Information, ECF No. 43-6.) She replaced Bob Converse, who had worked at the company since 1979. (ECF No. 44-2.) His salary was $85,000 per year at the time of his retirement in 2010. (Id. ) Over time, Plaintiff received regular salary increases. In February 2014, the month that she resigned, her salary was approximately $78,500. (Pl.'s Dep. 125.) She does not claim that she was paid differently from any other Shipping Superintendent at Rock-Tenn. Rather, she alleges that she was paid less than the employee who succeeded her. (Compl. ¶ 28, ECF No. 1.)

Some of Rock-Tenn's employees are union employees, paid on an hourly basis. In 2013, Plaintiff asked her supervisor, Tom Shannon, to provide her with a "Lead," which is a union employee that assists the Superintendent. (Pl's Dep. 131-33.) Plaintiff selected Gary Wood. (Id. ) Wood started working at the Battle Creek mill in 1994. He initially worked as a Reserve, handling tasks assigned to him, and then he worked in the machine room for 16 years. (Wood Dep. 6-7.)² In 2009, he transferred to the shipping department. (Id. at 7.) When he became a Lead in 2013, he received a 12% pay increase over the hourly rate earned by a regular shipper, in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement. (See CBA 2004-2009 at 46, ECF No. 43-7; CBA 2009-2013 at 47, ECF No. 43-11; Wood Dep. 24.) Plaintiff also requested, and Wood was able to receive, another 12% increase as a "step up" or "production" lead, during hours when she was not working. (Wood Dep. 23-25.) He maintained this level of pay after Plaintiff left the company. (Id. ) Wood earned a total of approximately $75,000 in 2012, $109,000 in 2013, and $113,000 in 2014.

On one occasion, Shannon asked Plaintiff to monitor the shipping area to ensure that no one threw cigarette butts on the ground and to issue citations if necessary. (Pl.'s Dep. 189-90.) Initially, she refused to do it, but then she issued a citation to one of the employees. (Id. ) After a discussion with the manager of the mill, she was relieved of this responsibility. (Id. at 190.)

In addition, Plaintiff was asked to train and certify employees to drive industrial trucks. (Id. at 193-95.) Plaintiff believed that her time was better spent in the shipping department, but she began training sessions in January 2014. (Id. at 199.) Two or three weeks later, Wood took over responsibility for conducting these sessions. (Id. at 200-01, 204.)

Another responsibility assigned to her was to monitor the security staff at the mill and to act as a liaison with the security contractor responsible for that staff. (Id. at 179.) Plaintiff asked if there would be additional compensation associated with this new responsibility. (Id. at 209.) The general manager told her that he would look into it, but he never got back to her. (Id. ) She never asked her direct supervisor for an increase in pay. (Shannon Dep. 27.)³

Over time, Plaintiff became frustrated with her supervisor. (Pl.'s Dep. 188.) He ignored her suggestions for improving the functioning of the shipping department. (Id. at 228-29.) In February 2014, Defendant was incurring $5,000 to $7,000 per week in detention costs, which are costs charged by independent trucking companies for the time their trucks spend idle on Defendant's premises waiting to be loaded. (Id. at 42.) Plaintiff suggested that Shannon correct this problem by pre-loading the trailers, but her suggestions were not implemented. (Id. at 184-85, 187, 225.)

On February 26, 2014, she met with her supervisor, the general manager, and the human resources director. The general manager mentioned that there was a problem with detention costs. Plaintiff indicated that she had given suggestions to Shannon to address this, who became red in the face after she made this comment. (Id. at 187.) The next day, Plaintiff resigned. Sometime after she left, Defendant cancelled her health insurance. Plaintiff claims that she never received any notice of her right to continue her health insurance.

After Plaintiff's resignation, Shannon assigned Wood to take over substantially all of her responsibilities. Unlike Plaintiff, Wood does not discipline employees and he does not act as liaison with the security service. (Shannon Dep. 48.) However, Wood helps with loading trucks, which is something that Plaintiff would "rarely" do because it is union work. (Pl.'s Aff. 4, ECF No. 46-2.) Wood and Shannon implemented a plan to reduce detention costs by pre-loading the trailers, resulting in significant savings.

II.

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires the Court to grant summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In evaluating a motion for summary judgment the Court must look beyond the pleadings and assess the proof to determine whether there is a genuine need for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). "[T]he district court must construe the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party." Martin v. Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. , 561 F.3d 439, 443 (6th Cir.2009) (citing Jones v. Potter , 488 F.3d 397, 403 (6th Cir.2007) ). When such a motion is filed by the defendant, as in this case, the "plaintiff must do more than rely merely on the allegations of her pleadings or identify a ‘metaphysical doubt’ or hypothetical ‘plausibility’ based on a lack of evidence; [a plaintiff] is obliged to come forward with ‘specific facts,’ based on ‘discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits[.]’ " Chappell v. City of Cleveland , 585 F.3d 901, 912 (6th Cir.2009) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) ; Matsushita , 475 U.S. at 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348 ). The proper inquiry is whether the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ; see generally Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co. , 886 F.2d 1472, 1476–80 (6th Cir.1989). Where a defendant seeks summary judgment on an affirmative defense on which it will bear the ultimate burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is proper " ‘only if the record shows that [the defendant] established the defense so clearly that no rational jury could have found to the contrary.’ " Beck–Wilson v. Principi , 441 F.3d 353, 365 (6th Cir.2006) (quoting Buntin v. Breathitt Cnty. Bd. of Educ. , 134 F.3d 796, 800 (6th Cir.1998) ).

III.

In Count I of the complaint, Plaintiff contends that she was paid less than male counterparts, in violation of the Equal Pay Act (EPA), 29 U.S.C. § 203 et seq. ; Michigan's Minimum Wage Law of 1964 (MWL), Mich. Comp. Laws § 408.381 et seq. ; and the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA), Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.2101 et seq. (Compl. ¶ 32.)

A. Equal Pay Act

The EPA prohibits employers from paying an employee at a rate less than that paid to employees of the opposite sex for work requiring "equal skill, effort, and responsibility," that is "performed under similar working conditions," unless such payment is made pursuant to a "seniority system," "merit system," or "a differential based on any other factor other than sex [.]" See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). "[T]o establish a prima facie case of wage discrimination, the EPA plaintiff must show that an employer pays different wages to employees of opposite sexes for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions." Buntin , 134 F.3d at 799 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Plaintiff may establish her prima facie case by showing a wage differential between herself and her predecessor, id. or between herself and her successor, Dixon v. Univ. of Toledo , 638 F.Supp.2d 847, 854 (N.D.Ohio 2009). In this case, it is not disputed that the employee who preceded her as shipping superintendent, Bob Converse, and the employee who succeeded her in substantially all of her responsibilities, Gary Wood, were both paid more than her. The Court will analyze the circumstances of both employees to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of fact for trial.

1. Gary Wood

Defendant asserts that Plaintiff has not established a prima facie case of discrimination based on the pay differential between her and Wood because Wood's position was different. Wood was a Lead. He did not hold the position of Shipping Superintendent. Moreover, as a union employee, he lacked management rights, including the ability to hire, fire, promote, or discipline employees.⁴

These distinctions are not dispositive. At...