Perkins v. Southern New England Tel. Co.
| Decision Date | 14 February 2012 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:07-CV-967 (JCH) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
| Parties | SHARON L. PERKINS, ET AL., Plaintiffs, Individually and on Behalf of Others Similarly Situated v. SOUTHERN NEW ENGLAND TELEPHONE CO., Defendant. |
Plaintiffs, Sharon Perkins, Michael Blasko, Joseph Kiely, Michael McDermott, and Kelly Werbinski, brought this action against defendant, Southern New England Telephone Co. ("SNET"), on behalf of themselves and a class of similarly situated employees (collectively, "plaintiffs"), pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act ("the FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 207, and Connecticut General Statutes §§ 31-60(a) and 31-76(c). Plaintiffs argued that they were improperly classified as exempt employees and, as a result, not paid for overtime work, in violation of federal and state law.
The court will offer only a short discussion of the relevant background. The plaintiff class consisted of approximately two hundred individuals who were employed as Level One Managers (hereafter "Level Ones" or "L1s") at SNET in Connecticut from June 2005 and thereafter, and who were assigned technicians. The class asserted that they were entitled to overtime wages pursuant to sections 31-60(a) and 31-76(c) of theConnecticut General Statutes. Of those approximately two hundred individuals, one hundred forty-eight of them opted into a FLSA collective action, asserting that they were entitled to overtime wages pursuant to the FLSA. SNET contended that the plaintiffs were not entitled to overtime wages because the plaintiffs were employed in a bona fide executive capacity (hereafter "executive exemption"), and therefore exempt from receiving overtime wages, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) and Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-58.
At the conclusion of twelve days of evidence, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant with regard to both federal and state law. Plaintiffs now move pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b) for judgment as a matter of law. In the alternative, plaintiffs seek a new trial, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a).
A new trial may be granted "for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions at law in the courts of the United States." Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(A). Generally, a new trial "'should be granted when, in the opinion of the district court, the jury reached a seriously erroneous result or . . . the verdict is a miscarriage of justice.' " DLC Mgmt. Corp. v. Town of Hyde Park, 163 F.3d 124, 133 (2d Cir.1998) (quoting Song v. Ives Labs., Inc., 957 F.2d 1041, 1047 (2d Cir.1992)). The decision of whether to grant a new trial is left to the sound discretion of the judge. See Pouliot v. Paul Arpin Van Lines, Inc., 235 F.R.D. 537, 542 (D. Conn. 2006).
Unlike judgment as a matter of law, a new trial may be granted even if there is substantial evidence supporting the jury's verdict. See DLC Mgmt. Corp., 163 F.3d at134. In considering whether to grant a new trial, a trial judge is free to weigh the evidence herself, and need not view it in the light most favorable to the verdict winner. Id. at 134. However, "a court should rarely disturb a jury's evaluation of a witness's credibility," and should only grant a new trial where the jury's verdict is "egregious." See id. (citations omitted). Further, "it is well-settled that Rule 59 is not a vehicle for relitigating old issues, presenting the case under new theories, securing a rehearing on the merits, or otherwise taking a second bite at the apple." Pouliot, 235 F.R.D. at 542 (quoting Sequa v. GBJ Corp., 156 F.3d 136, 144 (2d Cir. 1998)) (internal quotations omitted).
Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows for the entry of judgment as a matter of law if a jury returns a verdict for which there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 50. The standard under Rule 50 is the same as that for summary judgment: a court may not grant a Rule 50 motion unless "the evidence is such that, without weighing the credibility of the witnesses or otherwise considering the weight of the evidence, there can be but one conclusion as to the verdict that reasonable [persons] could have reached." This Is Me, Inc. v. Taylor, 157 F.3d 139, 142 (2d Cir.1998) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, in deciding such a motion, "the court must give deference to all credibility determinations and reasonable inferences of the jury . . . and it may not itself weigh the credibility of the witnesses or consider the weight of the evidence." Galdieri-Ambrosini v. Nat'l Realty & Dev. Corp., 136 F.3d 276, 289 (2d Cir.1998) (citations omitted). In short, the court cannot "substitute its judgment for that of the jury." LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 67F.3d 412, 429 (2d Cir.1995) (citations omitted). Rather, judgment as a matter of law may only be granted if: (1) there is such a complete absence of evidence supporting the verdict that the jury's findings could only have been the result of sheer surmise and conjecture, or (2) there is such an overwhelming amount of evidence in favor of the movant that reasonable and fair minded persons could not arrive at a verdict against it. Galdieri-Ambrosini, 136 F.3d at 289 (quoting Cruz v. Local Union No. 3 of the Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 34 F.3d 1148, 1154 (2d Cir.1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 110 F.3d 210, 214 (2d Cir.1997).
Moreover, "weakness of the evidence does not justify judgment as a matter of law; as in the case of a grant of summary judgment, the evidence must be such that 'a reasonable juror would have been compelled to accept the view of the moving party.'" This Is Me, Inc., 157 F.3d at 142 (quoting Piesco v. Koch, 12 F.3d 332, 343 (2d Cir. 1993)). The court "must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party in whose favor the verdict was rendered, giving that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences that the jury might have drawn in his favor." Norton v. Sam's Club, 145 F.3d 114, 118 (2d Cir.1998) (citation omitted); see also Mickle v. Morin, 297 F.3d 114, 120 (2d Cir.2002) (). Additionally, in making its determination, the court "'must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe.'" Mickle, 297 F.3d at 120 (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 151 (2000)). Thus, "[a] party seeking to overturn a verdict based on the sufficiency of the evidence bears a very heavy burden." Norton, 145 F.3d at 118.
Plaintiffs contend that they are entitled to a new trial for several reasons. First, plaintiffs argue that the jury verdict was against the weight of evidence. See Mem. Supp. Mot. New Trial at 4. Second, plaintiffs assert that the court's instructions to the jury contained several prejudicial errors. See id. at 4-13. Third, plaintiffs contend that the court erred in admitting certain evidence and allowing particular testimony. See id. at 13-19. Finally, plaintiffs argue that defense counsel made "inaccurate, misleading, and prejudicial statements" to the jury. See id. at 19-20.
Plaintiffs first argue that a new trial is warranted because the jury's verdict in favor of SNET was against the weight of the evidence with regard to both claims. See Mem. Supp. Mot. New Trial at 4. While the court may grant a new trial where the court finds that the verdict was against the weight of evidence, it should only do so where the jury's verdict was egregious, or a miscarriage of justice. See DLC Mgmt. Corp. v. Town of Hyde Park, 163 F.3d 124, 133-34 (2d Cir. 1998). In addition, a court should "rarely disturb a jury's evaluation of a witness's credibility." See id. at 134.
To demonstrate that the executive exemption applied under Connecticut law, SNET was required to prove:1 (1) plaintiffs were compensated at a rate of not less than four hundred seventy-five dollars per week; (2) plaintiffs' primary duty consists ofmanagement of the enterprise in which they are employed or of a customarily recognized department or subdivision thereof; and (3) that plaintiffs' duties include the customary or regular direction of the work of two or more other employees. See Conn. Agencies Regs. § 31-60-14(a). Similarly, to show that the executive exemption applied under the FLSA, SNET was required to prove: (1) plaintiffs were compensated on a salary basis at a rate of not less than four hundred fifty-five dollars; (2) the employee's primary duty is management of the enterprise in which the employee is employed or of a customarily recognized department or subdivision thereof; (3) the employee customarily and regularly directs the work of two or more other employees; and (4) the employee has the authority to hire or fire other employees, or the employee's suggestions and recommendations as to hiring, firing, advancement, promotion, or any other changes of status of other employees are given particular weight. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.100. The parties stipulated that the plaintiffs met the salary requirement for both exemptions.
Plaintiffs contend that SNET was required to prove each of these elements "plainly and unmistakably" or by "clear and convincing evidence." See Mem. Supp. Mot. New Trial at 9-13. This contention rests on the Supreme Court's directive that FLSA exemptions "are to be narrowly construed against the employers seeking to assert them and their application limited to those establishments plainly and unmistakably within their terms and spirit." See Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388, 396 (1960); see also Bilyou v. Dutchess Beer Distribs., Inc., 300 F.3d 217, 222 (2d...
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