Perodeau v. O'Connor

• Decision Date: 11 December 1957
• Parties: Henry R. PERODEAU and another v. Daniel F. O'CONNOR and another.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 512

146 N.E.2d 512

336 Mass. 472

Henry R. PERODEAU and another v. Daniel F. O'CONNOR and another.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Worcester.

Argued Sept. 30, 1957.

Decided Dec. 11, 1957.

Nicholas Fusaro and Nunziato Fusaro, Worcester, for plaintiffs.

Bruno J. DiCicco, Worcester, for defendants.

Before WILKINS, C. J., and RONAN, SPALDING, WILLIAMS and CUTTER, JJ.

RONAN, Justice.

This is an appeal from a final decree enjoining the defendants from preventing the plaintiffs from using a right of way, located partly on the defendants' land, in operating an automobile between Viking Terrace, a public way, and the plaintiffs' garage.

One Johnson in 1927 was the owner of two adjoining lots of land, each having a frontage of fifty feet on the northerly side of Viking Terrace, a public highway in the city of Worcester. Johnson had owned these lots since 1915. Johnson lived upon lot 27 and had erected a garage upon the rear part of lot 26. The easterly boundary of lot 26 and the westerly boundary of lot 27 comprised a common boundary. He sold lot 26 to one Fagerquist in October, 1927. The front part of this lot was then vacant. At the time of the conveyance tire marks made by Johnson's automobile between his garage and Viking Terrace were plainly visible. The westerly tire marks were seven feet westerly from the common boundary between lots 26 and 27 while the easterly marks were a foot easterly of this boundary. In 1927 Johnson and Fagerquist put on a cinder surface along the entire length of this eight foot strip and placed curbings along the easterly and westerly sides of this strip. The Johnson garage was moved to lot 27 in the rear of his residence but it was at no greater distance from Viking Terrace than when it was located on lot 26. Johnson continued to use the right of way. The change in the location of his garage merely resulted in a slight deviation to the east before reaching the original northerly terminus but did not require his driving over land which he had not always used. From the time they resurfaced the way and put in the curbings, and for nearly a quarter of a century and until 1951 while Johnson and Fagerquist occupied adjoining lots, they both assumed the burden of clearing snow from the way and keeping it in repair. Both enjoyed the use of the way without any interruption from anyone. Indeed, it did not appear that either had any other access to the public way from their respective garages.

Fagerquist sold lot 26 to the defendants in 1951. Johnson in 1951 conveyed lot 27 to one Pereira who conveyed it to the plaintiffs in 1952. The plaintiffs used the way until 1955 when they were blocked by a barrier set up by the defendants. The judge found that the way was reasonably necessary for the use and enjoyment of the plaintiffs' premises and that no other entrance to their garage was available. He found that the plaintiffs have a way by implication extending seven feet in width westerly over the common boundary between lots 26 and 27.

The deed to Fagerquist from Johnson made no mention of the right of way in question. It was silent as to any reservation by Johnson over the land conveyed or the creation of any easement in the adjoining land for the benefit of the land retained. It was said in Dale v. Bedal, 305 Mass. 102, 103, 25 N.E.2d 175, 176, 'But implied easements, whether by grant or by reservation, do not arise out of necessity alone. Their origin must be found in a presumed intention of the parties, to be gathered from the language of the instruments when read in the light of the circumstances attending their execution, the physical condition of the premises, and the knowledge which the parties had or with which they are chargeable.' And the rule that 'a deed is to be construed most...