Perreira v. State
| Citation | 768 P.2d 1198 |
| Decision Date | 06 February 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 87SC75,87SC75 |
| Parties | Vendria PERREIRA, Surviving Spouse of Augustus J. Perreira, Jr. (Deceased), Petitioner, v. The STATE of Colorado and its Agency, Fort Logan Mental Health Center, and Eric Anders, M.D., Respondents. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Colorado |
Blaine A. Rutenbeck, Denver, Colo., Richard K. Walsh, Colorado Springs, Colo Dean P. Grossenbach, Colorado Springs, Colo., for petitioner.
Hall & Evans, Carol M. Welch, William J. Barber, Alan Epstein, Denver, Colo., for respondents.
Kripke, Epstein & Lawrence, P.C., Scott W. Lawrence, Denver, Colo., for amicus curiae, Colorado Trial Lawyers Ass'n.
The question in this case is whether a state mental health center and its staff psychiatrist can be held liable in tort for the shooting death of a police officer by a mentally ill person, recently released from an involuntary commitment for short-term treatment. In Perreira v. State of Colorado, 738 P.2d 4 (Colo.App.1986), the court of appeals reversed a judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of the surviving wife of the police officer and held that, because the mentally ill person had made no specific threats against particular persons during the period of treatment at the mental health center, the officer was not in the foreseeable zone of danger and that the mental health center and the psychiatrist thus had no legal duty to the officer. We reject this unduly restrictive standard adopted by the court of appeals. We hold that when, as here, a staff psychiatrist of a state mental health facility is considering whether to release an involuntarily committed mental patient, the psychiatrist has a legal duty to exercise due care, consistent with the knowledge and skill ordinarily possessed by psychiatric practitioners under similar circumstances, to determine whether the patient has a propensity for violence and would thereby present an unreasonable risk of serious bodily harm to others if released from the involuntary commitment, and, further, that in discharging this legal duty the psychiatrist may be required to take reasonable precautions to protect the public from the danger created by the release of the involuntarily committed patient, including the giving of due consideration to extending the term of the patient's commitment or to placing appropriate conditions and restrictions on the patient's release. We accordingly reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. Because the standard of duty herein adopted had not been formulated as the controlling law when this case was tried, we believe the interests of fairness require a remand of the case for a new trial.
Before outlining the factual circumstances of this case, it will be helpful to summarize Colorado's statutory scheme for the care and treatment of mentally ill persons existing at the time of the events in question, since that statutory law provides the backdrop for our resolution of the issue before us.
The declared purposes of Colorado's statutory scheme for the care and treatment of mentally ill persons are the following: to secure such care and treatment as will be suited to the needs of mentally ill patients and to ensure that such care and treatment are skillfully and humanely administered with full respect for the person's dignity and personal integrity; to deprive a person of liberty for purposes of care and treatment only when less restrictive alternatives are unavailable or only when the mental patient's safety or the safety of others is endangered; to provide the fullest measure of privacy, dignity, and other rights to mental patients undergoing care and treatment; and to encourage the use of voluntary rather than coercive measures to secure care and treatment for mental illness. § 27-10-101(1), 11 C.R.S. (1982). A mentally ill person means "a person who is of such mental condition that he is in need of medical supervision, treatment, care, or restraint." § 27-10-102(7), 11 C.R.S. (1982). 1 The term "gravely disabled" means "a condition in which a person, as the result of mental illness, is unable to take care of his basic personal needs or is making irrational or grossly irresponsible decisions concerning his person and lacks the capacity to understand this is so." § 27-10-102(5), 11 C.R.S. (1982).
The statutory scheme provides that when a person appears to be mentally ill and, as the result of such illness, appears to be an imminent danger to others or himself, or appears to be gravely disabled, a "professional person"-- i.e., a person licensed to practice medicine in Colorado or a psychologist certified to practice in this state, § 27-10-102(11), 11 C.R.S. (1982)--may place the person in a designated facility for a seventy-two hour emergency evaluation. § 27-10-105(1)(a), 11 C.R.S. (1982). 2 After the evaluation, the detained person may be certified for not more than three months of short-term treatment under the following conditions:
(a) The professional staff of the agency or facility providing seventy-two-hour treatment and evaluation has analyzed the person's condition and has found the person is mentally ill and, as a result of mental illness, a danger to others or to himself or gravely disabled.
(b) The person has been advised of the availability of, but has not accepted, voluntary treatment; but, if reasonable grounds exist to believe that the person will not remain in a voluntary treatment program, his acceptance of voluntary treatment shall not preclude certification.
(c) The facility which will provide short-term treatment has been designated or approved by the executive director [of the Department of Institutions] to provide such treatment.
§ 27-10-107(1), 11 C.R.S. (1982).
Upon the filing of a certification for short-term treatment, the court must forthwith appoint an attorney to represent the mentally ill person, and the attorney may request the court to review the certification. § 27-10-107(5) and (6), 11 C.R.S. (1982). When a certification review is requested, the court is required to conduct a hearing and determine whether the person or facility seeking to detain the person establishes by clear and convincing evidence that such person is mentally ill and as a result of mental illness constitutes a danger to himself or others or is gravely disabled. § 27-10-111(1), 11 C.R.S. (1982). If a psychiatrist in charge of the evaluation and treatment of an involuntarily committed mental patient believes that a period longer than three months is necessary for treatment of the patient, the psychiatrist is required to file with the court an extended certification for treatment for a period of not more than three months. § 27-10-108, 11 C.R.S. (1982). The mental patient is entitled to a hearing on the extended certification under the same conditions as an original certification. Id.
When a mentally ill person has received short-term treatment for five consecutive months, the psychiatrist in charge of the evaluation and treatment may file a petition with the court for long-term care and treatment under the following conditions:
(a) The professional staff of the agency or facility providing short-term treatment has analyzed the respondent's [i.e., patient's] condition and has found that the [patient] is mentally ill and, as a result of mental illness, a danger to others or to himself or gravely disabled.
(b) The [patient] has been advised of the availability of, but has not accepted, voluntary treatment; but, if reasonable grounds exist to believe that the [patient] will not remain in a voluntary treatment program, his acceptance of voluntary treatment shall not preclude an order pursuant to this section.
(c) The facility which will provide long-term care and treatment has been designated or approved by the executive director [of the Department of Institutions] to provide such care and treatment.
§ 27-10-109(1), 11 C.R.S. (1982). Every petition for long-term care and treatment must include a request for a hearing before the court prior to the expiration of six months from the date of original certification. § 27-10-109(2), 11 C.R.S. (1982). Within ten days after the receipt of the petition, the patient or his attorney may obtain a jury trial by filing a written request with the court. § 27-10-109(3), 11 C.R.S. (1982). If the jury or court determines that the patient has already received treatment for five consecutive months and is still mentally ill and as a result thereof is a danger to others or himself or is gravely disabled, the court is authorized to issue an order of long-term care and treatment for a term not to exceed six months. § 27-10-109(4), 11 C.R.S. (1982). An order for long-term care and treatment expires upon the date specified therein unless further extensions for six month periods are sought and authorized based on the fact that the patient continues to be mentally ill and, as a result of the illness, continues to be a danger to others or himself or continues to be gravely disabled. § 27-10-109(5), 11 C.R.S. (1982).
A person receiving treatment pursuant to a short-term or long-term certification is entitled to "medical and psychiatric care and treatment suited to meet his individual needs and delivered in such a way as to keep him in the least restrictive environment possible." § 27-10-116(1)(a), 11 C.R.S. (1982). Whenever in the opinion of the psychiatrist in charge of treatment the patient "has received sufficient benefit from such treatment for him to leave," the psychiatrist may terminate an original certification for short-term treatment or a certification for extended short-term treatment and may also terminate an order for long-term care and treatment. § 27-10-110(1), 11 C.R.S. (1982). When a certification or extended certification is terminated, the psychiatrist in charge of treatment is required to notify the court in writing within five days of such termination. Id. In the case of a mentally ill person who is...
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