Perrell v. FinanceAmerica Corp., s. 82-2113
Decision Date | 01 February 1984 |
Docket Number | 82-2155,Nos. 82-2113,s. 82-2113 |
Citation | 726 F.2d 654 |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
Parties | 33 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1728, 33 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 34,128 Carroll J. PERRELL, Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, v. FINANCEAMERICA CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee. |
Walter L. Reardon, Jr., Albuquerque, N.M. (James K. Hansen, Albuquerque, N.M., with him on the brief), of Walter L. Reardon, Jr., P.A., Albuquerque, N.M., for plaintiff-appellee/cross-appellant.
John A. Mitchell, Santa Fe, N.M. (Leonard S. Katz and Jonathan Morse, Santa Fe, N.M., with him on the brief) of Mitchell, Alley & Rubin, Santa Fe, N.M., for defendant-appellant/cross-appellee.
Before SETH, Chief Judge, McKAY, Circuit Judge, and BOHANON, Senior District Judge. *
Plaintiff, Carroll J. Perrell, brought this action pursuant to the provisions of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 621 et seq. (hereinafter ADEA). Suing his employer FinanceAmerica Corporation (hereinafter FinanceAmerica), Mr. Perrell alleged that he was subjected to age discrimination that resulted in an employment alternative of accepting a demotion or being discharged by the employer.
Upon trial to a jury a verdict was returned for Mr. Perrell awarding damages for lost wages, pain and suffering, incidental expenses and liquidated damages in the total amount of $268,069.
FinanceAmerica appeals. Although the appellant raises numerous allegations of error, only two address fundamental error given the facts of this case. First, FinanceAmerica claims that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the standard of proof to be used in determining liability under the ADEA; and second, it is claimed that the district court erred in allowing the awarding of "compensatory damages" (i.e. pain and suffering) in an ADEA action.
In charging the jury on the standard of proof required of the plaintiff to prevail in an ADEA action, the trial court gave the following instruction:
(emphasis added)
This "made a difference" language has been addressed by other courts, and some have found it to be lacking in its statement of the applicable law. In Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir.1979) the court made the following comment:
600 F.2d at 1019. 1 See also Golomb v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 688 F.2d 547 (7th Cir.1982).
However, other courts have found the "made a difference" formulation to constitute a satisfactory explanation of the applicable law. See Kelly v. American Standard, Inc., 640 F.2d 974, 984 (9th Cir.1981); Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 317 (6th Cir.1975).
Upon examination of the language, we would generally agree with the court in Bentley v. Stromberg-Carlson Corp., 638 F.2d 9, 11 (2nd Cir.1981) that we see "no significant difference between the ... [made a difference] formulation and the 'determining factor' charge enunciated in Loeb ...." As we have stated before, no particular form of words is essential if the instruction as a whole conveys the correct statement of the applicable law. Brandt v. French, 638 F.2d 209 (10th Cir.1981). While the Loeb formulation is to be strongly preferred due to its lack of ambiguity, the "made a difference" formulation is not inherently infirm.
The essence of the correct formulation of the standard of proof is that it requires the jury to focus on the effect of the factor of age. The jury must understand that it is not enough that age discrimination figure in the decision to demote or discharge; age must "make a difference" between termination and retention of the employee in the sense that, "but for" the factor of age discrimination, the employee would not have been adversely affected. Cancellier v. Federated Dept. Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1316 (9th Cir.1982).
However, the instruction used in this case did not clearly articulate the essence of the law. To find for the defendant-employer under the instruction given in this case, the jury was required to determine that age was not a reason and that it made no difference. This formulation was more than ambiguous in that a jury member might infer that if age were any factor the defendant could not prevail. This, as noted above, is erroneous and could communicate the particular impression that must be specifically dispelled when charging the jury as to the ADEA standard of proof.
The standard of proof formulation is key to the understanding of liability under the ADEA. Thus, the erroneous instruction given in this case relates to the substantial rights of the defendant below. This error requires reversal unless this court can determine that the error was not prejudicial. McCandless v. United States, 298 U.S. 342, 56 S.Ct. 764, 80 L.Ed. 1205 (1936); see also Fillippon v. Albion View State Co., 250 U.S. 76, 39 S.Ct. 435, 63 L.Ed. 853 (1919).
In the trial below, the employer FinanceAmerica offered extensive evidence, if believed by the jury,...
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