Perrin v. Perrin
Decision Date | 08 February 1957 |
Citation | 201 Tenn. 354,299 S.W.2d 19,5 McCanless 354 |
Parties | , 201 Tenn. 354 Mrs. Bessie PERRIN v. R. C. PERRIN. |
Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Grover N. McCormick, Memphis, for petitioner.
Jack Norman, Nashville, for respondent.
This suit had its origin in the Chancery Court of Shelby County by a bill of Mrs. Bessie Perrin wherein she alleged that the defendant had 'abandoned her and turned her out of doors and refused and neglected to provide for her'. The prayer of the bill was for 'separate maintenance and support' and for general relief. The defendant filed an answer denying all material allegations of the bill, and, by cross bill, alleged many aggravating incidents on the part of the complainant and prayed for a divorce on the ground of cruel and inhuman treatment. Complainant filed an answer denying every charge in the cross bill.
The cause was heard by Hon. John E. Swepston, who was at that time Chancellor. He dismissed the cross bill without prejudice and sustained the complainant's suit for separate maintenance, awarding her $75 per month 'until further orders of the court'. She was permitted to occupy the residence which was owned by her and Mr. Perrin as tenants in common. The defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals; that court affirmed the Chancellor and remanded the cause for further proceedings.
Since the filing of the original bill 22 years ago the complainant has been paid the $75 per month as provided by the original decree with the exception of approximately two months when he was in arrears in the amount of $137.50. This sum, however, was later satisfied. During this long period of time the parties have litigated their differences, the defendant seeking an absolute divorce, while the complainant insisted upon the status quo.
The defendant contended that the complainant constantly refused to be reconciled and would not compose their differences. The complainant has insisted without equivocation that the defendant left her without cause; that she opposed a divorce and would welcome his return to her.
On April 27, 1943, the defendant filed a petition in the original cause, 'No. 40787', in which he recited all prior proceedings. It was headed, or entitled, 'Petition of Defendant to Make Divorce Absolute'. It charged that he and Mrs. Perrin had been separated for more than eight years, during which time 'they had rarely seen each other' and had not lived together as man and wife, and there was no chance of a reconcilation. It was his contention that Mrs. Perrin's suit for separate support and maintenance should be sustained as a suit for an absolute divorce. The petition prayed for subpoena to issue and answer thereto and that complainant (Mrs. Perrin) be given an absolute divorce. In answering this petition cross-petitioner makes the following contention:
On July 23, 1943, an order was entered dismissing the petition. In the course of his opinion the Chancellor held: '* * * it is the opinion of the court that upon said pleadings the court is without jurisdiction to entertain said petition or grant any relief prayed for therein.' An appeal was prayed and granted but it was never perfected.
Finally on May 4, 1953, which was approximately ten years after the dismissal of the foregoing petition, the defendant, Rufus C. Perrin, in the capacity of complainant filed an original bill against Mrs. Bessie Perrin in which he recited everything that had taken place in the original cause (Case No. 40787). He charged that when Mrs. Perrin filed her original bill she stated to him that 'she never intended to live with him again'; that he had sought on numerous occasions 'to iron out their differences' without avail. He charged desertion for more than two whole years, etc. Code 1932, Section 8426. On August 31, 1953, Mrs. Perrin filed a demurrer and a special plea of res adjudicata and reiterated again all steps that had been taken in Cause No. 40787, including all pleadings and court orders.
This last suit was heard by Hon. Larry Creson as Chancellor who sustained the foregoing plea. He further held that considering that Mrs. Perrin's original suit (Cause No. 40787) was still pending 'she cannot be guilty of desertion.' An appeal was prayed and granted to the Supreme Court but was never perfected. Later on the foregoing bill of Mr. Perrin was dismissed without prejudice.
On February 15, 1954, Mr. Perrin again sought to reopen the question of his right to relief from the marriage bond between himself and his wife. In this petition he charged that he had continued to try and effect a reconcilation which availed nothing. The gravamen of this petition was, as stated therein, either complainant should be awarded a divorce or that his cross-bill in this cause should be reinstated; that the whole case should be reviewed by the court.
Later another petition was filed by Mr. Perrin, as an original bill, reciting all prior proceedings and charging that Mrs. Perrin was guilty of 'desertion'. § 36-801, T.C.A.
On December 15, 1954, Hon. Hamilton Little, Chancellor, etc., heard the case on the entire record and the testimony of the respective litigants, as well as other witnesses. In discussing the merits of the case he found the following facts:
'At the hearing the defendant introduced evidence attempting to show that he had sought a reconciliation with the complainant, but that the complainant had refused a reconciliation, and, in fact, appeared to derive a perverse pleasure from the existence of the present status of the parties under the separate maintenance decree.
(Emphasis ours.)
The cause was appealed to the Court of Appeals and that court, in a divided opinion (Bejach, J., dissenting), reversed the Chancellor on the authority of Lingner v. Lingner, 165 Tenn. 525, 56 S.W.2d 749. In ruling upon this all important question, it was said:
The majority opinion further holds: 'We fully concur with the Opinion of the learned Chancellor in his Decree, denying the defendant the right to have a complete divorce on his behalf on the record made in this case.'
We granted certiorari and filed the following memorandum:
'In presenting oral argument in this case counsel are requested to discuss the following questions:
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State ex rel. Cihlar v. Crawford
...of a nuclear family — a married woman and man with their children, if any. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-3-113(b); Perrin v. Perrin, 201 Tenn. 354, 366, 299 S.W.2d 19, 24 (1957) (noting that marriage is the foundation of the family and society); McCormick v. State, 135 Tenn. 218, 226, 186 S.W. 95......
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Hodge v. Craig
...little debate that the family plays a vital role in our society. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 601 (Tenn.1992); Perrin v. Perrin, 201 Tenn. 354, 366, 299 S.W.2d 19, 24 (1957); Tenn.Code Ann. § 36–3–113(a) (2010). Beginning with the enactment of the Married Women's Emancipation Act in 1913......
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State Ex Rel Cihlar v Crawford, 99-00517
...of a nuclear family - a married woman and man with their children, if any. See Tenn. Code Ann. 36-3-113(b); Perrin v. Perrin, 201 Tenn. 354, 366, 299 S.W.2d 19, 24 (1957) (noting that marriage is the foundation of the family and society); McCormick v. State, 135 Tenn. 218, 226, 186 S.W. 95,......
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Atchley v. Atchley
...there is no common law of divorce. Both grounds for divorce and defenses against divorce actions are statutory. See Perrin v. Perrin, 201 Tenn. 354, 299 S.W.2d 19 (1957); Mount v. Mount, 46 Tenn.App. 30, 326 S.W.2d 493 From the foregoing analysis it appears to this Court that divorce should......