Perrin v. State
| Decision Date | 10 February 1904 |
| Citation | 78 S.W. 930 |
| Parties | PERRIN v. STATE. |
| Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
Appeal from District Court, Fannin County; Ben H. Denton, Judge.
Kenneth Perrin was convicted of manslaughter, and appeals. Reversed.
Jas. H. Lyday, for appellant. J. C. Meade, Dist. Atty., and Howard Martin, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
Appellant was convicted of manslaughter, and his punishment assessed at confinement in the penitentiary for a term of five years. The evidence shows that appellant was fireman at the gin in the town of Honey Grove, Fannin county. Deceased was unloading wood at the edge of the shed, over the furnace, when defendant told him not to pile the wood so high, as he could not reach it. Some words passed between them, which are not made clear by the evidence. Deceased got off his wagon, and defendant started toward the wagon, they meeting about halfway. Deceased struck defendant a blow with his fist, and perhaps a second blow, and turned, and just as he did so defendant struck deceased on the top of the head with a stick about 4½ feet long and an inch and a half in diameter. At the time the blow was struck deceased's back was to defendant. Deceased immediately fell backwards towards defendant in an unconscious condition, in which state he remained about 50 hours, and died from the result of the blow. A short while after the difficulty defendant was arrested. The evidence shows that the parties had been on friendly terms for some months prior to the difficulty, and as far as the record shows there were no antecedent malice or former grudges.
In the third ground of his motion for new trial appellant insists the court erred in giving the following charge: "If you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant with a stick or club, which you find was a deadly weapon or instrument reasonably calculated and likely to produce death by the mode and manner of its use, in a sudden transport of passion aroused by adequate cause, as the same is herein explained, and not in defense of himself against an unlawful attack reasonably producing a rational fear or expectation of death or serious bodily injury, did in Fannin county, Texas, at any time prior to February 18, 1903, unlawfully strike and kill Will Massey, the deceased, as charged in the indictment, you will find defendant guilty of manslaughter," etc. Appellant objected to this charge because it should have submitted the question of intent to kill, which was the crucial point; and, having limited defendant's right to slay and kill to self-defense, the charge was equivalent to and did eliminate this question on a vital point from the consideration of the jury, and was in effect a charge on the weight of the evidence, and left the jury to conclude that in the opinion of the court defendant struck the fatal blow with the intent to kill, and that if the killing was not in self-defense it was necessarily manslaughter, because, the weapon used not being a deadly weapon, defendant could not be convicted of any degree of any felonious homicide, unless it evidently appeared that defendant intended to slay. The charge given is not the law applicable to the facts of this case, as appellant insists, since the statute provides that where a party with a weapon not calculated to kill, in a sudden transport of passion, does kill, he is not guilty of manslaughter, unless the intent to kill evidently appears. This charge would authorize the jury to convict defendant of manslaughter if the facts existed; that is, if defendant, in a sudden transport of passion, struck deceased with a deadly weapon or instrument reasonably calculated and likely to produce death by the mode and manner of its use, and killed the adverse party, then, in that event, he would be guilty of manslaughter. This would be true if he intended to kill, but without this intent he would not be guilty of manslaughter. We think the charge is subject to appellant's criticism.
Appellant also insists that the court erred in frequently and repeatedly defining...
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Connell v. State
...we are referred to Thompson v. State, 24 Tex. App. 383, 6 S. W. 296; Fitch v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. R. 500, 36 S.W. 584; Perrin v. State, 78 S. W. 930, 9 Tex. Ct. Rep. 533. While there are some expressions in the first-named case which appear to favor appellant's contention, yet, when examined......
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Thomson v. State
...that from the manner of the use of said knife it was the evident intention of appellant to take the life of deceased. Perrin v. State, 78 S. W. 930, 9 Tex. Ct. Rep. 533; Posey v. State, 78 S. W. 689, 9 Tex. Ct. Rep. Appellant further insists that the court should have charged on the law of ......
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