Perry v. Bush

• Decision Date: 27 October 1903
• Citation: 46 Fla. 242,35 So. 225
• Parties: PERRY et al. v. BUSH.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

35 So. 225

46 Fla. 242

PERRY et al. v. BUSH.

Florida Supreme Court

October 27, 1903

In Banc. Error to Circuit Court, Columbia County; John F. White Judge.

Action between J. W. Perry and others and Florida V. Bush. From the judgment Perry and others bring error. Motion stricken from the docket.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

1. The appellate court will take judicial notice as to who are the presiding judges of the respective judicial circuits of the state.

2. When an attorney at law is elevated to the bench of any of our circuit courts as the judge thereover presiding, his right to practice law as an attorney, counselor, or advocate in any of the courts of this state, including the Supreme Court becomes suspended, and continues to be suspended so long as he occupies the official position of such circuit judge except, perhaps, in those cases alone wherein he is in propria persona a party in the cause, and in such excepted cases his appearance therein in the courts, if at all, should be to represent and protect his own individual rights exclusively.

COUNSEL T. B. Oliver, for plaintiffs in error.

B. H Palmer, for defendant in error.

OPINION

TAYLOR C.J.

This cause came on for hearing upon a motion made before this court for final judgment, under the provisions of chapter 4922, p. 53, Laws of 1901, in this court against the plaintiffs in error and the sureties upon their supersedeas bond heretofore given on writ of error from this court, the judgment of the circuit court in said cause having heretofore been affirmed here on such writ of error. ^[1] The motion is presented here and signed by B. H. Palmer as attorney for the defendant in error in said cause. The same is resisted here upon the ground, among others, 'because the B. H. Palmer, who signs and presents said motion to the court, is one and the same B. H. Palmer who is judge of the Third Judicial Circuit Court of Florida, and therefore disqualified from the practice of law in any of the courts of this state, or from appearing therein for any client as attorney.'

As this ground of opposition to the motion is in the nature of a plea in abatement thereof, predicated upon reasons that do not touch the merits of the motion itself, and does not involve any of the other grounds of opposition thereto we will consider such ground of opposition alone, without reference to the merits of the motion itself. We are entirely satisfied that the quoted ground of opposition to the motion is well taken. Of the fact that the B. H. Palmer, who, as attorney for the defendant in error, signs and presents such motion here, is the same person that is the present presiding judge of the Third Judicial Circuit of Florida, this court will take judicial notice. We are likewise fully satisfied that when an attorney at law is elevated to the bench of any of our circuit courts as the judge thereover presiding, his right to practice law as an attorney, counselor, or advocate in any of the courts of this state becomes suspended, and continues to be suspended so long as he occupies the official position of such circuit judge, except, perhaps, in those cases alone wherein he is in propria persona a party in the cause, and in such excepted cases his appearance therein in the courts, if at all, should be to represent and protect his own individual rights exclusively. It is true that we have no statute upon our books in express terms forbidding circuit judges from practicing law, but the rights, duties, privileges, and functions of the office of an attorney at law, counselor, or advocate, are so inherently incompatible with the high official functions, duties, powers, discretions, and privileges of a judge of one of our circuit courts, with their vast range of jurisdiction, both original and appellate, that express inhibitory legislation on the subject would seem to be superfluous, and a work of supererogation. Our state is divided into eight judicial circuits, presided over by one circuit judge to each of said circuits, the territory comprising each of them being circumscribed by well-defined metes and bounds. This careful defining of the territory to be presided over by each was not alone for the convenient dispatch of business before the courts, nor alone for the prevention of conflicts in...