Perry v. Eastgreen Realty Co.

• Decision Date: 01 February 1978
• Docket Number: No. 77-276,77-276
• Citation: 53 Ohio St.2d 51,7 O.O. 3d 130,372 N.E.2d 335
• Parties: , 7 O.O.3d 130 PERRY, Appellee, v. EASTGREEN REALTY COMPANY, Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 51

53 Ohio St.2d 51

372 N.E.2d 335, 7 O.O.3d 130

PERRY, Appellee, v. EASTGREEN REALTY COMPANY, Appellant.

No. 77-276.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Feb. 1, 1978.

On September 7, 1973, Rasheed A. Perry, appellee herein, and his family arrived on the premises of the Eastgreen Realty Company, appellant herein, in Reynoldsburg, Ohio, to look for an apartment. After conferring with a representative of appellant, appellee, his wife and his son moved to exit the premises. It was approximately 4:30 p. m.

While appellee and his family were walking in the direction of the setting sun, appellee collided with a glass wall. Appellee struck the wall with the right portion of his forehead, leaving a hole in the glass at least as big as his head; he sustained injuries.

A complaint charging appellant with negligence was filed by appellee on May 3, 1974. After a trial in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County, the jury found the issues in favor of appellee.

Appellant appealed from the judgment of the trial court and, on January 6, 1977, the Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment.

The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.

Harris & Hewitt and William B. Hewitt, Akron, for appellee.

Crabbe, Brown, Jones, Potts & Schmidt, William L. Schmidt and Vincent J. Lodico, Columbus, for appellant.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant agrees that the owner or occupant of a building who invites persons to enter owes them a duty to have the premises in a reasonably safe condition and to warn his invitees of latent or concealed perils of which he has, or reasonably should have, knowledge. However, appellant argues that if an invitee-plaintiff fails to provide evidence showing a peril, and fails also to submit evidence demonstrating that the defendant-owner was aware of this peril, the invitee has failed to present a jury question upon the issue of the owner's negligence.

We disagree with appellant's contention that an invitee must demonstrate that a peril was actually known to the owner of premises. The better view is that once the evidence establishes that a dangerous condition existed, and that it is a condition about which the owner should have known, evidence of actual knowledge on his part is unnecessary.

"The occupier is not an insurer of the safety of invitees, and his duty is only to exercise reasonable care for their protection. But the obligation of reasonable care is a full one, applicable in all respects, and extending to everything that threatens the invitee with an unreasonable risk of harm. The occupier must not only use care not to injure the visitor by negligent activities, and warn him of latent dangers of which the occupier knows, but he must also inspect the premises to discover possible dangerous conditions of which he does not know, and take reasonable precautions to protect the invitee from dangers which are foreseeable from the arrangement or use. The obligation extends to the original construction of the premises, where it results in a dangerous condition." Prosser on Torts (4 Ed.), 392-93 (1971). See, also, Peaster v. William Sikes Post No. 4825 V. F. W. (1966), 113 Ga.App. 211, 147 S.E.2d 686, 687-88; De Weese v. J. C Penney Co. (1956), 5 Utah 2d 116, 297 P.2d 898, 901; Gallagher v. St. Raymond's Roman Catholic Church (1968), 21 N.Y.2d 554, 289 N.Y.S.2d 401, 236 N.E.2d 632, 633-34 (so changing the pre-existing common law as to require outdoor lighting where none had been requisite); F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Bland (1933), 22 Ohio Law Abs. 660, 660-61; 39 Ohio Jurisprudence 2d 586-87, Negligence, Section 64.

We agree with the Court of Appeals in the instant cause that a business owner owes the duty of ordinary and reasonable care for the safety of his business invitees and is required to keep his premises in a reasonably safe condition. The burden of producing sufficient proof that an owner has failed to take safeguards that a reasonable person would take under the same or similar circumstances falls upon the invitee.

Upon our examination of the trial record, we find that appellee testified that he did not see the glass wall in question, even though he was looking directly ahead; that he was "quite certain" that neither furniture nor anything else was positioned in front of the glass wall; that both the outside and inside walls of the immediate surroundings appeared yellow-gold in color; that the glass was devoid of "marks or anything"; and that no draperies were hanging beside the glass. Appellee conceded he knew a wall was present, but said, "I thought it was further than where I hit it * * *." Appellee testified...