Perry v. House of Refuge

• Decision Date: 08 January 1885
• Parties: HOWARD L. PERRY, an Infant, by His Next Friend, Oliver H. Perry, v. THE HOUSE OF REFUGE.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

63 Md. 20

HOWARD L. PERRY, an Infant, by His Next Friend, Oliver H. Perry, v. THE HOUSE OF REFUGE.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

January 8, 1885

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Baltimore County.

The case is stated in the opinion of the court.

The cause was argued before ALVEY, C.J., YELLOTT, MILLER, IRVING RITCHIE and BRYAN, JJ.

Robert Biggs and R. R. Boarman, for the appellant.

William Reynolds, for the appellee.

Yellott J., delivered the opinion of the court.

The appellant instituted an action in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County against the appellee for the recovery of damages, the plaintiff alleging in his declaration that on several occasions he was maliciously assaulted and beaten by the officers and agents of the defendant, a corporation while in the regular course of their employment. It is apparent, from the evidence, that the appellant was beaten by teachers employed in the institution, and sustained serious injury in consequence of such treatment.

The Circuit Court rejected the prayers offered by the plaintiff, and, in conformity with the tenor of a prayer presented by the defendant, instructed the jury that the evidence in the cause was not legally sufficient to support the action. An instruction, thus eradicating the right of action, when brought under review, invokes the determination of questions relative to the responsibility of such corporations in actions of this nature.

With much earnestness of argumentation it has been contended that there can be no proper foundation for this action, because the House of Refuge is, like the Penitentiary of Maryland, an institution constituting a part of the government of the State, and therefore is not civilly liable in its corporate capacity for the tortious acts of its agents employed with a view to the efficient discharge of its public functions. There is, however, a widely perceptible dissimilarity between this corporation and the penitentiary. The latter is under the exclusive control of the government of the State. Its directors are appointed by the executive; its other officers receive their appointments from the directors; are required to give bond, and the remuneration for their services is designated and established by statutory provisions, by which the entire government of the institution is regulated and controlled. On the other hand, the subscribers to the House of Refuge are declared, by the act of incorporation, to be a body politic and corporate, and each subscriber, who pays the required sum, is constituted a member for life.

The conduct of its affairs is entrusted to a board of twenty-four managers, and of this number ten are elected by the members of the association, ten chosen by the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, and four appointed by the Governor of the State. Seven of these managers constitute a quorum for the transaction of business. They are authorized to make by-laws, ordinances and regulations, and to appoint officers, agents and servants, and to designate their duties. The Mayor and City Council are authorized to appropriate any sum of money, not exceeding $25,000, towards defraying the current expenses of the House of Refuge and St. Mary's Industrial School, and pecuniary aid is also received from the treasury of the State.

It does not follow, however, that because a number of the Board of Managers are appointed by the State, and others by the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, that the corporation is thereby converted into a public institution. In this court, and in those of other States, the exposition of principles determining the status of such institutions in this respect has been in an opposite direction. It has been distinctly declared that the appointment of trustees and directors by State or municipal authority, to participate in the management, does not divest these associations of the attributes of private corporations, and clothe them with the immunities and privileges appertaining to public institutions. St. Mary's Industrial School v. Brown, 45 Md. 330; Nelson v. Cushing, 56 Mass. 521.

It has been contended that a corporation cannot be made a defendant in an action of this nature, the remedy being solely against the individual who committed the wrong. Not until a comparatively recent period has the law, in this respect, undergone important mutations. It was for a long time maintained as an undoubted principle that a corporation could neither sue nor be sued in an action of battery, the reason assigned being that a corporation could "neither beat nor be beaten in its body politic." The enlightened jurisprudence of the present age has ignored such metaphysical subtleties, and recognized a rule more in conformity with the modern tendency to respond to the demand for substantial justice in every exigency. It is now a principle, established by numerous adjudications, that if the servant of a corporation aggregate commit an assault by the authority of the corporation, an action of trespass for assault and battery may be maintained against such corporation. And if the assault is committed on behalf of and for the supposed benefit of a corporation, the body politic, by ratifying the act, incurs the responsibility. Moore v. R. R. Co., 4 Gray 465; Hewett v. Swift, 85 Mass. 422.

In the consideration of questions of this nature it must not be forgotten that, in legal contemplation, a corporation is an artificial entity, and can only act through the intervention of its officers or agents. When the agent of an individual acting within the scope of his designated duties, commits a trespass, the principal is constructively present, and by implication authorizes and sanctions the act, and thus incurs the legal responsibility. It is obvious that this principle is necessarily applicable in all suits against bodies politic and corporate. And it is important to advert to another fundamental rule. A corporate body is the mere creature of law, deriving all its powers from the act of incorporation, and existing solely by legal sanction within the limits prescribed by legislative authority. Within its sphere of action it is liable for torts as well as for infractions of contract, but beyond that point the individuals who participated in the pretended corporate acts are personally responsible. Head v....