Perry v. Tweedy

• Decision Date: 17 May 1907
• Citation: 57 S.E. 782,128 Ga. 402
• Parties: PERRY et al. v. TWEEDY.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

57 S.E. 782

128 Ga. 402

PERRY et al. v. TWEEDY.

Supreme Court of Georgia

May 17, 1907

Syllabus by the Court.

In ordinary life insurance, where no power of divestiture or to change the beneficiary is reserved in the policy, the issuance of the policy confers a vested right upon the person so named as beneficiary, and the insured cannot transfer such interest to any other person without the consent of such beneficiary.

Where a man insured his life under a regular life policy, and designated, as the beneficiary to whom the amount of insurance should be paid at his death, his wife, her executors, administrators, or assigns, and she died before the death of the insured, without having made any assignment her interest in the policy was an asset of her estate, and the persons who would be entitled, under the intestate laws to share in the personal estate of such beneficiary at the time of her death would be entitled also to share in the proceeds of the policy upon the death of the insured.

The fact that the policy was not payable until after the death of the insured would not prevent him from being interested in the assets left by the deceased.

Where after the death of the insured, the administrator of his wife, the beneficiary, collected the amount due under two such policies, there having been no children or descendants of children, and the husband having been the sole heir of the wife, and having survived her, his administrators were entitled to recover from her administrator such proceeds, to be distributed as his estate, instead of being distributed among the mother, brothers, and sisters of the beneficiary.

No question is raised as to whether there were any debts of the beneficiary, or whether, upon the collection of the proceeds of the policies by the administrator of the beneficiary, such indebtedness should be paid therefrom before payment of the same to the administrators of the husband.

There is a difference between a certificate of membership in a mutual benefit association and an ordinary life insurance policy in reference to the matters dealt with in the preceding notes; and decisions made in cases arising upon mutual benefit certificates, or by-laws of benefit societies are distinguishable from those arising in regard to ordinary life insurance policies.

Error from Superior Court, Putnam County; H. G. Lewis, Judge.

Action by J. E. Perry and others, as administrators of Mark C Perry, against J. R. Tweedy, as administrator of Augusta Perry, deceased. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiffs bring error. Reversed.

Crum & Jones, for plaintiffs in error.

W. F. Jenkins & Son and Turner & Adams, for defendant in error.

LUMPKIN, J. (after stating the facts).

According to the great weight of authority, in ordinary life insurance, where no power of divestiture or to change the beneficiary is reserved in the policy, the issuance of the policy confers a vested right upon the person so named as beneficiary, and the insured cannot transfer such interest to any other person without the consent of such beneficiary. It has been suggested that this rule may have had its origin in statutory provisions, and that legislative enactments may have had an influence in the development of the doctrine. However this may have been, the doctrine itself has become a prevailing one, regardless of statutes, and in jurisdictions where no such statutes have existed. 3 Am. & Eng. Encyc. Law (2d Ed.) 980 et seq., and notes; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Ireland (Tex. Sup.) 17 S.W. 617, 14 L.R.A. 278; Central Bank of Washington v. Hume, 128 U.S. 195, 9 S.Ct. 41, 32 L.Ed. 370; Hubbard v. Stapp, 32 Ill.App. 541. In Smith v. Head, 75 Ga. 755, it was held that, where a husband made a policy of life insurance payable to his wife at his death, it became her property. In the opinion, Chief Justice Jackson said: "This policy, payable at her husband's death, is her property. The policy is payable to her then. It is as much hers as any other property can be, as any note payable in the future, or any fee in remainder, or any other property not to be used by her till a certain event transpires." See, also, Cason v. Owens, 100 Ga. 142, 144, 28 S.E. 75. A policy of life insurance is a chose in action, even before the death of the insured. Steele v. Gatlin, 115 Ga. 929, 931, 42 S.E. 253.

These policies were on their face payable, upon the death of the insured, to his wife, her executors, administrators, and assigns. If, as just held, she had a vested interest in them upon her death during the lifetime of the insured that vested interest or asset was as much a part of her estate as any other personal property which she may have left. Suppose that she had left a chose in action maturing, or a promissory note payable upon the death of her husband; clearly this would have been a part of her estate, and would have been dealt with as such. The fact that a life insurance policy may be terminated by failure to pay premiums, or on other grounds stated in the contract, in no way affects the principle that it is a chose in action, and as such becomes a part of the estate of the deceased beneficiary. Mr. Joyce, after considering various decisions, states the general rule thus: "If a person designates another as beneficiary under a regular life policy, and the person designated dies before the insured, then, in the absence of anything to the contrary in the contract, the interest in the policy will pass to the...