Person v. District of Columbia
| Decision Date | 17 August 2009 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 06-1995 (RMU). |
| Citation | 642 F.Supp.2d 24 |
| Parties | William PERSON, Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Anthony Graham, Sr., Michael L. Smith, Smith, Graham & Crump, LLC, Largo, MD, for Plaintiff.
Steven J. Anderson, Office of Attorney General for DC, Washington, DC, Perry L. Foreman, Jr., Law Offices of Perry L. Foreman, Jr., Fort Washington, MD, for Defendants.
GRANTING THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA'S PARTIAL MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA'S PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS1
The plaintiff, William Person, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the defendant the District of Columbia2 ("the District") for the alleged deprivation of his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The plaintiff alleges that during the period of his incarceration, the District violated his constitutional rights through its agents' deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, which resulted in the amputation of his leg. The District has filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that the Fourteenth Amendment is not applicable to the District, that the plaintiff cannot show that the alleged denial of medical care was a result of an official District policy and that the plaintiff failed to include indispensable parties in the action. The court concludes that the plaintiff has not demonstrated that a genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to his Eighth Amendment claim and, accordingly, grants the District's motion for partial summary judgment. With respect to the plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claim, the plaintiff concedes that he has not stated a cognizable claim, and the court grants the District's motion to dismiss that claim.
The District conducts an intake medical examination for each new inmate. Def.'s Mot., Ex. 4 at 40-41. During this intake examination, the inmate is seen by a nurse and a physician to determine if further medical attention is necessary. Id., Ex. 4 (Dep. of Jewel Kendall, R.N. ("Kendall Dep.")) at 41. In addition, the inmate is given a copy of the "Inmate Handbook"3 and informed of the "sick call system," which is one method by which an inmate may request medical attention while incarcerated. Id. at 8 & Ex. 3 (Dep. of Paulos Kidane, M.D. ("Kidane Dep.")) at 21-22; Kendall Dep. at 19-20, 65. To request medical attention through the sick call system, an inmate fills out a form setting forth the relevant medical issues. Kidane Dep. at 21-22; Kendall Dep. 19-20. The forms are picked up once a day and a nurse reviews the forms and responds. Kendall Dep. at 44. If the inmate has an urgent medical need, the nurse has the inmate brought to the urgent care area immediately; otherwise the inmate is seen the following day by a nurse in the cell block. Id. at 68.
Another way in which an inmate may receive medical attention is for the inmate to tell an officer of the medical problem. Id. at 19. That officer must then call the infirmary, where a nurse or physician reviews the inmate's chart and determines what action to take. Id. If medical attention is necessary, the inmate is either brought to the hospital or a nurse goes to the jail and accompanies the inmate to the urgent care area. Id. at 42. Should the inmate require urgent medical care, the response time is five to ten minutes. Id.
An additional policy applicable in this case is the District's practice of rescheduling medical appointments if they conflict with court hearings. See Def.'s Reply at 6. The District reschedules the appointments to take place "immediately" after the court date, but typically not on a Saturday or Sunday. Id. The urgent care area, however, is available on the weekends, as evidenced by the plaintiff's utilization of the service on Sunday, November 2, 2003. Id. at 4; Kendall Dep. at 54.
The undisputed facts in this case are as follows. On October 17, 2003, the plaintiff fractured his right leg while descending a set of concrete stairs. Def.'s Mot. at 5; Pl.'s Opp'n at 3. He underwent surgery at the Greater Southeast Community Hospital ("GSCH"), and doctors placed his leg in a cast. Def.'s Mot. at 5; Pl.'s Opp'n at 3. GSCH then released the plaintiff into the custody of the D.C. Department of Corrections, which contracts with the Center for Correctional Health Policies and Studies ("CCHPS") to provide medical care to inmates. Def.'s Mot. at 5-6; Pl.'s Opp'n at 3. Once the plaintiff arrived at the District's jail on October 25, 2003, Dr. Paulos Kidane and Jewel Kendall, a registered nurse, performed an intake medical examination. Def.'s Mot. at 5.
As a result of this intake examination, Kidane ordered that the plaintiff receive pain medication every eight hours. Id. at 11. The plaintiff received his first dosage of pain medication on October 25, 2003, and received it three times a day for the next five days, with two exceptions. Id. at 11-12. The plaintiff states that the pain in his leg worsened from October 25, 2003 until November 2, 2003 and that he repeatedly complained about the pain and the need for medical attention to correctional officers. Id. at 6-7. Each time the officer responding to the plaintiff's request told the plaintiff that he had called for medical care, but that it had not yet arrived. Id. at 7 & Ex. 1 ("Pl.'s Dep.") at 56. The plaintiff indicates that he submitted a form through the sick call system once before his court hearing and that a nurse came and administered 250 milligrams of Tylenol. Pl.'s Dep. at 57.
As a result of the intake examination, Kidane also referred the plaintiff to an orthopedic specialist "to be seen as soon as possible" because he needed "immediate attention." Pl.'s Opp'n at 4; Kidane Dep. at 24, 54. An appointment was set for October 31, 2003. Def.'s Mot. at 12; Pl.'s Opp'n at 4. On the morning of October 31, 2003, however, the plaintiff went to court for a scheduled court appearance and missed his appointment with the orthopedic specialist. Def.'s Mot. at 12; Pl.'s Opp'n at 4. Because the orthopedic appointment conflicted with the court hearing, the appointment was rescheduled for November 6, 2003. Def.'s Mot. at 12. On Sunday, November 2, however, GSCH readmitted the plaintiff after he continued to complain of severe leg pain. Pl.'s Opp'n at 5. The plaintiff subsequently underwent an amputation of his lower leg as it had become gangrenous. Id.
The plaintiff filed a complaint in the D.C. Superior Court on October 13, 2006, alleging medical malpractice by GSCH and Dr. Talaat Maximous, the doctor at GSCH who originally treated the plaintiff, and violations of his constitutional rights by the District and the Department of Corrections. See generally Compl. The case was removed to this court on November 22, 2006. On May 14, 2007, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, retaining the claims asserted in his original complaint, but removing the Department of Corrections as a defendant4 and asserting negligence claims against Defabio, Inc., the management company in charge of the premises where the plaintiff was injured, and Webster B. Trapp, the owner of the premises. See generally Am. Compl. The plaintiff voluntarily dismissed defendant Defabio, Inc. on August 16, 2008, see Notice of Dismissal (Aug. 16, 2008), and voluntarily dismissed defendants GSCH and Maximous on December 3, 2008, see Stipulation of Dismissal (Dec. 3, 2008). Id. at 1-3. The District then filed the instant motion for summary judgment on January 14, 2009, which is now ripe for review. See generally Def.'s Mot. The court now turns to this motion.
The District argues that to the extent the plaintiff's § 1983 claim is premised on a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights, it must be dismissed because the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to states and not to the District. Def.'s Mot. at 16. The plaintiff does not respond to this assertion, see generally Pl.'s Opp'n, and as a result, the court may treat the District's argument as conceded, see Buggs v. Powell, 293 F.Supp.2d 135, 141 (D.D.C.2003) (). Accordingly, the court grants the District's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claim.5 See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499, 74 S.Ct. 693, 98 L.Ed. 884 (1954); Ennis v. Lott, 589 F.Supp.2d 33, 35 n. 2 (D.D.C.2008) (); accord Stoddard v. D.C. Pub. Defender Servs., 535 F.Supp.2d 116, 117 n. 3 (D.D.C.2008) ().
Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Diamond v. Atwood, 43 F.3d 1538, 1540 (D.C.Cir.1995). To determine which facts are "material," a court must look to the...
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