Ennis v. Lott, Civil Action No. 08-0146(HHK).
Citation | 589 F.Supp.2d 33 |
Decision Date | 15 December 2008 |
Docket Number | Civil Action No. 08-0146(HHK). |
Parties | Quenta ENNIS, Plaintiff, v. Bobby LOTT, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Quenta Ennis, Washington, DC, pro se.
Corliss Vaughn Adams, Office of the Attorney General, Washington, DC, for Defendants.
This matter is before the Court on motions to dismiss filed on behalf of the District of Columbia Department of Corrections and Rick Berry.1 For the reasons stated below, the motions will be granted.
At all times relevant to the Complaint, plaintiff was detained at the District of Columbia's Central Detention Facility ("D.C. Jail") awaiting transfer to a facility operated by the Federal Bureau of Prisons. See Compl. ¶ 1. According to plaintiff, on June 15, 2006, he was released from his cell for a 30-minute recreation period, during which he intended to make two telephone calls. See id. ¶¶ 4-5. Before plaintiff could make his second call, defendant "Berry informed [him] that [his] time was up." Id. ¶ 6. Defendant Lott entered the room and "put on a pair of gloves as he was yelling for [plaintiff] to get off the phone." Id. ¶ 7. Defendant Lott then, "without any provocation or purpose[,] approached [plaintiff], hung up the phone, and began grabbing [him] by the neck and choking [him] as he [was] shoving [plaintiff] away from the phone." Id. ¶ 9. Defendant Berry "attempted to intercede by telling Lott to take his hands off [plaintiff] ... [but] made no attempts to either physically stop Lott or contain his continued assault." Id. ¶ 10. Lott "continued his assault on [plaintiff] by continously [sic] punching [him] in the face." Id. ¶ 11. As a result, plaintiff sustained a broken nose, multiple bruises, loosened teeth, and he continues to experience "nasal problems," pain, and headaches. Id. ¶ 15.
Defendant Lott filed a Disciplinary Report charging plaintiff with an assault on staff and lack of cooperation. See Plaintiff's Exhibits in Support of Complaint [Dkt. # 14-2], Ex. C (Disciplinary Report). According to Lott's report, plaintiff threw a soap dish which hit Lott in his chest. See id. An Adjustment Board found plaintiff guilty of both offenses and sanctioned him with placement in administrative segregation and loss of privileges for 30 days. See id. ( ) at 1. According to plaintiff, these disciplinary charges "were only filed after [plaintiff] made his intentions clear that he intended to file grievances against [defendant] Lott and others." Compl. ¶ 19. He further alleged that he was denied a fair hearing before the Adjustment Board, and that its failure to record the disciplinary proceedings violated its own procedures. Id. ¶ 20.
Plaintiff brings this civil rights action against corrections officers Lott and Berry and against the District of Columbia Department of Corrections ("DOC") under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), for alleged violations of rights protected by the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.2 He demands compensatory and punitive damages and declaratory relief.
Defendant Berry is sued in both his official and individual capacities. A suit against a government official in his official capacity "generally represent[s] only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent," such that "an official capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity." Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985). Accordingly, plaintiff's claims against defendant Berry in his official capacity are dismissed. See, e.g., Price v. District of Columbia, 545 F.Supp.2d 89, 95 (D.D.C.2008) ( ). These claims are treated as if they are brought against the District of Columbia directly, and defendant Berry will be dismissed in his official capacity as a party defendant.
With respect to the claims against him in his individual capacity, defendant Berry argues that he is protected by qualified immunity "insofar as his ... conduct dues not violate clearly established rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Defendant Rick Berry's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of his Motion to Dismiss ("Berry Mot. to Dismiss") at 5 ( ). First, defendant Berry argues that the complaint fails to "identify the ... constitutional rights allegedly violated ... with specificity." Id. Second, he argues that his actions were objectively reasonable under the circumstances. Id. at 6.
Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, "government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). Indeed, "qualified immunity protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986). The Supreme Court has "emphasized that qualified immunity questions should be resolved at the earliest possible stage of a litigation." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 n. 6, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). When assessing a qualified immunity defense, the first inquiry a court must make is whether a constitutional right would have been violated on the facts alleged. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001); Barham v. Ramsey, 434 F.3d 565, 572 (D.C.Cir.2006). Only if this question is answered in the affirmative must the federal officer then demonstrate that "a reasonable officer could have believed" that the actions were lawful "in light of clearly established law and the information the ... officer[ ] possessed." Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641, 107 S.Ct. 3034; see Barham, 434 F.3d at 572; Harris v. District of Columbia, 932 F.2d 10, 13 (D.C.Cir.1991) ( ).
According to the Complaint, defendant Berry "did knowingly and intentionally act while under the color of law[] to violate [plaintiff's] Eighth Amendment [r]ight to be free from cruel and unusual punishment by conspiring and allowing [d]efendant Lott to physically assault [him], and further failing to immediately report and later attempting to downplay and cover up the facts as to what had truly occured [sic] before, during, and after the incident." Compl. at 6. In other words, defendant Berry's mere "attempt[] to intercede by telling Lott to take his hands off of [plaintiff], [while making] no attempts to either physically stop Lott or contain his continued assault," id. at 4, violated plaintiff's Eighth Amendment rights. Defendant Berry cannot be held liable for the alleged unconstitutional acts of his fellow correctional officer, however. See Haynesworth v. Miller, 820 F.2d 1245, 1259 (D.C.Cir.1987) (); Arnold v. Moore, 980 F.Supp. 28, 35 (D.D.C.1997) ( ).
Generally, when a plaintiff sues a government agent in his individual capacity and the government agent raises a qualified immunity defense, the plaintiff must overcome the qualified immunity defense in order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Jackson v. Bush, 448 F.Supp.2d 198, 200 (D.D.C.2006). Plaintiff fails to allege facts showing that defendant Berry assaulted plaintiff or otherwise violated plaintiff's constitutional rights. Accordingly, the Court will grant defendant Berry's motion to dismiss.
The DOC moves to dismiss the complaint on the ground that is not a suable entity. See Defendant D.C. Department of Corrections's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint [Dkt. # 8-2] ("Def.'s Mot.") at 5-6. Because DOC is an agency of the District of Columbia government without the power to sue or be sued directly, it argues that "it is not a proper party defendant and dismissal of this lawsuit ... is mandated by statutory law." Id. at 6. Plaintiff counters that the terms "District of Columbia Department of Corrections" and "District of Columbia" are "understood to be synonomous [sic] to the layman." Traverse in Reply to Defendants' Opposition To And Request To Dismiss Claim ("Pl.'s Opp'n to D.C. Mot.") at 6. For this reason, he asks that the District of Columbia should be substituted as the party defendant. Id.
The DOC is not a suable entity. See, e.g., Kundrat v. District of Columbia, 106 F.Supp.2d 1, 5 (D.D.C.2000) (...
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