Perugini v. Berryhill
| Decision Date | 26 June 2017 |
| Docket Number | Case No. CV 16-7694-KK |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of California |
| Parties | JENNIFER PERUGINI, Plaintiff, v. NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. |
Plaintiff Jennifer Perugini ("Plaintiff") seeks review of the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("Commissioner" or "Agency") denying her application for Title II Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB"). The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). For the reasons stated below, the Commissioner's decision is REVERSED and this action is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this Order.
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On November 26, 2013, Plaintiff filed an application for DIB, alleging a disability onset date of August 24, 2007. Administrative Record2 ("AR") at 26, 115-17. Plaintiff's application was denied initially on May 14, 2014. Id. at 65-70. On July 15, 2014, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). Id. at 71. On February 2, 2016, Plaintiff appeared with counsel and testified at a hearing before the assigned ALJ. Id. at 398-416. A vocational expert ("VE") also testified at the hearing. Id. at 416-20. On February 24, 2016, the ALJ issued a decision denying Plaintiff's application for DIB. Id. at 23-37.
On April 22, 2016, Plaintiff filed a request to the Agency's Appeals Council to review the ALJ's decision. Id. at 15-20. On August 15, 2016, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review. Id. at 1-7.
On October 15, 2016, Plaintiff filed the instant action. ECF Docket No. ("Dkt.") 1, Compl. This matter is before the Court on the Parties' Joint Stipulation ("JS"), filed May 31, 2017. Dkt. 20, JS.
Plaintiff was born on September 1, 1959, and her alleged disability onset date is August 24, 2007. AR at 43. She was forty-seven years old on the alleged disability onset date and fifty-six years old at the time of the hearing before the ALJ. Id. Plaintiff completed college and has work experience as a data processing sales representative and project assistant / director. Id. at 401, 417. Plaintiff alleges disability based on tinnitus; migraine headaches; cervical and lumbar discprotrusions; cervical stenosis; Raynaud's disease; fibromyalgia; complex regional pain syndrome; and derangement of the shoulder. Id. at 26.
To qualify for DIB, a claimant must demonstrate a medically determinable physical or mental impairment that prevents her from engaging in substantial gainful activity, and that is expected to result in death or to last for a continuous period of at least twelve months. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 721 (9th Cir. 1998). The impairment must render the claimant incapable of performing the work she previously performed and incapable of performing any other substantial gainful employment that exists in the national economy. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999).
To decide if a claimant is disabled, and therefore entitled to benefits, an ALJ conducts a five-step inquiry. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. The steps are:
See Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098-99; see also Bustamante v. Massanari, 262 F.3d 949, 953-54 (9th Cir. 2001); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b)-(g)(1), 416.920(b)-(g)(1).
The claimant has the burden of proof at steps one through four, and the Commissioner has the burden of proof at step five. Bustamante, 262 F.3d at 953-54. Additionally, the ALJ has an affirmative duty to assist the claimant in developing the record at every step of the inquiry. Id. at 954. If, at step four, the claimant meets her burden of establishing an inability to perform past work, the Commissioner must show that the claimant can perform some other work that exists in "significant numbers" in the national economy, taking into account the claimant's residual functional capacity ("RFC"), age, education, and work experience. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098, 1100; Reddick, 157 F.3d at 721; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g)(1), 416.920(g)(1).
At step one, the ALJ found Plaintiff has not engaged "in substantial gainful activity during the period from her alleged onset date of August 24, 2007, through her date last insured of December 31, 2012." AR at 28.
At step two, the ALJ found Plaintiff "had the following severe impairments: right shoulder impingement syndrome; and degenerative disc disease of the cervical and lumbar spine." Id.
At step three, the ALJ found Plaintiff "did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1." Id. at 29.
The ALJ found Plaintiff had the following RFC:
"to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except for any work involving overhead reaching with the right upper extremity."
Plaintiff presents one disputed issue in the present case: Whether the ALJ properly considered Dr. J. Graham Bray's agreed medical opinion when determining Plaintiff's RFC.
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a district court may review the Commissioner's decision to deny benefits. The ALJ's findings and decision should be upheld if they are free of legal error and supported by substantial evidence based on the record as a whole. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S. Ct. 1420, 28 L. Ed. 2d 842 (1971); Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2007).
"Substantial evidence" is evidence that a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007). It is more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance. Id. To determine whether substantial evidence supports a finding, the reviewing court "must review the administrative record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner's conclusion."Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720 (citation omitted); see also Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1159 (9th Cir. 2012) () (citation omitted). "If the evidence can reasonably support either affirming or reversing," the reviewing court "may not substitute its judgment" for that of the Commissioner. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720-21; see also Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012) ().
The Court may review only the reasons stated by the ALJ in his decision "and may not affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which he did not rely." Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). If the ALJ erred, the error may only be considered harmless if it is "clear from the record" that the error was "inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination." Robbins, 466 F.3d at 885 (citation omitted).
To assess Plaintiff's RFC determination, the ALJ reviewed and summarized the opinions and findings of five of Plaintiff's physicians: (1) Dr. J. Graham Bray, an orthopedist; (2) Dr. Pasquale Montesano, a spine surgeon; (3) Dr. Randy Schaefer, an orthopedist; (4) Dr. John Champlin, a family medicine specialist; and (5) Dr. Daniel Fung, an orthopedist. AR at 31-32. The ALJ additionally reviewed and summarized the opinion of the State Agency medical consultant. Id. at 32.
The ALJ highlighted four of the six medical opinions. First, the ALJ noted "opinions from Dr. Montesano and Dr. Bray in November 2006 and July 2007,respectively precluded [Plaintiff] basically from various physical activities including 'heavy lifting,' under workers' compensation guidelines." Id. at 33. Second, the ALJ observed, in May 2008, Dr. Champlin "restricted [Plaintiff] to lifting of no more than 15 pounds, and no work at or above shoulder height on the right side." Id. Lastly, the ALJ noted the State Agency medical consultant found Plaintiff "could perform medium exertion with limited overhead reaching on the right." Id.
The ALJ prescribed weight to two of the physicians: Dr. Champlin and the State Agency medical consultant. See id. As to Dr. Champlin, the ALJ concluded he was giving "great weight to the opinion of Dr. Champlin, and is construing the 15 pound limit as consistent with light work under Social Security guidelines, which is defined as lifting 10 pounds frequently, and only occasionally lifting items up to 20 pounds." Id. As to the State Agency medical consultant, the ALJ concluded he was giving "great weight to the State Agency medical consultant in this case, who found [Plaintiff] could perform medium...
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