Peste v. Peste
| Decision Date | 23 September 1969 |
| Docket Number | No. 5--40008--11,5--40008--11 |
| Citation | 1 Wn.App. 19,459 P.2d 70 |
| Parties | Helene Joyce PESTE, Appellant, v. Fred G. PESTE, Respondent. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
Owen P. Hughes, of Neal, Bonneville, Hughes & Viert, Tacoma, for appellant.
B. Franklin Heuston, Shelton, for respondent.
This is an action seeking to set aside a property settlement agreement and a part of the divorce decree which confirmed the settlement. The decree was entered by default on May 2, 1958.
This action was commenced by appellant, Helene Joyce Peste, on June 10, 1965. She had been the defendant in the divorce action.
In her complaint plaintiff claims several theories for the equitable relief sought: (1) that the defendant or his attorney had fraudulently misrepresented the value of the community assets; (2) that the defendant had exercised undue influence over her; and (3) that the court was defrauded by the failure of defendant to introduce testimony as to the value of the community assets.
Plaintiff claimed as an alternative theory that if there was not actual fraud proven, the 'wrong' against her, arising from the disproportionate division of the property, gave rise to a constructive trust in her favor.
Defendant denied these allegations of wrongdoing and asserted the statute of limitations (RCW 4.16.080(4)) and laches as a defense.
The trial consumed some 6 days of conflicting testimony concerning the circumstances surrounding the execution of the property settlement agreement and the circumstances leading up to that event. At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law and judgment dismissing the action.
Specifically, the court found that despite the large disparity between the assets received by the defendant as compared to that which plaintiff received in the settlement, there was no fraud or undue influence, and that the agreement 'was entered into by both parties in good faith after their rights had been explained and at a time when all of the material facts were known to both of them.' The trial court also concluded that the disparity in the settlement was not such as would raise a constructive trust and finally, that the action was barred by the statute of limitations.
Plaintiff has assigned as error portions of 10 of the trial court's findings of fact, and the failure of that court to enter 13 of plaintiff's proposed findings. She concedes, however, that her appeal cannot be based upon challenging the trial court's resolution of disputed factual issues, but must be grounded, if at all, in the proposition that a property settlement agreement Must be set aside where the award to the wife is substantially less than the award to the husband, even though no element of wrongdoing has entered into its execution. It is to this issue and the related statute of limitations problem that we focus our attention.
The parties to this action were married on February 6, 1934. At the time of the divorce, May 2, 1958, two of their three daughters were married adults. The youngest, age 18, was a senior in high school.
At this time all of their property was community property. Aside from the home, furnishings, bank accounts, insurance, and automobiles, the principal asset of the community was an undivided one-half interest in a partnership, doing business as Douglas Fir Christmas Tree Company. While the trial court made no finding as to the value of these assets, the defendant conceded by stipulation at the trial that the value of the community interest in the partnership was between $100,000 and $105,000. The other assets would probably have increased this sum to $135,000. The property settlement agreement contained a detailed description of these assets (without values). The plaintiff was awarded her personal effects, certain household furnishings, and a total cash amount of $6,600, payable in installments over 3 years. The defendant was awarded the balance of the community estate.
The trial court, with substantial evidence to support it, found that prior to entering into the agreement, plaintiff was fully knowledgeable of the values of the assets of the marital community, since she had for many years worked in the management of the partnership and personally handled the parties' personal finances. Findings of fact 12, 14.
The trial court further found, with substantial evidence to support it, that prior to the execution of the property settlement agreement and during the pendency of the divorce action, the plaintiff was repeatedly and independently advised by a number of people, '(a) to get her own attorney, (b) that she was entitled to a larger settlement, (c) that she had a right to a one-half interest in the community property, and (d) to take more of the community assets.' Findings of fact 22.
From our detailed review of the record, we are convinced that the trial court was correct in its finding that plaintiff, with knowledge of all the facts, acted 'freely and voluntarily' in entering into the agreement. Even should we disagree with that finding, we are bound by the frequently stated rule that findings of fact made by the trial court cannot be disturbed on appeal if there is substantial evidence to support such findings. Watson v. Yasunaga, 73 Wash.2d 325, 438 P.2d 607 (1968).
The first question for our decision is whether or not a wife may waive substantially all of her community interest upon the dissolution of the marriage where no wrongdoing has occurred to induce such waiver.
In approaching this question, we are mindful of the well-established rule that a wife has a vested property right in the community property equal with that of her husband. Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Powers, 192 Wash. 475, 74 P.2d 27, 114 A.L.R. 531 (1937); In re Estate of McCoy, 189 Wash. 103, 63 P.2d 522 (1937).
We are also mindful that by statute the burden has been placed upon the husband in the transaction now before us, to show the good faith of the transaction. RCW 26.16.210. Yeager v. Yeager, 82 Wash. 271, 144 P. 22 (1914).
Both by statute and Supreme Court decision, the courts are required to carefully scrutinize transactions between spouses because of the confidential relationship existing between them. RCW 26.08.110. The case of In re Estate of Madden, 176 Wash. 51, 53, 28 P.2d 280, (1934) states the rule:
While the common-law disabilities of married women have been removed by statute in this state, the confidential relationship existing between husband and wife is still recognized to exist * * *. In such relationships of confidence, courts of equity examine with great care transactions between the parties and agreements affecting their property rights. The burden, in such cases, is on him seeking to sustain the agreement to prove that it was fair and entered into with full knowledge of the facts by the one reposing confidence.
But these statutes and rules afford us no basis for determining the question here presented, since the defendant husband has, by the trial court's findings, sustained his burden of showing the bona fides of the transaction.
Also, the doctrine of constructive trust, so ably advocated by plaintiff, furnishes us with no basis for our decision.
That doctrine, were we to...
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Jennings v. Jennings, 20839-3-II
...favoring finality in property settlements." Martin v. Martin, 20 Wash.App. 686, 690, 581 P.2d 1085 (1978) (citing Peste v. Peste, 1 Wash.App. 19, 459 P.2d 70 (1969)). In Peste v. Peste, we said, "To permit collateral attacks upon divorce proceedings without any more than a showing of a disp......
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Marriage of Olsen, Matter of
...or incapacity involved in the basic agreement. See In re Marriage of Cohn, 18 Wash.App. 502, 569 P.2d 79 (1977); Peste v. Peste, 1 Wash.App. 19, 459 P.2d 70 (1969). Both parties were represented by counsel and there was consideration on each side to support a Petitioner argues that the cont......
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Carpenter v. Carpenter, 1
...to Everson and Van Loan. .... There is a compelling policy interest favoring the finality of property settlements. Peste v. Peste, 1 Wash.App. 19, 459 P.2d 70 (1969). This policy interest would be greatly undermined if the court were to create the potential for reexamination of every milita......
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Estate of Lindsay, Matter of
...relinquishment of a known right, or such conduct as warrants an inference of the relinquishment of such right." Peste v. Peste, 1 Wash.App. 19, 24, 459 P.2d 70 (1969) (quoting Bowman v. Webster, 44 Wash.2d 667, 669, 269 P.2d 960 (1954)); Mid-Town Ltd. Partnership v. Preston, 69 Wash.App. 22......
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§64.03 Vacation of Decrees (Cr 60)
...Marriage of Burkey, 36 Wn. App. 487. The policy reasons favoring the finality of divorce settlements were set forth in Peste v. Peste, 1 Wn. App. 19, 25, 459 P.2d 70 (1969): "To permit collateral attacks upon divorce proceedings without any more than a showing of a disparity in the award, w......
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Chapter A. Restrictions On Property Subject to Succession
...280 (1934). 44 Lee v. Lee, 27 Wn.2d 389, 178 P.2d 296 (1947). 45 Tausick v. Tausick, 52 Wash. 301, 100 P. 757 (1909); Peste v. Peste, 1 Wn. App. 19, 459 P.2d 70 46 RCW 26.16.210. 47 RCW 26.09.070(3); Nancy C. Phelps, Comment, Antenuptial and Postnuptial Contracts in Washington, 54 Wash. L. ......
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Table of Cases
.... . . .28.05[10] Pesta; State v., 87 Wn. App. 515, 942 P.2d 1013 (1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24.04[3][b]; 50.02[2] Peste v. Peste, 1 Wn. App. 19, 459 P.2d 70 (1969) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64.03[5] Petelle, In re Estate of, 8 Wn. App.2d 714, 440 P.3d 1026 (2019) . .......
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Table of Cases
...Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 101 Wn.2d 795, 684 P.2d 1281 (1984): 282 Perry v. Wetzel, 122 Wash. 129, 210 P. 362 (1922): 91, 112 Peste v. Peste, 1 Wn. App. 19, 459 P.2d 70 (1969): 248 Peters' Estate, In re, 43 Wn.2d 846, 264 P.2d 1109 (1953): 66, 98, 106, 109, 166, 167 Peterson, In re Estate of, 102 ......