Peterman v. Pataki, 2004 NY Slip Op 51092(U) (NY 6/25/2004)
| Decision Date | 25 June 2004 |
| Docket Number | 99-0520. |
| Citation | 2004 NY Slip Op 51092(U) |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | SCOTT PETERMAN, UPSTATE CITIZENS FOR EQUALITY, INC and PERSONS AND ENTITIES SIMILARLY SITUATED, v. GEORGE PATAKI, Governor of the State of New York, |
Leon Koziol, Esq [Utica, New York] for Plaintiff.
Eliot L. Spitzer, Attorney General of the State of New York, Robert Siegfried, Assistant Attorney General, of Counsel [Albany] for Defendants, State of New York.
Peter D. Carmen, Mackenzie Hughes, LLP [Syracuse] William W. Taylor, III, Michael R. Smith and Elizabeth Taylor, Zuckerman Spaeder, LLP [Washington, D.C.] [Admitted pro-hac vice] for Oneida Indian Nation of New York and Ray Halbritter.
The above-referenced matter is before this court pursuant to [1] Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment [New York Civil Practice Law and Rules § 3212, and [2] the Oneida Indian Nation of New York's [herein after Nation] cross-motion for leave to renew [New York Civil Practice Law and Rules § 2221[e]]. Oral argument was heard by the court on April 22, 2004, after which, on May 6, 2004, counsel for the Nation "supplemented" its initial motion. Final submissions were received on May 22, 2004, after which decision was reserved. Having reviewed the submissions of the parties and the Nation, for the reasons set forth below, this court makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
Findings of Fact:
As more fully set forth in this court's previous Letter Decisions, the instant action finds it genesis in the 1993 Compact entered into between the Nation and the defendant, State of New York. Plaintiffs challenge the authority of then Governor Mario Cuomo to execute a compact with the defendant, Oneida Indian Nation of New York to operate gambling casinos within the State of New York under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988 [25 U.S.C. § 2701, et seq.]. In essence, the plaintiffs argue that then Governor Cuomo lacked the authority to enter into the compact without legislative approval, and that the compact contravenes public policy against class III gaming activity.
Following a conditional dismissal of the instant action by Justice Murad, this court, by Letter Decision dated October 24, 2001 granted plaintiffs' motion for leave to file second amended complaint, and denied the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment as premature.1 On December 20, 2001 this court signed an Order consistent with its letter decision. The Order was filed and entered in the Oneida County Clerk's office on January 24, 2002. On the same date, plaintiffs filed their second amended complaint. Following entry of the order and service of the second amended complaint,, the Oneida Indian Nation of New York moved for leave to renew and reargue this court's January 24, 2002 order, the State of New York moved to dismiss plaintiffs' second amended complaint and plaintiffs, Scott Peterman, Upstate cross moved for summary judgment.
By Letter Decision dated May 23, 2002, the court granted the Nation's motion for leave to renew/and or reargue, and based upon a review of the record before it, adhered to its original decision, denied the State of New York's motion to dismiss and denied plaintiffs' cross motion for summary judgment as premature2. Following entry of this Courts' August 14, 2002 Order, the State of New York appealed this court's decision to the Appellate Division, Fourth Department. In December of 2003, the State of New York withdrew its appeal, and the instant motion and cross motions were brought.
By Notice of Motion dated February 9, 2004, plaintiffs moved for summary judgment arguing that:
The high court [New York Court of Appeals] has rendered a decision on the validity of a 1993 compact entered into between the Mohawk Tribe and New York State, finding that the purported transaction violated the separation of powers doctrine. As relevant here, it found that the compact was illegal, by virtue of its lack of legislative authorization. The governor cannot bind the state to such a compact, and notwithstanding the various positions claiming constructive ratification, the [Court of Appeals] handed down a decision substantially consistent with the reasoning of most high courts in other states that have addressed the question.
[Plaintiffs' Counsel's Affirmation in Support of Summary Judgment at ¶ 20]. In sum and substance, plaintiffs argue with respect to their first cause of action that, under the doctrine of stare decisis, this court is bound to follow the New York Court of Appeal's Decision in Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce, Inc. v. Pataki, 100 N.Y.2d 801 (2003), and to find the compact invalid3.
Defendants, in opposition to the instant motion for summary judgment, in essence concede the applicability of the decision in Saratoga Chamber of Commerce, supra, with respect to the plaintiffs' first cause of action. This concession, however, is not the end of the court's analysis.
On April 19, 2004, three days before the scheduled return date, the Nation entered: "...special appearance for the limited purpose of contesting the jurisdiction of the court, and specifically to renew the nation's motion to dismiss the Complaint on the grounds of Tribal sovereign immunity." [April 18, 2004 Notice of Special Appearance]. The Nation's motion for leave to renew is predicated on two arguments:
First, the ruling of the Court of Appeals in Saratoga Chamber of Commerce v. Pataki, 100 N.Y.2d 801, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 570 (2003), establishes that this litigation affects significant interests of the nation. Consequently, this Court's decision to the contrary must be reconsidered. Second, the ruling in Saratoga has altered the interests this court considered in ruling that the litigation could proceed in the tribe's absence. There is now no compelling interest in addressing a significant issue of state law. The potential prejudice to the nation, however, is even greater than it was prior to the ruling in Saratoga, because it is now clear that the State cannot and will not adequately protect the Nation's interest. The State's refusal to present a meritorious laches defense on behalf of the Nation is illustrative of this conflict.
[Nation's Memorandum of Law at p.2].
Following oral argument on April 22, 2004, counsel for the Oneida Nation submitted a Supplemental Affirmation, raising for the first time an argument that the instant action should be dismissed insofar as there no longer exists a justiciable controversy. The affirmation is predicated on an argument that insofar as the parties agree there is no genuine dispute, and thus no justiciable controversy the court is required to dismiss the instant action. In opposition to the supplemental affirmation, the State defendants argue:
...The Oneidas now urge that the state and the plaintiffs entered into an agreement regarding the separation of powers issue resolved in the Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce case, which effectively prejudiced the interests of the Oneidas. There was never any `agreement' made between the State and the plaintiffs.
As the record demonstrates, the State conceded that under the principal of stare decisis [so in original], this court was bound to follow the Court of Appeal's determination in Saratoga on the separation of powers question pertaining to the Governor's authority to enter into the 1992 Compact with the Oneidas without legislative authority [citation omitted]. The State also concedes that the application of the Saratoga decision to the instant matter would result in a declaration that the Governor violated State separation of powers law when he entered into the compact with the Oneidas in 1993, and consistent with the ruling in Saratoga, the Compact was void and unenforceable under State law.
[May 17, 2004 Letter from Assistant Attorney General Robert A. Siegfried].
In light of the foregoing, this court turns its attention to the substantive issues before it.
Conclusions of Law:
A. Motion for Leave to Renew, Oneida Indian Nation of New York's [New York Civil Practice Law and Rules § 2221[e]:
As set forth in the Nation's counsel's affirmation in support of its motion for leave to renew, the Nation's argument is limited to "... the grounds of tribal sovereign immunity and the indispensability of the Nation as a party to the case."[Affirmation of Peter D. Carmen in Support of the Nation's Motion for Leave to Renew at ¶ 2]. As more fully set forth above, the Nation's position is predicated upon an argument that the Court of Appeal's decision in Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce, supra, establishes that a significant interest of the Nation will be effected, and second that the State, as a result of the decision, will no longer act to protect the interests of the Nation in this action.
New York Civil Practice Law and Rules § 2221[e] provides:
(e) A motion for leave to renew:
1. shall be identified specifically as such;
2. shall be based upon new facts not offered on the prior motion that would change the prior determination or shall demonstrate that there has been a change in the law that would change the prior determination; and
3. shall contain reasonable justification for the failure to present such facts on the prior motion.
N.Y.Civ. Prac. L.&R. § 2221[e] (McKinney 1993) [emphasis added]. Upon review of the papers submitted by the Nation, this Court grants leave to renew.
Turning to the merits, in its two previous Letter Decisions and resultant Orders, this court held that the Nation is not an indispensable party, as defined by New York Civil Practice Law and Rules §1101. In reviewing the decision of the Court of Appeals in Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce, supra, this court does not find, as the Nation argues, that the decision announced a change in the law sufficient to change the court's prior determination. In holding that the Mohawk tribe was not an indispensable party in the...
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