Peters v. Casualty Co. of America

• Decision Date: 17 April 1918
• Docket Number: 14555.
• Citation: 101 Wash. 208,172 P. 220
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: PETERS v. CASUALTY CO. OF AMERICA.

172 P. 220

101 Wash. 208

PETERS v. CASUALTY CO. OF AMERICA.

No. 14555.

Supreme Court of Washington

April 17, 1918

Department 1. Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Boyd J. Tallman Judge.

Action by David Peters against one Schwartz and wife and the Casualty Company of America. Verdict and judgment against the Casualty Company, and it appeals. Affirmed.

Bradford Allison & Egan and Henry S. Noon, all of Seattle, for appellant.

MacKinnon & Schooley, E. H. Guie, and J. A. Guie, all of Seattle, for respondent.

PARKER J.

This action was commenced by the plaintiff, Peters, against the defendants, Schwartz and wife and the Casualty Company seeking recovery of damages claimed to have been suffered by him through the negligence of Schwartz, acting by his agent in the operation of his automobile for hire in the city of Seattle. The Casualty Company was made a defendant because it had executed a bond as surety with Schwartz as principal in pursuance of chapter 57, Laws 1915 (section 5562-37 and following of Remington's Code), relating to motor vehicles as passenger carriers in cities of the first class, so that, in so far as the action is against the Casualty Company it is an action upon the bond. Trial in the superior court for King county sitting with a jury resulted in verdict and judgment against the Casualty Company in the sum of $1,875, from which it has appealed to this court.

It is contended in appellant's behalf that there was a failure of proof of ownership of the car in Schwartz at the time respondent was injured by its operation, and that appellant had been released from the obligation of its bond because Schwartz had then sold the car, which was then being operated by another person. The bond upon which recovery is sought was executed and filed in the office of the secretary of state on April 24, 1916, and thereupon a permit was issued under chapter 57, Laws 1915, to Schwartz to operate his car for hire in the city of Seattle. Schwartz had theretofore received his license for this car for the year 1916, the license number being 36388, which is the number specified in the bond as descriptive of the car. Thereafter, on May 25, 1916, Schwartz executed a contract of sale for the car, and thereafter other contracts were executed, all purporting to transfer the title of the car to other persons. While there are some circumstances shown in the record which suggest that Schwartz had at all times retained some interest in the car, we shall assume, for argument's sake, that as between him and subsequent purchasers under these contracts he parted with all interest in it. The license number plates for the year 1916 issued to Schwartz and placed upon the car by him were never removed by him or any other person during that year, and the automobile was continued to be operated for hire under that number. Indeed, it seems highly probable that the number plates were left on the car in pursuance of the understanding of all the parties to these contracts of sale. So that, in so far as the license number plates and the license and bond records of the state relating to the operation of automobiles for hire are concerned, the public was, in effect, advised that the car belonged to Schwartz and was being operated by him for hire. The car was being so operated for hire in the city of Seattle on June 27, 1916, when respondent was injured, as he claims, by the negligence of its driver, at the intersection of Spring street and Third avenue. Section 13, at page 391, c. 142, Laws 1915 (section 5562-13, Rem. Code) reads in part as follows:

'Upon the sale of any motor vehicle the delivery thereof shall not be deemed to have been made until the vendor shall have removed his number plates therefrom. * * *'

This provision of the general motor vehicle law and the facts above noticed, we conclude, answers the contention made in appellant's behalf that there was no proof of the ownership of the car by...