Peters v. City of Medford

• Decision Date: 30 October 1936
• Citation: 4 N.E.2d 338,295 Mass. 588
• Parties: PETERS v. CITY OF MEDFORD.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

295 Mass. 588

4 N.E.2d 338

PETERS v. CITY OF MEDFORD.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

October 30, 1936

Exceptions from Superior Court, Middlesex County; Williams, Judge.

Action of contract by Lewis H. Peters against the City of Medford. On plaintiff's exceptions to findings of Superior Court for defendant.

Exceptions overruled.

F Juggins and L. H. Peters, both of Boston, for plaintiff.

J. E Howard, City Sol., of Medford, and P. Mondello, Asst. City Sol., of Boston, for defendant.

CROSBY, Justice.

This is an action brought to recover for legal services rendered the licensing board of the defendant. Agreed facts were in substance as follows: In March or April, 1933, the members of the licensing board of the defendant were appointed by John H. Burke, the mayor of the defendant city, under the provisions of St.1933, c. 120 which is entitled ‘ An Act authorizing and regulating the manufacture transportation and sale of wines and malt beverages.’ The same persons were reappointed by the same mayor December 6, 1933, under the provisions of St. 1933 (Ex.Sess.) c. 376, Burke went out of office as mayor on or about January 1, 1934, and John J. Irwin succeeded him. On April 18, 1934, Irwin wrote to each of the members of the licensing board that he was on that date removed from office in accordance with an opinion rendered by the city solicitor of the defendant city on the ground stated that the members of the board were not appointed in accordance with the General Laws and the city charter. After receipt of these letters the members of the licensing board engaged the plaintiff to represent the board and the members thereof. In accordance therewith the plaintiff appeared in an equity session of the Superior Court, and, as a result of that appearance, a judge of that court revoked without prejudice the order of the mayor removing said members of the licensing board of the city as contained in the letters signed by the mayor and above referred to. Thereafter the board of aldermen purported to issue victuallers' licenses to several applicants, and intended to consider an application for a license for the sale of alcoholic beverages. The licensing authorities again engaged the plaintiff to represent them. The plaintiff again appeared in an equity session of the Superior Court and, after hearings, a report was made by a judge of that court in which it was recited that the plaintiffs in that suit constituted the license board of the defendant city, ‘ having been appointed under the provisions of law, and that the Board of Aldermen for said city have purported to issue victuallers' licenses to several applicants, and intended to consider an application for a license for the sale of alcoholic beverages.’ The judge ruled ‘ that the plaintiffs are the duly organized and proper Board to issue licenses to victuallers and for the sale of Alcoholic beverages in the said City * * * and that the defendants are without authority in such matters. * * *'

In December, 1934, the plaintiff submitted bills for his services in the two proceedings, and the amount of his compensation in each proceeding as agreed between him and the licensing board was $900 in the first and $600 in the second. No appropriation was contained in the 1934 budget for these bills. The licensing authorities forwarded the bills with their approval indorsed thereon to the mayor of the defendant city; later they included a provision for $1,500, the amount of the two bills, in their estimated budget for the year 1935. Thereafter the mayor submitted the full city budget and the item of $1,500 or any part thereof, as requested by the licensing authorities, was not included in the appropriations recommended by the mayor.‘ At no time prior to 1935 did the Licensing Authorities have an...