Peters v. Dulien Steel Products, 31611
| Decision Date | 17 January 1952 |
| Docket Number | No. 31611,31611 |
| Citation | 39 Wn.2d 889,239 P.2d 1055 |
| Parties | PETERS et al. v. DULIEN STEEL PRODUCTS, Inc. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Robbins & Robbins, Seattle, Imus & Marsh, Kelso, for appellant.
John F. McCarthy and McCoy, Purcell & Elliott, all of Longview, for respondents.
This is an appeal from a judgment entered upon the verdict of a jury.
Appellant owned three steel vessels which it had acquired from the maritime commission. On November 27, 1946, appellant sold the hulls of the three vessels, then partially dismantled, to respondents for the sum of $7,500. Respondents agreed to pay the Port of Kalama the monthly rental of $750 for dock facilities while the hulls were being scrapped, and all expenses of the dismantling. Appellant agreed to buy all of the steel resulting from the dismantling of the ships for nine dollars per gross ton. This price was subject to adjustment.
The preceding portions of the agreement were in writing. Respondents claim that the parties also orally agreed that the non-ferrous materials obtained from the vessels were to be sold to the appellant at market price, and that appellant was to account for and pay to respondents the proceeds of those sales, less costs, in addition to the agreed payments for the steel. Appellant denies this claim.
Respondents commenced to cut up one of the hulls about December 1, 1946. On February 3, 1947, appellant agreed to raise the rate for steel from nine dollars to ten dollars a ton. On March 28, 1947, appellant took over the work, claiming that the monies it had then advanced to respondents were so far in excess of the value of shipments of scrap that it would make no further advances. Respondents contend they were prevented from doing anything under the contract after that date.
Respondents claim damages for breach of contract upon three causes of action: (1) that they had removed and placed in a warehouse on the dock, when appellant took over the operation, certain nonferrous material of the value of $10,595, for which they were not paid; (2) that they were not paid for the nonferrous material shipped to appellant prior to March 28, 1947, of the value of $15,000; and (3) that they had sustained a loss of profits because they were not permitted to complete the work.
We will first consider appellant's claim that the trial court erred in not granting appellant's motion to strike respondents' demand for a jury trial.
It is appellant's contention that, from the pleadings, the case is one of equitable cognizance because an accounting is involved, and that it was error to deny its motion to strike respondents' demand for a jury. The respondents' allegation that appellant was to render them an accounting of all materials, showing the amount and value thereof, was denied in the answer. Other provisions of the contract were also in issue. Judge Howard J. Atwell, one of the judges of Cowlitz county, ruled on this question. We agree with his ruling that these causes of action are legal in their nature. In essence, they are actions at law for the recovery of the purchase price of certain material under a contract, the terms of which are disputed, and for damages for breach of contract. A trial by jury cannot be denied merely because the questions of fact are complicated or involve figures which are difficult to carry in mind. If the action is one purely legal in its essence and nature, the parties have a right to a trial by jury. Gatudy v, Acme Construction Co., 1938, 196 Wash. 562, 83 P.2d 889.
On the merits, appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict, and that the trial court erred in not granting its motion for judgment for appellant notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial.
The law of the case was settled by the instructions, to which no exception was taken. Our examination of the facts, as they appear from the eight-hundred-page statement of facts, brings us to the conclusion that there was sufficient evidence to justify submission of the case to the jury on all issues, but that there was not sufficient evidence to support the amount of the verdict. As is sometimes the case, we have a better opportunity than does the trial judge to review a question of this nature, particularly in a case like this...
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State v. Hoffman
... ... art. 1, § 21. Peters v. Dulien Steel Prods., Inc, 39 Wash.2d 889, 239 P.2d 1055 ... ...
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Allard v. Pacific Nat. Bank
...a jury trial exists where the action is purely legal in nature. Brown, 94 Wash.2d at 365, 617 P.2d 704; Peters v. Dulien Steel Prods., Inc., 39 Wash.2d 889, 891, 239 P.2d 1055 (1952). Where the action is purely equitable in nature, however, there is no right to a trial by jury. Brown, 94 Wa......
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Durrah v. Wright
...trial court deemed a jury impractical because of the difficulty in crafting jury instructions. But see Peters v. Dulien Steel Prods., Inc., 39 Wash.2d 889, 891, 239 P.2d 1055 (1952) ("trial by jury cannot be denied merely because the questions of fact are complicated or involve figures whic......
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Allchin v. Normandy on the Heights Homeowners Association, No. 33758-4-II (WA 4/4/2006)
...315 (1941). Conversely, there is no right to a jury trial where the action is purely equitable in nature. Peters v. Dulien Steel Prods., Inc., 39 Wn.2d 889, 239 P.2d 1055 (1952); Dexter Horton Bldg. Co. v. King County, 10 Wn.2d 186, 116 P.2d 507 (1941); Knudsen v. Patton, 26 Wn. App. 134, 1......