Peters v. General Motors Corp.

• Decision Date: 17 January 2006
• Docket Number: No. WD 62807.,WD 62807.
• Citation: 200 S.W.3d 1
• Parties: Randall D. PETERS, Personal Representative of the Estate of Constance Marie Peters, Deceased, Respondent, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION; Appellant Moffett's Auto Works, Inc., Defendant.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 1

200 S.W.3d 1

Randall D. PETERS, Personal Representative of the Estate of Constance Marie Peters, Deceased, Respondent, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION; Appellant Moffett's Auto Works, Inc., Defendant.

No. WD 62807.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

January 17, 2006.

Application for Transfer to Supreme Court Denied February 28, 2006.

Application for Transfer Sustained May 2, 2006.

Case Retransferred September 26, 2006.

Court of Appeals Opinion Redopted October 2, 2006.

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Turner, Reid, Duncan, Loomer & Patton, P.C., Rodney E. Loomer, Elizabeth D. Badger and Nancy Dixon, Kansas City, Wallace S. Squibb, Springfield, Bryan Cave LLP, Ann K. Covington, James F. Bennett, St. Louis, Bingham McCutchen LLP, Frank M. Hinman, Thomas S. Hixson, Lee G. Sullivan, Renee M. DuPree, San Francisco, CA, for appellant.

Mark J. Evans and Bradley D. Kuhlman, Evans & Kuhlman, Kansas City, Michael W. Blanton, Lee's Summit, Edward D. Robertson, Bartimus, Frickleton, Robertson & Obetz, Jefferson City, Mary D. Winter, Anthony L. Dewitt, Jefferson City, Robert L. Langdon, James K. Emison, Kevin D. Stanley and Robert C. Sullivan, Lexington, for respondent.

Before VICTOR HOWARD, P.J., HAROLD L. LOWENSTEIN, ROBERT G. ULRICH, PAUL M. SPINDEN, JAMES M. SMART, THOMAS H. NEWTON, RONALD R. HOLLIGER, LISA WHITE HARDWICK, J.J., FOREST HANNA, GENE MARTIN, and JOHN MORAN, Sr. J.J.¹

ROBERT G. ULRICH, Judge.

General Motors Corporation (GM) appeals from the judgment for Respondent, Randall Peters, in his individual capacity for his claim of loss of consortium and as next friend for his wife, Constance Peters, on her products liability claims for damages, actual and punitive, as a result of an accident involving the Peters' GM manufactured 1993 Oldsmobile Cutlass (the Cutlass), which left Mrs. Peters in a persistent vegetative state. Mr. Peters filed a four-count petition seeking damages for Mrs. Peters' personal injuries and his loss of consortium, alleging three separate theories of liability: (1) strict products liability—defective design; (2) strict products liability—failure to warn; and (3) negligence. The claims asserted that the cruise control located on the Peters' vehicle was defectively designed and dangerous, that GM knew it was dangerous and failed to warn, and that it caused Mrs. Peters' injuries. Mr. Peters presented expert testimony to prove defective design. Because no witnesses could be found of the accident, he also relied on circumstantial evidence to deduce that Mrs. Peters did not errantly apply the accelerator pedal and that the cruise control device on the vehicle malfunctioned and caused the accident.

GM responded that the three-mode cruise control system was not defectively designed, but even if it were, absolutely no evidence was presented to prove that the Cutlass' cruise control malfunctioned to cause the Cutlass to accelerate, as post accident inspections undisputedly showed that the system appeared to be working properly, and no residual evidence existed that demonstrated the mechanism had malfunctioned. According to GM, because no evidence was presented, direct or circumstantial, that suggested any sort of malfunction in the Cutlass, the likely cause of Mrs. Peters' accident was her inadvertent application of the accelerator pedal.

At the close of Mr. Peters' evidence, and again at the close of all the evidence, GM moved for directed verdict. The trial court, however, denied both motions. All three theories of liability alleged by Mr. Peters were submitted to the jury: (1) products liability—defective design; (2) products liability—failure to warn; and (3) negligence, and the jury returned its verdict, awarding $20,000,000 in compensatory damages on behalf of Mrs. Peters and $10,000,000 in compensatory damages to Mr. Peters' in his individual capacity and assessing GM $50,000,000 in punitive damages. The trial court accepted the jury's verdict and entered judgment thereon. On February 6, 2003, GM filed its motion for JNOV; and alternatively for a new trial, remittitur, and to amend the judgment, which the trial court subsequently denied. This appeal followed.

GM asserts ten points on appeal. In Points I and II, it claims that the trial court erred in overruling its motion for directed verdict at the close of all the evidence because the evidence presented was insufficient to present a submissible case as to all three theories of liability submitted to the jury. In Points III and IV, GM claims that the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence at trial; while in Point V, it claims that the trial court erred in excluding certain evidence it sought to introduce at trial. In Points VI-X, GM advocates several claims concerning the damages awarded, which include a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support an award of punitive damages, and alternative assertions for remitter.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On the morning of September 6, 2000, Mrs. Peters was involved in a single vehicle accident as the Peters' 1993, eight-year-old GM manufactured Cutlass automobile traveled 118 feet in reverse from the driveway of the Peters' residence across the street to the front of the house, sideswiped a tree in the neighbor's front yard while traveling about 22-25 miles per hour, and continued to travel in reverse back across the street for 95 feet into the Peters' front yard where the two left tires scaled a yard landscape timber slightly less than a foot high, and where the vehicle ultimately stopped with only the left front tire over the timber. Mr. Peters heard a noise and immediately exited the family residence, observed the vehicle and his wife, called 911, and attempted to comfort her. She was lying unconscious with her upper torso across the front passenger seat. The engine of the vehicle was idling.

GM does not contest that Mrs. Peters sustained severe injuries when the vehicle sideswiped the neighbor's tree or that she was rendered unconscious when that occurred.² Mrs. Peters suffered seven cranial fractures and severe brain injury, and her left arm was amputated at the forearm. Her brain injuries left her in a persistent vegetative state.

No witnesses observed the accident or the events that immediately followed before Mr. Peters observed the vehicle with the left front wheel in the planter in his front yard. The vehicle was parked in the driveway near the garage door overnight, and Mrs. Peters' apparent intent was to exit the driveway to enter the street in front of the Peters' residence and proceed to her employment as a schoolteacher.

After the event, the parties employed experts to inspect the Cutlass. The Cutlass appeared to be in proper working order. No physical evidence was discovered of any sort of mechanical or electrical malfunction, including the cruise control mechanism. The vehicle had been driven 75,000 miles without cruise control incident or malfunction.

On March 5, 2001, Mr. Peters filed his four-count petition seeking damages for Mrs. Peters' injuries and his loss of consortium. In Count I, he sought recovery on Mrs. Peters' behalf against GM on a strict products liability theory as authorized by section 537.760,³ alleging, inter alia, that: (1) the cruise control system installed in the Cutlass was defectively designed in that it had a propensity to cause sudden and unwanted acceleration, and (2) GM failed to warn of the resulting danger. In Count II, again on Mrs. Peters' behalf, he sought recovery against GM on a negligence theory, alleging, inter alia, that GM breached the duty of care owed to Mrs. Peters by: (1) designing a defective and dangerous cruise control system, which was installed in the Cutlass; and (2) failing to warn of the resulting danger. In Count III, which was dismissed before trial as a result of a settlement agreement, Mr. Peters sought recovery against Moffett's Auto Works, an auto shop that had performed repair work on the Cutlass' electrical system. And, in Count IV, Mr. Peters asserted his loss of consortium predicated by Mrs. Peters' injuries as pled in Counts I and II.

No witnesses observed the vehicle traverse any part of the journey, and circumstantial evidence was presented to prove that the cruise control mechanism malfunctioned and caused the accident. GM conceded during the trial on at least four occasions that the vehicle's acceleration and Mrs. Peters' injuries were caused by one of two options: (1) the accelerator pedal was applied by Mrs. Peters (referred to during trial as pedal error) or by an object pressed against it (referred to as pedal misapplication during trial), or (2) the cruise control on the vehicle malfunctioned resulting in its activation without driver input and the car's acceleration. Mr. Peters' opening statement to the jury included, "Was it Connie Peters' foot or was it the cruise control that caused the accident? It was either her foot . . . or it was the cruise control."

GM'S CLAIMED ERRORS

Points III and IV regarding the admissibility of certain evidence introduced by Mr. Peters at trial are first considered because their resolution has some bearing on Points I and II. Therefore, Points III and IV are addressed before GM's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence as to all three theories of liability submitted to the jury, expressed in Points I and II, is considered. Point V regarding the exclusion of certain evidence is discussed next. Finally, Point VII regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to submit punitive damages is discussed.

I. Introduction of testimony of seven witnesses of other similar incidents as evidence of defective design and customer complaints as evidence of notice of dangerous instrumentality

In Point IV, GM claims that the trial court erred in allowing a total of seven witnesses to testify about their experiences of sudden unwanted vehicular acceleration...