Peters v. Hospital Authority of Elbert County
Decision Date | 29 June 1995 |
Docket Number | No. S95Q0414,S95Q0414 |
Citation | 265 Ga. 487,458 S.E.2d 628 |
Parties | PETERS et al. v. HOSPITAL AUTHORITY OF ELBERT COUNTY, Georgia et al. |
Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
William S. Stone, Thomas E. Sasser, III, William S. Stone, P.C., Blakely, Stephen C. Carter, Stephen C. Carter, P.C., Hartwell, for Peters.
Gregg E. McDougal, Joseph H. Huff, Knox & Zacks, P.C., Augusta, for Hospital Authority of Elbert County.
Mary E. Wyckoff, American Civ. Liberties Union, Atlanta, amicus curiae.
After Mrs. Peters delivered a stillborn child at Elbert Memorial Hospital, she and her husband, residents of South Carolina, filed suit against the hospital authority and various medical personnel in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia, seeking to recover damages for, among other things, prenatal injuries allegedly inflicted upon the fetus by the defendants, as well as for the pain and suffering of the fetus. Applying Georgia law to the diversity action (see 28 U.S.C. § 1652), the district court dismissed the claims the Peterses brought as the representatives of the stillborn child, ruling that Georgia law did not recognize the causes of action they were asserting. When the Peterses appealed the district court's order to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, that court determined that the dispositive question of law had not been resolved in any Georgia state court, and certified the following question to this court for resolution:
Can a parent state a cause of action on behalf of a stillborn child for damages arising from prenatal injuries to the child? In essence, does a stillborn child have a right to recover for injuries sustained while inside the womb?
We answer the question in the negative.
1. OCGA § 51-1-9 authorizes "[e]very person" against whom a tort is committed to recover therefor, and OCGA § 9-2-41 provides that a cause of action for the recovery of damages for personal injury is not abated by the death of a party. Invoking § 9-2-41, the Peterses wish to pursue, as the representatives of the stillborn child, causes of action which they contend the stillborn child was entitled to pursue under § 51-1-9. The heart of the Peterses' position is that the stillborn child had a cause of action against the alleged tortfeasors, despite not having been born alive. The question before us is whether live birth is a necessary prerequisite to the maintenance of an action by the victim of a tort.
Since 1951, Georgia law has recognized that a child born after sustaining a tortious prenatal injury may bring an action to recover damages for the injury sustained. Tucker v. Howard L. Carmichael & Sons, Inc., 208 Ga. 201(1), 65 S.E.2d 909 (1951). See also Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d 727 (1956); Fallaw v. Hobbs, 113 Ga.App. 181, 147 S.E.2d 517 (1966). These cases implicitly held that the live birth of the allegedly injured fetus was a prerequisite to the child's maintenance of the suit. It has been recognized that the parent of a stillborn child is statutorily entitled to recover the full value of the life of the stillborn (Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga.App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100 (1955); see also Shirley v. Bacon, 154 Ga.App. 203, 267 S.E.2d 809 (1980)), but no Georgia appellate court has ever held that the stillborn child has a cause of...
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