Peters v. Saft

• Decision Date: 18 September 1991
• Docket Number: KEN-91-68,Nos. 5925,s. 5925
• Citation: 597 A.2d 50
• Parties: Edward PETERS v. Scott SAFT, et al.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 50

597 A.2d 50

Edward PETERS v. Scott SAFT, et al.

Nos. 5925, KEN-91-68

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued June 20, 1991.

Decided Sept. 18, 1991.

John A. McArdle (orally), Mark L. Randall, Daniel G. Lilley, P.A., Portland, for plaintiff.

Michael E. Carpenter, Atty. Gen., Peter J. Brann (orally), Asst. Atty. Gen., Augusta, for intervenor.

Catherine R. Connors, Pierce, Atwood, Scribner, Allen, Smith & Lancaster, Portland, for amicus curiae, Trial Lawyers Ass'n.

Jonathan S. Piper, Jill M.P. Allen, Preti, Flaherty, Beliveau & Pachios, Portland, for amicus curiae, St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co.

James M. Bowie (orally), Elizabeth G. Knox, Thompson & Bowie, Portland, for defendants Saft and Powell.

Mark G. Lavoie, Margaret Cushing, Norman, Hanson & Detroy, Portland, for defendant Whitmore.

Before McKUSICK, C.J., and ROBERTS, WATHEN, GLASSMAN, CLIFFORD and COLLINS, JJ.

WATHEN, Justice.

Defendants Scott Saft, Kershaw Powell, Richard Whitmore, and the State, intervening as a defendant, appeal the decision and order of the Superior Court (Kennebec County, Alexander, J.) on plaintiff Edward Peters' declaratory judgment action. Defendants challenge the court's determination that the damage cap included in Maine's Liquor Liability Act, 28-A M.R.S.A. §§ 2501-2519 (1988), violates both the state and federal equal protection clause. Plaintiff seeks to reinforce the court's ruling by arguing that the offending provision also violates his right of due process, his right to trial by jury and his right to a remedy under the "open courts" provision of the Maine Constitution. By cross-appeal, plaintiff challenges the court's determination that other provisions of the Act are constitutional. Specifically, plaintiff challenges the fact that the Act excludes all other remedies, abolishes joint liability and requires a notice of claim. Finding no basis for declaring any portion of the Act unconstitutional, we vacate the judgment of the Superior Court and deny the cross-appeal.

Plaintiff brought an action against Saft, Powell and Whitmore, alleging that he attended a party held at the home of Powell and hosted by Saft. He alleges that while at the party, he was pushed into the shallow end of a swimming pool by Whitmore and received a serious spinal cord injury. Plaintiff alleges that Saft was a server of alcohol within the meaning of the Liquor Liability Act, that Powell knew that alcohol would be served, and that Saft negligently served Whitmore alcohol when Whitmore was visibly intoxicated. He sought actual and punitive damages for negligence, liability under the Act, battery and negligent failure to provide prompt medical care. A separate count of plaintiff's complaint challenged the constitutionality of the Act on a number of grounds and sought a declaration that portions of the Act are unconstitutional. The State intervened to defend the constitutionality of the Act and, after hearing, the Superior Court determined that the damage cap set forth in 28-A M.R.S.A § 2509 violated equal protection. Rejecting plaintiff's other challenges to the constitutionality of the statute, the court directed the entry of a final judgment pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 54(b) and defendants and the State appealed.

I

In 1987, Maine enacted the Liquor Liability Act setting forth an exclusive remedy for persons injured as the result of negligent or reckless service of liquor by a licensee or any person providing liquor to another. 28-A M.R.S.A. §§ 2501-2519. Damages under the Act are limited as follows:

In actions for damages permitted by this Act, the claim for and award of damages for all losses, except expenses for medical care and treatment, including devices and aids, against both a server and the server's employees and agents, may not exceed $250,000 for any and all claims arising out of a single accident or occurrence.

28-A M.R.S.A. § 2509. The Superior Court determined that section 2509 violated equal protection because

the special preferences which the damage cap gives to liquor servers, compared to all other private citizens, and the special handicap which the damage cap imposes on victims of negligent liquor servers, compared to victims of all other private negligence, involve discrimination which has no rational basis in relation to the stated goals of the legislation or any other legitimate legislative purpose stated or unstated.

We conclude that the court misapplied the "rational basis" standard.

In considering an equal protection challenge ¹ to a statute, we have said:

It is clear that governmental efforts to alleviate social and economic problems may draw constitutionally sound distinctions among beneficiaries if the dissimilar treatment is rationally related to the objectives of those efforts. The party challenging the classification bears the burden of demonstrating by clear and irrefutable evidence its arbitrariness and irrationally discriminatory nature. Further, the law will be upheld if there exists any conceivable state of facts which justifies the distinction. Thus, even if the classification lacks mathematical precision, the law survives constitutional scrutiny unless there exists no conceivable set of facts which prevents the characterization [of the classification] ... as arbitrary, invidious or irrational.

Beaulieu v. City of Lewiston, 440 A.2d 334, 338-39 (Me.1982) (citations omitted) (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original); see Danish Health Club, Inc. v. Town of Kittery, 562 A.2d 663, 665-66 (Me.1989); Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230, 101 S.Ct. 1074, 1080, 67 L.Ed.2d 186 (1981). Faced with an equal protection challenge to a statutory classification that does not impinge on fundamental rights or draw distinctions on a suspect basis such as race, color, creed or national origin, the test is to determine if there is a rational basis for the classification that furthers a legitimate governmental aim. "Whether the enactment is wise or not, and whether it is the best means to achieve the desired result are matters for the Legislature and not the court." State v. Fantastic Fair & Karmil Merchandising Corp., 158 Me. 450, 467, 186 A.2d 352 (1961) (quoting Baxter v. Waterville Sewerage District, 146 Me. 211, 214, 79 A.2d 585 (1951)).

The purposes of the Liquor Liability Act are outlined as follows:

1. Primary legislative purpose. The primary legislative purpose of this Act is to prevent intoxication-related injuries, deaths and other damages among the State's population.

2. Secondary purposes. The secondary legislative purposes are to:

A. Establish a legal basis for obtaining compensation for those suffering damages as a result of intoxication-related incidents in accordance with this Act;

B. Allocate the liability for payment of damages fairly among those responsible for the damages, which will encourage liquor liability insurance availability; and

C. Encourage all servers of alcohol to exercise responsible serving practices.

28-A M.R.S.A. § 2502. To achieve these ends, the legislature provided a remedy against a server of alcohol for injuries sustained as a result of the actions of a person who was visibly intoxicated when served. In order to distribute the risk fairly and moderate the cost of liability insurance, the legislature placed a cap on any recovery for non-medical damages. See generally Report of a study by the Joint Standing Committee on Legal Affairs, The Dram Shop Act & Liquor Liability Law in Maine (1986). Because the statutory classifications are not suspect and because the pursuit of a negligence claim is not a fundamental right, Maine Medical Center v. Cote, 577 A.2d 1173, 1177 (Me.1990), the sole question is whether the Act bears some rational relationship to the stated governmental end.

Plaintiff's argument and the opinion of the Superior Court proceed on the premise that under common law principles of negligence, a server of alcohol was fully responsible to third persons injured by the person served. Accordingly, plaintiff argues that it is irrational to seek the stated goal of preventing "intoxication-related injuries, deaths and other damages" by diminishing the liability incurred by serving alcohol. Plaintiff asks how injuries will be reduced by increasing the legal protection afforded to those who serve alcohol. The flaw in plaintiff's argument lies in the premise. We have never ruled on the common law liability of an alcohol server to third persons. But cf. Klingerman v. Sol Corp. of Me., 505 A.2d 474 (Me.1986) (vacating the dismissal of a negligence complaint brought against an alcohol server by the estate of a deceased who died of alcohol poisoning). See Comment, From "Maine Law" to Model Act: Liquor Liability in Maine, 39 Me.L.Rev. 149 (1987). Accordingly, the legislature could reasonably have concluded that the liability of the server in such circumstances was at least uncertain. The establishment of an unquestioned basis for legal liability, even though including only a limited recovery, could rationally be thought to provide a more effective incentive for the responsible service of liquor and the realization of the primary legislative purpose. In short, the relationship between the means and the goal is rational and does not result in a denial of equal protection under either the state or federal constitution.

Plaintiff next argues that the ruling of the Superior Court can be upheld on alternative grounds. We find no merit in plaintiff's contentions concerning due process (U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1) (Me. Const. art. I § 6-A), the right to trial by jury (Me. Const. art. I § 20), or the right to a remedy (Me. Const. art. I § 19). The object of the statute bears a rational relationship to the health, safety and welfare of the general public. The means employed are appropriate to the achievement of the ends sought. The manner of exercising the power is not unduly arbitrary or capricious. Thus, there is no violation of due process. See Danish Health Club, Inc., ...