Peters v. State
Citation | 636 A.2d 340,161 Vt. 582 |
Decision Date | 19 November 1993 |
Docket Number | No. 93-004,93-004 |
Parties | Donna PETERS, et al. v. STATE of Vermont. |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of Vermont |
Before GIBSON, DOOLEY, MORSE and JOHNSON, JJ.
Lawrence Peters died as the result of an accident on Route 125 in East Middlebury, Vermont, on February 3, 1988. His widow, on behalf of herself, the estate, and the minor children, brought a wrongful death action against the State of Vermont, alleging that the State was negligent in the placement of warning signs on the highway. She claimed that the State waived immunity for the negligence under 12 V.S.A. § 5601(a) * of the Vermont Tort Claims Act.
The State moved for summary judgment on the ground that placement of warning signs on state highways is a uniquely governmental function for which no private analog exists, and therefore, there was no waiver of sovereign immunity. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment for the State. Plaintiff moved for reconsideration, which the court denied, and this appeal followed. We reverse.
In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, we use the same standard as that used by the trial court. Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. V.R.C.P. 56(c); State v. Delaney, 157 Vt. 247, 252, 598 A.2d 138, 141 (1991). Here, the State conceded, for purposes of its motion, that it was negligent in the placement of warning signs on Route 125 and that this negligence caused the death of Lawrence Peters. The issue on appeal, therefore, is whether the State was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Plaintiff contends that the facts conceded by the State are comparable to situations where a private citizen may be sued, and therefore, a private analog does exist. We agree. In LaShay v. Department of Social & Rehabilitation Services, 160 Vt. 60, ---, 625 A.2d 224, 229 (1993), we held that the Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services (SRS) was not immune from liability for negligently placing and supervising a child in foster care. We found that private individuals or entities may also place and supervise children in foster care, and may be liable for negligence "comparable" to that asserted by the plaintiff; therefore, a "comparable" cause of action could be brought against SRS. Id.; see also Denis Bail Bonds, Inc. v. State, 159 Vt. 481, ---, 622 A.2d 495, 498 (1993) ().
In the present case, too, a private analog exists where plaintiff's claim against the State is comparable to recognized causes of action that may be brought against private persons who own or control roads. See Department of Hwys. & Pub. Transp. v. Bacon, 754 S.W.2d 279, 281 (Tex.Ct.App.1988) ( ); cf. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 342 comment d, illustration 2 (1965) (where A owns road and invites B to drive on that road, A liable for failure to warn B of dangerous condition); id. § 367 ( ); Reider v. City of Spring Lake Park, 480 N.W.2d 662, 667 (Minn.Ct.App.1992) ( ); Ridge v. Grimes, 53 N.C.App. 619, 281 S.E.2d 448, 450 (1981) ( ); Wolfe v. Union Pacific R.R., 230 Or. 119, 368 P.2d 622, 625 (1962) ( ); Baran v. Pagnotti Enterprises, Inc., 402 Pa.Super. 298, 586 A.2d 978, 983 (1991) ( ).
The State contends that its immunity is waived only if a private individual would be liable under the "same circumstances," pointing out that the use of the word "same" in Vermont's statute constitutes a "critical distinction" from the Federal Tort Claims Act. Compare 12 V.S.A. § 5601(a) with 28 U.S.C.A. § 2674 . In this case, according to the State, the "same circumstances" would require that a private individual negligently place a warning sign on a state road. Since the duty to erect appropriate signs on state roads is conferred on the Agency of Transportation only, 19 V.S.A. § 10(7), private individuals have no...
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