Peters v. Texas Instruments Inc.
| Decision Date | 30 September 2011 |
| Docket Number | C.A.No. 10C-06-043 JRJ |
| Parties | Christopher Peters, by his father and next friend Grady Peters, and Grady Peters and Rosetta Peters Individually, Plaintiffs, v. Texas Instruments Incorporated, Defendant. |
| Court | Delaware Superior Court |
Upon Defendant Texas Instruments Incorporated's
Motion to Dismiss: GRANTED
Ian C. Bifferato, Esquire, David W. deBruin, Esquire, Kevin G. Collins, Esquire,
John Z. Haupt, Esquire, Richard S. Gebelein, Esquire, Bifferato, LLC,
pre hac vice, Waters & Kraus, LLP, 3219 McKinney Ave., Dallas, Texas
75204, attorneys for the plaintiffs.
Katharine L. Mayer, Esquire, McCarter & English, LLP,
Wilmington, Delaware, 19899, Mary A. Wells,pro hac vice,
Marilyn S. Chappell, Esq. (argued), pro hac vice, Wells, Anderson & Race, LLC,
attorneys for the defendant.
Defendant, Texas Instruments Incorporated ("T.I."), has filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that all of the plaintiffs' claims are barred by the exclusivity provision of the Texas Workers' Compensation Act.1
Plaintiffs allege that while employed at T.I.'s Texas Facilities, Grady Peters was exposed to "hazardous, genotoxic, and reproductively toxic substances"2 which caused an insult to his reproductive system. Plaintiffs allege that Grady's exposure occurred "prior to and at the time of the conception and gestation of his son, Christopher Peters . . . ."3 Christopher Peters was born with birth defects, including retinoblastoma.4 According to plaintiffs, as a result of T.I.'s wrongful conduct, Christopher's injuries "were caused or contributed to by Plaintiff Grady Peters' exposure."5
There is no dispute that Texas law, not Delaware law, applies to the issues involved in this motion. T.I. argues that because all of the plaintiffs' claims "stem from an alleged workplace injury to Grady," i.e., contamination or alteration of hissemen through exposure to toxic substances, recovery under workers' compensation benefits is the exclusive remedy.6 In opposition, plaintiffs argue that T.I. has failed to make a showing that it is protected by the "Texas workers' compensation regime," and plaintiffs' claims are not derivative. 7 For those reasons, plaintiffs assert these claims are not barred by the exclusivity provision of the Texas Workers' Compensation Act.8
In its Reply Brief,9 T.I. argues that: (1) Grady's claim would have been the basis for a workers' compensation claim had it been timely asserted, and all of the Plaintiffs' claims derive from Grady's alleged workplace exposure, therefore, these claims are barred; and (2) plaintiffs' claim for preconception tort liability is not recognized under Texas law.10 For the reasons that follow, T.I.'s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.
Christopher Peters was born on June 11, 1995 with severe birth defects, including retinoblastoma.11 As a result of the retinoblastoma, Christopher had to have his eye removed and is partially blind. 12 Grady Peters is Christopher's father, and Rosetta Peters is his mother. Christopher, Grady, and Rosetta ("Plaintiffs") reside in the State of Texas.13 Plaintiffs claim that Christopher's numerous birth defects were proximately caused or contributed to by Grady's exposure to hazardous, genotoxic, and reproductively toxic substances, pollutants or contaminates released into the environment from T.I. facilities in Texas where Grady was employed from approximately 1980 until 1997.14
According to plaintiffs, T.I. utilized hazardous toxic chemicals or substances in "clean rooms," used for manufacturing semiconductor computer "wafers," "chips" and "boards."15 Grady was allegedly exposed to these harmful chemicals while performing duties associated with the "clean rooms."16 Grady was required to use these chemicals in the "clean rooms" and elsewhere in T.I.'s facilities.17
Plaintiffs allege that T.I. failed to utilize proper measures to prevent its
workers from being exposed to these harmful chemicals. 18 No ventilation system was used to protect workers like Grady in the "clean rooms" from inhalation or skin exposure to the chemicals that were being used.19 As a result, the chemicals recirculated and remained in the air."20 Also, any "protective" gear worn by employees only served to protect the "chips" from particles on the employees' clothing and bodies. 21 Contrary to its name, the protective gear provided no protection to the employees.22
Grady claims that prior to and at the time of his son's conception he was exposed to some or all of the following chemicals and substances: (a) Ethylene glycol ethers, (b) Propoylene glycol ethers, (c) Positive Photoresist systems, (d) Fluorine compounds, (e) Chlorinated compounds, (f) Radio frequency radiation and ionizing radiation, (g) Arsenic compounds, (h) Volatile organic degreasing and cleaning solvents, (i) Organic solvents, and (j) Epoxy resign based glues.23 Plaintiffs further allege that T.I. failed and refused to warn, advise, and or protect its workers of and from the dangerous characteristics and health threats associated with exposure to these chemicals and substances.24
T.I.'s motion seeks dismissal for failure to state a claim.25 As noted by the Delaware Supreme Court:
Long-settled doctrine governs this Court's review of dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6). Under that doctrine, the threshold for the showing a plaintiff must make to survive a motion to dismiss is low. Delaware is a notice pleading jurisdiction. Thus, for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, it need only give "general notice of the claim asserted." A court can dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted only if "it appears with reasonable certainty that the plaintiff could not prove any set of facts that would entitle him to relief." On a motion to dismiss, a court's review is limited to the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint. An allegation, "though vague or lacking in detail" can still be well-pleaded so long as it puts the opposing party on notice of the claim brought against it. Finally, in ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a trial court must draw all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion.26
The first issue for determination is whether the exclusive remedy provision of the Texas Workers' Compensation Act bars claims for injuries suffered by an employee's child caused or contributed to by the employee's exposure tohazardous substances in the workplace. 27 Plaintiffs argue that because Christopher is not an employee of T.I., he is not eligible for workers' compensation under the Texas Labor Code for his personal injuries, 28 and thus, his personal injury claims cannot be barred. Under Texas law, recovery of workers' compensation benefits is the exclusive remedy available to an employee covered by workers' compensation insurance coverage against an employer for a work-related injury sustained by theemployee. 29 According to T.I., Grady's potential eligibility for workers' compensation benefits arises from the following allegations:
Thus, T.I. argues the "foundational allegations" for plaintiffs' claims are that Grady, through his work at T.I., sustained workplace exposure to reproductively toxic substances that caused insult to his reproductive system, i.e., his sperm.31 T.I. points out that under plaintiffs' causation theory, if Grady's sperm had not been damaged by such exposure, Christopher would not have been born with birth defects.32 To put it simply, Christopher's injury is entirely dependent on his father's alleged workplace exposure.
T.I. goes on to assert that Grady's alleged workplace exposure was a compensable injury under Texas Workers' Compensation statutes,33 and Grady's failure to file a workers' compensation claim does not prohibit application of theexclusivity bar.34 T.I. reasons that if a tort plaintiff could avoid the workers' compensation exclusivity bar merely by failing to file a claim, the statutory system would be meaningless.35 The Court agrees with this analysis. But this does not resolve the question of whether Christopher's personal injury claims are barred by the exclusivity provision.
If Christopher's claims are "derivative," they are barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Texas Workers' Compensation Act.36 According to plaintiffs, Christopher's injuries 37 Plaintiffs point out that no Texas case is directly on point and suggest "this is perhaps only because no defendant in Texas has ever seriously asserted the argument T.I. makes here."38 T.I. counters that it is clear under Texas law that the workers' compensation exclusivity bar "applies to all of Plaintiffs' claims, as claims of family members that derive from an employee's alleged workplace injury fall within the scope of the bar,"39 and cites several cases in support of this argument which the Court will address in seriatim.
In Aguirre v. Vasquez, 40 four employees were driving home from a job when they encountered a dust storm. The driver decided to stop the truck and "wait out the storm."41 While waiting, a tractor-trailer stuck the employees' truck killing three employees and injuring another.42 The court held that surviving family members could not...
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