Peters v. United States

• Decision Date: 13 February 1899
• Docket Number: 463.
• Parties: PETERS v. UNITED STATES.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

94 F. 127

PETERS v. UNITED STATES.

No. 463.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

February 13, 1899

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

W. H Bogle, W. H. Pritchard, and B. W. Coiner, for plaintiff in error.

Wilson R. Gay, U.S. Atty., and Charles E. Claypool, Asst. U.S Atty.

Before ROSS and MORROW, Circuit Judges, and HAWLEY, District Judge.

HAWLEY District Judge.

William G. Peters, the plaintiff in error, was indicted by the United States grant jury of the district of Washington for a violation of the provisions of section 5209, Rev. St., which reads as follows:

'Sec. 5209. Every president, director, cashier, teller, clerk or agent of any association, * * * who makes any false entry in any book, report, or statement of the association, with intent, in either case, to injure or defraud the association, * * * or to deceive any officer of the association or any agent appointed to examine the affairs of any such association; * * * shall be imprisoned not less than five years nor more than ten.'

The indictment contained 46 counts. Counts 1 to 22, inclusive, have reference to alleged false entries and reports made with intent to injure or defraud the association. The remaining counts came under the other provisions of the statute, as to the acts of defendant having been committed with intent to deceive an agent appointed to examine the affairs of such association, or making false reports and statements of the bank to the comptroller of the currency.

Upon the first trial of the case the jury found a verdict as follows:

'We, the jury impaneled in the above-entitled cause, find the defendant, William G. Peters, guilty as charged in the indictment, in falsifying the returns to the comptroller of currency, and also books of the Columbia National Bank, and on balance of counts we do not agree.'

Therefore, in due time, counsel for Peters moved the court for his discharge upon the following grounds:

'Because the verdict of the jury is insufficient in form, substance, and law to authorize the entry of any judgment against the defendant other than a judgment of acquittal, and that he be discharged, and do go hence without day.'

This motion was overruled, and exception taken. Thereupon a motion was made 'for a judgment of acquittal and discharge on said verdict as to counts 1 to 22 of said indictment, both inclusive'; which motion was overruled, and exceptions thereto were allowed.

Peters then made a motion to set aside the verdict of the jury and for a new trial, which was granted. The trial of the cause was continued until the next term; at which time, the cause coming on regularly to be heard--

'The defendant, William G. Peters, moved the court for leave to file his plea of former jeopardy to counts 1 to 22, both inclusive, of the indictment herein, and his plea of former acquittal to counts 23 to 46, both inclusive, of said indictment, which leave was given, and said plea was thereupon filed; and thereupon the district attorney moved the court for leave to enter a nolle prosequi as to counts 2 to 22, both inclusive, of said indictment, which was granted, and a nolle prosequi was thereupon entered, and said defendant discharged as to said counts 2 to 22. And thereupon, upon the statement of the district attorney that he intended to produce no evidence touching the matters alleged in count 1, except evidence to prove the organization of the Columbia National Bank, its location, and the appointment, qualification, and acting of the defendant as its cashier, and to prove venue, the court overruled said pleas as to count 1, and also as to counts 23 to 46, inclusive; to which action of the court in overruling said pleas as to count 1, and counts 23 to 46, inclusive, the defendant excepted, and his exception was allowed.'

The case thereafter proceeded to trial on the remaining counts (23 to 46, inclusive) on defendant's plea of not guilty. The jury found a verdict thereon as follows:

'We, the jury impaneled in the above-entitled case, find the defendant, William G. Peters, guilty as charged in counts numbered 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, and 46 of the indictment therein contained.

Motions were thereafter made for a new trial and in arrest of judgment. These motions were overruled, for the reasons given by the circuit court in U.S. v. Peters, 87 F. 984.

The rights of a defendant in a criminal case should, at all times, be carefully guarded. But courts must look at the substance, instead of the mere shadow, of the alleged errors. Courts should not be called upon to deal with 'trifles light as air.' We have carefully read all the testimony contained in the record, and have arrived at the conclusion that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the verdict of the jury. This being true, there must be something legal, tangible, and real affecting the essential rights of the defendant to justify the court in reversing the verdict of the jury. Error in law must be affirmatively shown. If the plaintiff in error has not been deprived of any substantial right; if he has not been misled; if he has not been prejudiced or injured in any respect,-- he has no real or substantial cause for complaint simply because the old forms and precedents have not been literally followed. He presents for the consideration of this court 40 specific assignments of error, nearly equal in number to the counts originally contained in the indictment. Twenty-one of these counts were summarily disposed of for want of any proof to sustain them. If may, in the outset, be said that at least that number of the assignments-- some of which, like the counts in the indictment, are repeated, to save any question as to there being a proper statement-- may likewise be disposed of. But, notwithstanding this fact, the case is left as full of points as the hide of a porcupine is of quills.

It is our duty to carefully examine all questions worthy of consideration, and it will be our endeavor to group them under as few heads as possible, and at the same time to leave none of the important points unnoticed or undisposed of.

It must be borne in mind that the national courts do not resort to common law as a source of criminal jurisdiction. Crimes and offenses cognizable under the authority of the United States can only be such as are expressly designated by law. It devolves upon congress to define what are crimes, to fix the proper punishment, and to confer jurisdiction for their trial. U.S. v. Walsh, 5 Dill. 60, Fed. Cas. No. 16,636; U.S. v. Martin, 4 Cliff. 156, Fed. Cas. No. 15,728; In re Greene, 52 F. 104; Swift v. Railroad Co., 64 F. 59; U.S. v. Hudson, 7 Cranch, 32; U.S. v. Coolidge, 1 Wheat. 415; U.S. v. Britton, 108 U.S. 199, 206, 2 Sup.Ct. 531.

Every indictment should charge the crime, which is alleged to have been committed, with precision and certainty, and every ingredient thereof should be accurately and clearly stated; but where the offense is purely statutory, and the words of the statute fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offense intended to be punished, it is sufficient to charge the defendant in the indictment with the acts coming fully within the statutory description, in the substantial words of the statute. Ledbetter v. U.S., 170 U.S. 606, 610, 18 Sup.Ct. 774, and authorities there cited; 10 Enc.Pl. & Prac. 483, and authorities there cited.

Few indictments under the national banking law have been so skillfully drawn as to escape the hypercriticism of learned counsel. Many of them might, doubtless, have been made more definite and clear. Our object will be to get at the merits, if any there be, of the numerous objections urged,-- to ascertain whether the defendant has been prejudiced by the course pursued by the court; whether any of his legal rights has been invaded or violated; and to brush away the cobwebs of pure technicalities with which the trial of the case, as in all criminal cases, seems to be surrounded.

The true test of the sufficiency of an indictment is not whether it might possibly have been made more certain, but whether it contains every element of the offense intended to be charged, and sufficiently apprised the defendant of what he must be prepared to meet; and, in case any other proceedings are taken against him for a similar offense, whether the record shows with accuracy to what extent he may plead a former acquittal or conviction. U.S. v. Simmons, 96 U.S. 362; U.S. v. Carll, 105 U.S. 612; U.S. v. Hess, 124 U.S. 483, 8 Sup.Ct. 571; Pettibone v. U.S., 148 U.S. 197, 13 Sup.Ct. 542; Potter v. U.S., 155 U.S. 438, 15 Sup.Ct. 144; Evans v. U.S., 153 U.S. 584, 587, 588, 14 Sup.Ct. 934, 939; Batchelor v. U.S., 156 U.S. 426, 15 Sup.Ct. 446; Cochran v. U.S., 157 U.S. 286, 290, 15 Sup.Ct. 628.

The essentials of an indictment drawn under the provisions of section 5209 are clearly stated in U.S. v. Britton, 107 U.S. 655, 662, 2 Sup.Ct. 512, 518, as follows:

'(1) That the accused was the president or other officer of a national banking association which was carrying on a banking business. (2) That, being such president or other officer, he made in a book, report, or statement of the association, describing it, a false entry, describing it. (3) That such false entry was made with intent to injure or defraud the association, or to deceive any agent, describing him, appointed to examine the affairs of the association.'

See, also, Cochran v. U.S., 157 U.S. 286, 293, 15 Sup.Ct. 628.

The indictment under consideration sets forth all of these essentials in proper manner and form.

With these general observations, which are more or less applicable to many, if not all,...