Petersen, In re
| Decision Date | 10 June 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 65866-8,65866-8 |
| Citation | 980 P.2d 1204,138 Wn.2d 70 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | In re the Detention of Ronald Lane PETERSEN. |
Robert W. Goldsmith, Suzanne L. Elliott, Seattle, for Petitioner.
Norm Maleng, King County Prosecutor, James E. Rogers, Deputy, David Hackett, Deputy, Seattle, for Respondent.
We decide in this case whether committed sexually violent predators who seek appellate review of annual show cause hearings concerning their continuing confinement may appeal as of right, or whether they must file a motion for discretionary review. Where the trial court finds in a hearing under RCW 71.09.090(2) there is no probable cause to believe a violent sexual predator's condition has changed, an appellate court reviews such a decision under the provisions of RAP 2.3(b).
We also decide whether the 1997 finding that Petersen, who has been confined as a sexually violent predator since 1995, failed to show facts existed to warrant a full evidentiary hearing on whether his condition had so changed that he was safe to be conditionally released to a less restrictive alternative or unconditionally released. We grant discretionary review of the trial court's decision on the 1997 annual review, and hold the State
presented ample evidence Petersen's condition had not changed. We affirm the trial court's decision.
1. When a person under commitment as a sexually violent predator wishes to appeal a ruling by the trial court concerning probable cause to believe the person's condition has changed pursuant to RCW 71.09.090(2), is the appeal as of right or must the person file a motion for discretionary review?
2. Did the trial court properly deny Petersen's motion to invalidate the 1997 evaluation of his condition?
Ronald Lane Petersen has a history of brutal sexual assaults that extends back to the age of eight. At that tender age, Petersen and another boy held down a third boy and pulled his pubic hairs out one by one. Petersen admitted molesting younger girls. At age 10, he began exposing himself to his sister and passing cars. At age 15, he was caught molesting a 6 year old girl. Petersen fantasized about rape.
From 1972 to 1974, Petersen admitted numerous rapes and attempted rapes in the Yakima area. He generally committed his crimes while wearing a ski mask, armed with a pistol or other weapon. In one instance, he raped a disabled woman within eyesight of her 10 year old son. Upon being arrested, Petersen agreed in April 1974 to plead guilty to rape and three other rape counts were dismissed. He enrolled in Western State Hospital's sexual psychopath program. He was granted work release from that program in December 1975, but promptly committed additional sexual assaults while on work release.
Upon his formal discharge from the Hospital in March 1976, Petersen assaulted a young woman in July 1976 and was convicted of second degree assault with intent to commit rape. He was released from prison in July 1987, but committed a further sex offense in December 1987. In a particularly heinous crime, Petersen, masquerading as a law enforcement officer, forced a young mother to leave her eight month old baby in a car at the side of the road while he drove away with her to commit the crime. For this crime, Petersen pleaded guilty to first degree rape and was imprisoned until September 1993.
As a result of these multiple crimes, after Petersen's last release from prison, the State sought his commitment as a sexually violent predator pursuant to chapter 71.09 RCW, relating to commitment of sexually violent predators. 1 After a 1995 trial in which the State's experts testified Petersen suffered from paraphilia, 2 sexual sadism, and an anti-social personality disorder, a unanimous jury concluded Petersen was a sexually violent predator needing total confinement. He has been at the Special Commitment Center (SCC) in the custody of the Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) since. Petersen appealed that decision to us (Supreme Court Docket No. 63398-3).
Petersen has undergone three annual evaluations at SCC since his original commitment. He has declined all treatment at SCC and has declined to present any expert testimony on his behalf in any of his annual reviews, although he has a statutory right to obtain an expert's opinion at public expense if he is indigent. RCW 71.09.070. Petersen's annual evaluation in 1996, based on the declarations of two State experts, concluded he did not meet the criteria for release from confinement. The trial court subsequently found Petersen's condition had not changed, largely because he refused sex offender treatment at SCC. The trial court concluded the report established a basis, with sufficient factual specificity, to continue his confinement at SCC. Petersen appealed from that Like the 1996 evaluation, Petersen's annual evaluation in 1997 concluded, in a report by staff clinical psychologist Dr. Regina Harrington, that Petersen continued to suffer from his previous conditions and he "has the propensity for and is still capable of perpetuating sexual aggression." Clerk's Papers at 14. The report stated: Clerk's Papers at 15-16. Petersen offered no evidence to controvert Dr. Harrington's report. Based on this report and the absence of controverting evidence, the trial court subsequently held a hearing and found there was no probable cause to believe Petersen deserving of a full evidentiary hearing regarding the propriety of his release from commitment.
decision; his appeal is currently before us (Supreme Court Docket No. 63398-3).
Petersen then filed a notice of appeal seeking direct review of the trial court's orders denying his motion to invalidate the annual report and to continue his commitment. 3 Our Deputy Clerk raised the question of whether Petersen was allowed an appeal as of right under the circumstances, or was limited to filing a motion for discretionary review. Our Commissioner subsequently heard the arguments of the parties on the question, and issued a ruling redesignating Petersen's notice of appeal as a motion for discretionary review. Petersen then moved to modify the Commissioner's ruling.
We initially issued an order requesting additional briefing on the issue of appellate review and then accepted the matter for oral argument, specifying as the issues on review (1) the proper avenue for invoking appellate court review, and (2) whether the trial court's decisions in Petersen's periodic review should be affirmed. Order of April 9, 1998. 4
To decide the proper method for invoking review of trial court decisions under RCW 71.09.090(2), we must first place decisions under chapter 71.09 RCW in a proper analytic context. Commitments under Washington's sexually violent predators act are civil in nature. In re Personal Restraint of Young, 122 Wash.2d 1, 23, 857 P.2d 989 (1993). 5 Moreover, such commitments are of an indefinite duration, persisting "until such time as the person's mental abnormality or personality disorder has so changed that the person is safe either (a) to be at large, or (b) to be released to a less restrictive alternative as set forth in RCW 71.09.092." RCW 71.09.060(1). The Legislature specifically found "the treatment needs of [the sexually violent predator] population are very long That the commitment was for an indefinite duration was specifically recognized by the majority in Young when we upheld the constitutionality of the statute, stating:
term," thereby implying the statute contemplates a prolonged period of treatment. RCW 71.09.010.
Even though petitioners potentially face a long period of civil commitment, the sexually violent predator Statute is wholly sustainable. Those committed under the sex predator Statute have been through a full trial with a complete range of procedural protections. From this trial, a jury has determined that the State has met the highest burden possible--beyond a reasonable doubt--in proving that the committed individual suffers from a mental abnormality which renders him a danger to the community. Although the period of confinement is not predetermined, the Statute's release provisions provide the opportunity for periodic review of the committed individual's current mental condition and continuing dangerousness to the community.
Young, 122 Wash.2d at 39, 857 P.2d 989 (emphasis added). Similarly, the dissent in Young recognized the indefinite duration of the commitment of sexually violent predators under the statute in several passages, describing the statute as providing for "indefinite" confinement. Young, 122 Wash.2d at 60, 65, 68, 70, 857 P.2d 989. The dissent even characterized the statute as "a lifetime preventive detention scheme," id. at 69, 70, 857 P.2d 989, and as a law that authorized the State "to hold that person forever for the 'good of the community'." Id. at 61, 857 P.2d 989.
Petersen argues the statute does not provide for an indefinite period of commitment, but instead requires an annual de novo determination beyond a reasonable doubt that he is a sexually violent predator in order for his confinement to continue. We disagree. A plain reading of the statute does not support Petersen's contention. Nevertheless, he points to Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997) (), as authority. In Hendricks, the Court interpreted a sexually violent predator statute similar in many respects to Washington's and said:
Furthermore, commitment under the Act is only potentially...
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