Petersen v. Cnty. of Stanislaus

• Decision Date: 01 April 2013
• Docket Number: CASE NO. 1: 12-cv-00933-AWI-BAM
• Parties: MICHELE PETERSEN, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF STANISLAUS, et. al, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California

MICHELE PETERSEN, Plaintiff,

v.COUNTY OF STANISLAUS, et. al, Defendants.

CASE NO. 1: 12-cv-00933-AWI-BAM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Dated: April 1, 2013

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO

REMAND

Currently before the Court is Michele Petersen's ("Plaintiff") Motion to Remand. (Doc. 30.) Defendants¹ filed an opposition on March 20, 2013. (Doc. 34.) Plaintiff filed her reply on March 20, 2013. (Doc. 35.) The Court deemed the matter suitable for decision without oral argument pursuant to Local Rule 230(g), and vacated the hearing scheduled for April 3, 2013. (Doc. 36.) The Court has considered the parties' submissions and carefully reviewed the entire file. For the reasons that follow, the Court recommends that Plaintiff's Motion to Remand should be GRANTED.²

I. BACKGROUND

Between April of 2010 and continuing until Plaintiff's termination in May of 2011, Plaintiff was employed by the County of Stanislaus as a social worker. (Pl.'s First Amended Complaint "FAC" ¶ 24, Doc. 26.) During Plaintiff's employment with Defendants, Plaintiff alleges she suffered from an anxiety disorder and attention deficit disorder. (FAC ¶ 14.)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants discriminated against her due to her physical and mental disabilities. (FAC ¶ 19.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges she was subjected to heightened job requirements when Defendants knew Plaintiff suffered from mental and physical disabilities that precluded the performance of excessive responsibilities. (FAC ¶¶ 14-20.) Plaintiff alleges that when she complained of these circumstances, Defendants conducted a "fabricated investigation" whereby Plaintiff was falsely accused of violations of Stanislaus County Code Section 3.28.00 (Dishonesty, Insubordination and Inexcusable Neglect of Duties). (FAC ¶ 18.) Plaintiff also alleges Defendants disclosed to other employees and members of the general public confidential information concerning Plaintiff's medical condition. (FAC ¶¶ 14-20.)

On May 3, 2012, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants in the Superior Court of California, County of Stanislaus. (Doc. 1, Ex. A.) Plaintiff's complaint alleges the following causes of action: employment discrimination, retaliation and harassment under California state law; intentional infliction of emotional distress; breach of contract; breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; negligent supervision; defamation; and civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 and 1988. Id. On June 8, 2012, Defendants removed Plaintiff's case to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). (Doc. 1.) In support of removal, Defendants represented this Court had original jurisdiction over Plaintiff's federal civil rights claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Id.

On June 5, 2012, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claims. (Doc. 7.) On July 6, 2012, Plaintiff filed a motion to sever and remand her state law claims to the Stanislaus Superior Court. (Doc. 10.) Defendants' motion to dismiss was unopposed, and Plaintiff's complaint was dismissed with leave to amend. (Doc. 20.) Shortly thereafter, the Court denied Plaintiff's motion to remand as moot. (Doc. 21.)

Plaintiff subsequently failed to file an amended complaint, and the Court issued an order to show cause as to why Plaintiff's case should not be dismissed with prejudice for Plaintiff's failure to file an amended complaint. (Doc. 22.) Plaintiff responded that it was her belief the filing of an amended complaint would waive her right to seek remand. (Doc. 23.) On January 14, 2013, the Court issued an order informing Plaintiff that the filing of an amended complaint would not waive her right to seek remand. (Doc. 25.) However, the Court acknowledged that addressing the remand issue prior to a determination on the sufficiency of the pleadings was the more prudent course of action. (Doc. 25.) The Court informed Plaintiff she could file an amended complaint and, if she so chose, renotice her motion to remand, which the Court would determine prior to determining any motion attacking the pleadings. Id.

On February 15, 2013, Plaintiff filed her FAC. (Doc. 26.) Plaintiff's FAC was substantially similar to her original complaint, however, Plaintiff's FAC abandoned her federal civil rights claims. Id. On March 6, 2013, Plaintiff filed a motion to remand this case to the Stanislaus Superior Court. (Doc. 30.) Plaintiff's motion to remand presents two principal arguments: (1) because Plaintiff has abandoned her federal claims, this Court no longer has original jurisdiction over her case; and (2) the Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011 eliminates the federal court's discretion to hear unrelated state law claims in removed actions based on federal question jurisdiction. Id.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

"A motion to remand is the proper procedure for challenging removal." Moore-Thomas v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 553 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2009). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), remand may be ordered either for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or for any defect in removal procedure.

A defendant may remove any civil action from state court to federal district court if the district court has original jurisdiction over the matter. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); See also, Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2009) ("The threshold requirement for removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 is a finding that the complaint contains a cause of action that is within the original jurisdiction of the district court.") Generally, district courts have original jurisdiction over civil actions in two instances: (1) where a federal question is presented in an action arising under the Constitution, federal law, or treaty; or (2) where there is complete diversity between the parties. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332; See also, Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1042 ("A defendant may remove an action to federal court based on federal question jurisdiction or diversity jurisdiction.") In regards to federal question jurisdiction, federal courts have "jurisdiction to hear, originally or by removal from a state court, only those cases in which a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action, or that the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law." Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 27-28, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983).

The Ninth Circuit "strictly construe[s] the removal statute against removal jurisdiction." Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir.1992) (citing Boggs v. Lewis, 863 F.2d 662, 663 (9th Cir.1988); Takeda v. Northwestern National Life Insurance Co., 765 F.2d 815, 818 (9th Cir.1985)). Thus, "[f]ederal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance." Gaus, 980 F.2d at 656. There is a strong presumption against removal jurisdiction, which means that the defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper. Id. (citing Nishimoto v. Federman-Bachrach & Associates, 903 F.2d 709, 712 n. 3 (9th Cir.1990); Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir.1988)); Harris v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co., 425 F.3d 689, 698 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108-09 (1941)). Any doubt as to the right of removal must be resolved in favor of remand. Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566.

B. This Court Has Jurisdiction Over Plaintiff's State-Law Claims

Plaintiff contends the Court no longer has subject matter jurisdiction over the action because she dismissed her federal civil rights claims. Defendants respond that this Court retains jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims because subject matter jurisdiction is determined at the time of removal and at the time Plaintiff's claims were removed, Plaintiff pled a federal cause of action.

As Defendants correctly observe, federal jurisdiction depends upon the circumstances that exist at the time of removal. See, Sparta Surgical Corp. v. National Ass'n of Secs. Dealers, Inc., 159 F.3d 1209, 1213 (9th Cir. 1998) ("[J]urisdiction must be analyzed on the basis of the pleadings filed at the time of removal without reference to subsequent amendments"). "Once a federal court acquires removal jurisdiction over a case, it also acquires jurisdiction over pendent state claims. Dismissal of the federal claims does not deprive a federal court of the power to adjudicate the remaining pendent state claims." Nishimoto v. Federman-Bachrach & Associates, 903 F.2d 709, 715 (9th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted); See also, Albingia Versicherungs A.G. v. Schenker Int'l, Inc., 344 F.3d 931, 936 (9th Cir. 2003) (court had discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after federal claim dismissed (unless dismissal was for lack of subject matter jurisdiction)), amended at 350 F.3d 916. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court recently confirmed that when a case is removed to federal court on a federal question claim, "[u]pon dismissal of the federal claim, the District Court retain[s] its statutory supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims." Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 640, 129 S.Ct. 1862, 1867, 173 L.Ed.2d 843 (2009). Under these circumstances, any "decision declining to exercise that statutory authority was not based on a jurisdictional defect but on [the district court's] discretionary choice not to hear the claims despite its subject-matter jurisdiction over them." Id.

Plaintiff cites Baddie v. Berkeley Farms, Inc., 64 F.3d 487, 491 (9th Cir. 1995) for the proposition that "[t]his Court no longer has original jurisdiction as alleged by defendants (Dkt # 1; 2: 2-9) in that plaintiff's amended complaint asserts no claims arising under federal law . . . ." (Doc. 35, 3: 8-14.) Baddie, however, does not support this proposition. Baddie considered whether 28...