Peterson v. Hegna

• Decision Date: 29 February 1924
• Docket Number: 23,702
• Citation: 197 N.W. 484,158 Minn. 289
• Parties: HELENA PETERSON AND OTHERS v. NELS HEGNA
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

197 N.W. 484

158 Minn. 289

HELENA PETERSON AND OTHERS v. NELS HEGNA

No. 23,702

Supreme Court of Minnesota

February 29, 1924

Action in the district court for Mower county by the heirs at law of Genelia Berg, deceased, to recover $4,500. The case was tried before Peterson, J., who when plaintiff rested denied defendant's motion that the action be dismissed and at the close of the testimony denied his motion for a directed verdict, and a jury which returned a verdict for $5,107.50. From an order denying his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial, defendant appealed. Reversed.

SYLLABUS

Action on compromised claims barred by statute -- doctrine of family settlements limited.

Plaintiffs stepchildren of defendant, recovered verdicts of $4,500 against him upon an alleged compromise agreement to pay that sum in settlement of certain claims they asserted on account of their father's estate and their mother's dower interest. It is held:

(1) That part of the charge to which the main objection of appellant is directed is substantially correct insofar as it goes in defining doubtful or disputed claims that will support a compromise.

(2) An utterly baseless claim cannot support an agreement to compromise it.

(3) In view of the evidence and the charge defendant was entitled to the requested instruction that the asserted claims were barred by the statute of limitations.

(4) The doctrine that family settlements are favored in law should not be extended to personal claims growing out of torts or money demands between members of a family, but to cases involving the disposition of property in which the members of the family are interested.

Catherwood & Nicholsen, for appellant.

F. G Sasse and R. A. Dunnette, for respondents.

OPINION

HOLT, J.

Plaintiffs sued and recovered upon an oral promise made by defendant to pay them $4,500 as a compromise of claims they asserted against him. Defendant appeals from the order denying his motion in the alternative for judgment or a new trial.

In 1865, Ole Lewis died intestate, the owner of 215 acres of land and less than $500 worth of personal property. Of the land 125 acres was in Mower county and 90 in Dodge county. He left a widow about 30 years old and three daughters, the oldest 7 years of age. Defendant married the widow in 1867. The widow was appointed administratrix of the estate and guardian of the children. In 1869 the probate court granted the guardian a license to sell the interests of the wards in the lands mentioned and the same were sold at public vendue to defendant for $2,460. When the children came of age the guardian accounted, and they received the proceeds of the sale, then amounting to over $5,000. Their mother, defendant's wife, died in 1913. With her defendant had 7 children living. One of the three stepdaughters died some 19 years ago, leaving a husband and 7 children, who are parties plaintiff in addition to the two stepdaughters now living.

The evidence shows that some years after the death of the mother his stepchildren began to assert some claims against him. At first they were made to his children, but finally to him personally. The evidence does not disclose upon what act of defendant plaintiffs based their claims; but the items hinted at are: That there was no final decree in the estate of Ole Lewis disposing of the small personal property; that defendant's wife had an unassigned dower interest in the 120 acre farm in Mower county from which she was entitled to the rental value from defendant, except as barred by the statute of limitations and that some $400 or $500 had come from the estate of a grandfather of Ole Lewis' children, and also that a government pension during the minority of the children had been received. These pretended claims were each and all barred for more than 30 years, unless that of the alleged right to recover the value of the use of the so-called dower interest, and that accrued more than 6 years prior to the promise on which this action is predicated.

It must be admitted that it is difficult to find anything upon which to base any sort of a demand against defendant. Under the statute (G.S. 1866, c. 48, § 12), the widow of Ole Lewis could occupy the lands with the heirs without the dower being admeasured or assigned to her. She did so occupy the Mower county land jointly with defendant, the grantee of the heirs, up to her death. Under such circumstances, it is not conceivable that she could assert a claim for use and occupation. As to the question the court charged correctly, we think, that the mother, the guardian, was presumed to have collected that and not defendant. And as to the estate of plaintiffs' grandfather there is nothing definite except defendant's admission that his three stepdaughters had something less than $500 coming therefrom some 35 years ago, but that he took no steps to collect it, considering that other heirs were in more need thereof. He was under no obligation to enforce the rights of his stepchildren. He was not their guardian.

Plaintiffs' evidence also suggests that defendant obtained a quit-claim deed of the 120 acres in Mower county from his stepdaughters in 1899 by fraudulently representing that it covered only the 5-acre wood lot. There is no substance to this charge. At that time, nearly 30 years after the sale, they stood little chance of attacking its validity upon any ground. They had received and enjoyed the full proceeds of the sale. Insofar as this oral compromise embraces any claim for the delinquencies of defendant's wife as guardian or as administratrix it must fail under the statute of frauds. So the only basis in law or morals that might ever have existed for the assertion of a claim by plaintiffs against defendant must be made to spring from the dower interest in the 120-acre-Mower-county land. And on the part of defendant the only consideration for his promise is to be sought in his desire to secure the good will of plaintiffs toward himself and his children, for he testified that, although he knew plaintiffs had nothing coming from him, nevertheless, he desired to give them a present to the end that they would make no claim against his estate or trouble his heirs, and so that he might die in peace. He admitted in his testimony that on October 22, 1921, he orally promised to pay plaintiffs $4,500 two days thereafter. This occurred in the office of the probate court at Austin.

There are many errors assigned upon the charge and the refusal to give requested instructions; also upon the denial of judgment notwithstanding.

One of the main contentions on this appeal centers upon the correctness of this part of the charge: "To find that there was a disputed or doubtful claim between the parties it is sufficient if you find that the parties concerned in it thought at the time that there was a question between them. It is not even necessary that the question in dispute should be necessarily doubtful if the parties concerned therein bona fide considered it so." This is substantially the language in Demars v. Musser-Sauntry L.L. & Mnfg. Co. 37 Minn. 418, 35 N.W. 1, approved in Hansen v. Gaar Scott & Co. 63 Minn. 94, 65 N.W. 254 and Sunset Orchard Land Co. v. Sherman Nursery Co. 121 Minn. 5, 140 N.W. 112. Elliott Contracts, § 237, states: "It would seem, however, that the good faith of the parties to the compromise instead of color of right has been finally adopted in England and in most of the states of this country as the test by which to determine the validity of a compromise. The rule applicable to all cases may therefore be stated thus, -- the compromise of a claim which is asserted in good faith and of the validity of which the parties at the time entertain a doubt, and about which there is a bona fide controversy, is a valuable consideration and will support a promise or contract." Similar conclusions are stated in 5 R.C.L. pp. 881-883, and 12 C.J. §§ 15-20 on p. 322 et seq. Many authorities are collected in note to Armijo v. Henry, 25 L.R.A. (N.S.) 275. See also Belt v. Lazenby, 126 Ga. 767, 56 S.E. 81; Adams v. Crown Coal & Tow Co. 198 Ill. 445, 65 N.W. 97; Bement v. May, 135 Ind. 664, 34 N.E. 327, 35 N.E. 387; Urdanger v. Frayer, 183 Iowa 39, 166 N.W. 693; Melcher v. Ins. Co. 97 Me. 512, 55 A. 411; Blount v. Wheeler, 199...