Peterson v. Lindner

• Decision Date: 25 June 1985
• Docket Number: 84-1701,Nos. 84-1466,s. 84-1466
• Citation: 765 F.2d 698
• Parties: Lowell PETERSON, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Kenneth E. LINDNER, Secretary of the Department of Administration, State of Wisconsin, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 698

765 F.2d 698

2 Fed.R.Serv.3d 992

Lowell PETERSON, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Kenneth E. LINDNER, Secretary of the Department of Administration, State of Wisconsin, Defendant-Appellee.

Nos. 84-1466, 84-1701.

United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.

Argued Jan. 18, 1985.

Decided June 25, 1985.

Russell T. Golla, Anderson, Fisher, Shannon, O'Brien & Rice, Stevens Point, Wis., for plaintiffs-appellants.

Linda M. Clifford, LaFollette, Sinykin, Anderson & Munson, Madison, Wis., for defendant-appellee.

Before CUDAHY, Circuit Judge, FAIRCHILD, Senior Circuit Judge and GRANT, Senior District Judge. ^*

CUDAHY, Circuit Judge.

In this class action, a group of Wisconsin circuit court reporters brought suit for declaratory and injunctive relief and damages, claiming that salary classifications under which they were paid violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, and gave rise to a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Although the district judge originally assigned to the case ruled there was a constitutional violation, a second judge later reconsidered that ruling and then dismissed the reporters' claims. We affirm the dismissal.

I.

This case was originally filed in the Western District of Wisconsin, but due to a particularly burdensome workload there, it was informally transferred to the Eastern District and assigned to Judge Myron Gordon. After certification of the suit as a class action, the parties agreed to submit the case to the court for resolution of the liability issue, on the basis of stipulated facts and documents. Judge Gordon found the relevant facts as follows:

Prior to August 1, 1978, Wisconsin's state trial courts were divided into two categories: circuit courts and county courts. Court reporters in the circuit courts were paid by the state. One-half of the base salary of county court reporters was paid by the state; the other half was paid by the county in which the court was located.

In addition to the base salary paid to reporters by the state and/or the counties, each county was permitted to pay its circuit and county court reporters an additional payment known as a county supplement, if it so desired. Some counties paid large supplements; other counties paid smaller supplements or none at all.

On August 1, 1978, state legislation creating a single level trial court system in Wisconsin went into effect. All county courts became circuit courts, and the circuit courts all had the same functions and responsibilities. Judges who had previously been county court judges became circuit court judges, and all judges' salaries were equalized. Former county court reporters became circuit court reporters, but their salaries were not equalized.

As part of the new legislation, Sec. 20.923(7m), Wis.Stats., provided that the salaries of all circuit court reporters and former county court reporters who became circuit court reporters on August 1, 1978, continue at the same rate earned before that date. These reporters are eligible for annual pay increases pursuant to Sec. 20.923(7), Wis.Stats. The increases are based on a percentage of the reporter's salary, but such percentage is computed without regard to the portion of salary previously received as a county supplement.

For court reporters hired after August 1, 1978, the salary range is established in Sec. 20.923(7), Wis.Stats. This salary range is not tied to the former county supplement pay system.

The impact of Secs. 20.923(7) and 20.923(7m) for the plaintiffs is that all court reporters are now circuit court reporters with the same functions and responsibilities, but they are not paid the same. A reporter falls into a different salary classification depending on the amount, if any, of county supplement he or she received prior to August 1, 1978. The highest county supplement paid at that time was $434.00 per month; the lowest supplement was zero.

....

....

In support of their position, the plaintiffs point to the conclusions of the court reporter qualification and compensation committee. The latter committee was formed pursuant to the legislative mandate of Sec. 753.18(3), Wis.Stats., and it included a member of the defendant's staff. Its final recommendation of February, 1980, and two letters or reports by its chairperson summarizing and explaining the recommendations, have been entered into the record by stipulation. In short, the committee concluded that broad salary differentials generated by county supplements are irrationally based on the date, county, and status of appointment rather than on job proficiency.

Peterson v. Hanson, 565 F.Supp. 87, 88-89 (E.D.Wis.1983).

Based on these facts, Judge Gordon concluded that there was no rational reason for continuing, under the new single-level trial court system, the disparate salary classifications that were based primarily on the previous receipt of county supplements. He thus decided that the statutes incorporating those disparities were unconstitutional. Holding that injunctive relief was appropriate, Judge Gordon required the defendant in the future to pay each member of the class the difference between the highest county supplement incorporated into the salary structure and the portion of the reporter's salary representing the county supplement, if any, he or she had previously received, and also ordered that annual salary increases and fringe benefits be adjusted accordingly. Id. at 89. Judge Gordon reserved ruling on questions concerning compensatory damages, interest and attorneys' fees.

On June 6, 1983, the defendant moved for reconsideration of the injunction granting prospective relief, on the basis that the relevant statutes had been repealed, and that a new pay plan had been implemented on June 1, 1982, that would eliminate the county supplement-based salary disparities. The reporters submitted facts disputing this claim. On July 6, 1983, the defendant appealed to this court the order granting the injunction. On August 18, Judge Gordon indicated in a memorandum of certification his intention to grant the defense motion for reconsideration of the injunction if the appeal was remanded. Judge Gordon noted that the stipulations submitted by the parties, on which his previous decisions about liability and injunctive relief were based, had made no mention of the repeal of the statutes and new pay plan, and that there was considerable dispute concerning the effect of the injunction on salaries under that new plan. Therefore without altering his prior holding that the statutes were unconstitutional, Judge Gordon certified his intention to reconsider the injunctive portion of his previous order. Peterson v. Hanson, 569 F.Supp. 694, 695-96 (W.D.Wis.1983).

The defendant subsequently moved to dismiss the appeal, the case was remanded, and on October 24, 1983, Judge Gordon vacated the injunction. Since by this time the work demands in the Western District had eased, he then returned the case to the Western District where a new judge was assigned to the case to handle unresolved matters. These matters included the fashioning of appropriate relief after consideration of the effect of the new pay plan.

The case was first assigned to Judge Shabaz. The defendant then moved for reconsideration of the portion of Judge Gordon's original order declaring the statutes unconstitutional. In response, the reporters moved to strike the motion to reconsider on the ground that Judge Gordon's order was final and could not be reconsidered and also successfully moved that Judge Shabaz be disqualified.

Finally, the case was reassigned to Judge Crabb. On February 29, 1984, Judge Crabb entered an order in which she reversed Judge Gordon's decision declaring the statutes unconstitutional, and dismissed the case. Peterson v. Lindner, No. 81-C-994-C (W.D.Wis. Feb. 28, 1984). It is from this order that the reporters now appeal.

II.

Before reaching the issue whether the Wisconsin statutes were unconstitutional, we consider the reporters' argument that it was improper for Judge Crabb to reconsider and reverse Judge Gordon's original order, which had declared the statutes unconstitutional. The reporters contend that Judge Gordon's order was final, under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. Secs. 2201-2202, and for purposes of appeal, under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291. Since the defendant did not appeal that portion of the order declaring the statutes unconstitutional within the applicable time limit, the reporters contend, it became final and binding, was not subject to reconsideration by Judge Crabb, and so must be reinstated.

Although questions about the finality of judgments are frequently thorny, the general rule is that a decision is final for purposes of appeal if it " 'ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.' " Freeman v. Kohl & Vick Machine Works, Inc., 673 F.2d 196, 198 (7th Cir.1982) (quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233, 65 S.Ct. 631, 633, 89 L.Ed. 911 (1945)). Thus where "a judgment is rendered with respect to only part of the relief sought by plaintiffs and where consideration of further relief is specifically reserved, the judgment is not final." Harris v. Goldblatt Brothers, Inc., 659 F.2d 784, 786 (7th Cir.1981). Since at the time Judge Gordon ruled the statutes unconstitutional and entered an injunction, he expressly left open for future resolution such issues as the availability of damages, the order was presumably not final and appealable.

The reporters argue, however, that this case presents an exception to the general rule, because Judge Gordon's order granted declaratory relief. They base this argument on the words of the Declaratory Judgment Act, which provides in part:

In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction ... any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested pa...