Peterson v. Little-Giant Glencoe Portable Elevator Div. of Dynamics Corp. of America, LITTLE-GIANT

• Decision Date: 08 May 1984
• Docket Number: No. C6-83-1376,LITTLE-GIANT,C6-83-1376
• Citation: 349 N.W.2d 280
• Parties: Neoma PETERSON, as Trustee for the Heirs of Rodney R. Peterson, Respondent, v.GLENCOE PORTABLE ELEVATOR DIVISION OF DYNAMICS CORPORATION OF AMERICA, Respondent, Easterlund Implement, Inc., Appellant. Prince Manufacturing Corporation, Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals

Page 280

349 N.W.2d 280

Neoma PETERSON, as Trustee for the Heirs of Rodney R Peterson, Respondent, v. LITTLE-GIANT GLENCOE PORTABLE ELEVATOR DIVISION OF DYNAMICS CORPORATION OF AMERICA, Respondent Easterlund Implement, Inc., Appellant Prince Manufacturing Corporation, Respondent.

No. C6-83-1376.

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

May 8, 1984.

Review Granted October 19, 1984.

Syllabus by the Court

I

Extent to which a mid-trial settlement should be disclosed to the jury rests in the sound discretion of the trial court; the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting disclosure of mid-trial settlements where evidence of negligence or strict liability of all parties was submitted to the jury.

II

A tortfeasor is entitled to contribution from a joint-tortfeasor who, by virtue of the Workers Compensation Act, has no liability to the plaintiff, when the joint-tortfeasor's negligence exceeds that of the plaintiff.

III

A special verdict of negligence but no strict liability against manufacturers of a product is consistent and reconcilable where theories of recovery are founded on both failure to warn and on a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user.

IV

Evidence was sufficient to create jury issues on all questions of negligence or strict liability and the trial court properly denied motions for directed verdict.

Donald M. Jardine, John C. Dunlap, St. Paul, for appellant.

Gerald L. Maschka, Mankato, for Neoma Peterson.

Robert T. Stich, Minneapolis, for Little-Giant Glencoe Portable Corp. of America.

Douglas R. Archibald, Minneapolis, for Prince Mfg. Corp.

Heard, considered and decided by WOZNIAK and HUSPENI, NIERENGARTEN, JJ.

OPINION

NIERENGARTEN, Judge.

This is an appeal from an order of the trial court denying defendant Easterlund Implement, Inc.'s motion for a new trial and judgment notwithstanding verdict in a products liability action. Easterlund contends the Court erred in failing to adequately disclose midtrial settlement agreements to the jury, in requiring contribution from Easterlund who had no common liability with other defendants, in allowing a jury finding of negligence but no strict liability of defendant manufacturer Little-Giant Glencoe, in failing to direct a verdict against defendant Little-Giant Glencoe and Prince Manufacturing, and in allowing the verdict against Easterlund to stand on insufficient evidence. We affirm.

FACTS

Rodney Peterson was killed on April 8, 1981 when a hydraulic wing on farm equipment, a soil finisher, fell on him. This products liability action was then commenced against the manufacturer of the soil finisher, respondent Glencoe, and the dealership that owned the soil finisher, appellant Easterlund. Defendant Prince, the manufacturer of the hydraulic cylinder on the soil finisher, was subsequently impleaded. During the trial, settlements were reached whereby Prince paid Glencoe $225,000.00 to take over the defense of and indemnify Prince from all losses. Plaintiff Peterson's damages were stipulated at $750,000.00. The apportionment of liability on this amount was to be based on the jury's allocation of fault among Easterlund, Glencoe and Prince.

The jury found Glencoe 65% at fault, Easterlund 35% at fault and attributed no fault to Prince.

I DID THE COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO COMPLETELY INFORM THE JURY OF THE MIDTRIAL SETTLEMENTS?

Immediately following settlement, the trial court advised the jury:

An agreement has been reached which will no longer require the attorneys for Prince Manufacturing Corporation to be present; however, you are advised that you are to continue to evaluate the evidence as to Prince and as to all other parties. Further instructions will be given to you upon conclusion of this trial on these particular matters.

Prior to settlement, Glencoe pursued both Easterlund and Prince. Following settlement, Glencoe's pursuit of Prince ceased and any further evidence of Prince's liability (based upon defective cylinders) was developed by Peterson and Easterlund. In closing arguments, Glencoe focused only on Easterlund's liability and Easterlund focused on both Prince and Glencoe.

The Court refused Easterlund's chamber request for a more elaborate explanation of the settlements, explaining;

Easterlund's motion for the suggested instruction is denied on the basis that to provide a fair and balanced presentation to the jury as to what actually occurred would entail and require the Court to give several other instructions which, in the Court's view, would cause confusion in the minds of the jury, possibly prejudice, and would outweigh any advantage that might be served by advising them of the position of Prince.

The Court then instructed the jury as follows:

As mentioned to you yesterday the parties did reach an agreement in this case and they reached an agreement among other things as to damages. Therefore you need not determine that matter but you will have to determine what proportion of negligence, if any, should be assigned to each of the three defendants; Easterlund Implement, Inc., Glencoe Portable Elevator, and Prince Manufacturing. Essentially that will be your job, to make those determinations.

Midtrial settlements should be disclosed to the jury to the extent that a fair verdict may be reached, including information explaining the absence of a settling tortfeasor, but the extent of such disclosure is within the Court's discretion. Frey v. Snelgrove, 269 N.W.2d 918 (Minn.1978). Absent clear abuse, a reviewing Court does not interfere with the exercise of discretion. O'Brien v. Kemper, 276 Minn. 202, 149 N.W.2d 487 (1967).

Easterlund claims that the sudden absence of adversity between Glencoe and Prince and the sudden disappearance of Prince's counsel from the lawsuit, following settlement, led to such jury confusion and misunderstanding that Prince was cleared of all wrongdoings. While it is true there was a certain amount of vagueness and ambiguity in the court's final instructions, the jury was explicitly advised on two separate occasions to consider the liability of Prince. It is reasonable to infer that the jury weighed the evidence against Prince and found it to be insufficient to sustain a finding of fault.

Both before and after settlement, Peterson and Easterlund remained adversaries of Prince and there is no evidence of any failure on their part to develop their theories of Prince's liability, regardless of Glencoe's silence after settlement. The record reveals no clear abuse in the Court's failure to disclose the agreement between Glencoe and Prince in the detail requested by Easterlund.

II WAS GLENCOE ENTITLED TO CONTRIBUTION FROM EASTERLUND WHO WAS ENGAGED IN A COMMON ENTERPRISE WITH PETERSON AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT?

The trial court dismissed plaintiff Peterson's claims against Easterlund because decedent Peterson and Easterlund's employees were engaged in a common enterprise at the time of the accident and decedent's heirs elected to receive Worker's Compensation benefits under Minn.Stat. § 176.061 (1982). The Court allowed Glencoe, however, to continue its action for contribution against Easterlund with the result that Easterlund was included in the jury's apportionment of fault among the defendants. Easterlund claims there was no common liability between it and other defendants, ergo, there could be no contribution. Glencoe maintains, however, that Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp., 312 Minn. 114, 257 N.W.2d 679 (1977) controls.

Lambertson held that a third party tortfeasor partially liable for injuries sustained by an injured employee may maintain an action for contribution against an employer even though the employee is barred from directly proceeding against the employer under § 176.061. The Supreme Court opined that:

Contribution is a flexible, equitable remedy designed to accomplish a fair allocation of loss among parties. Such a remedy should be utilized to achieve fairness on particular facts, unfettered by outworn technical concepts like common liability.

312 Minn. at 128, 257 N.W.2d at 688. In Lambertson, the employer was required to pay out benefits to the injured employee, thus sharing an uncommon liability with the third party to claimant employee. That uncommon liability created an obligation to contribute with the third-party tortfeasor toward payment of the employee's damages to the extent of the employer's workers compensation liability. In the instant case, Peterson was not entitled to benefits from Easterlund because of the common enterprise in which they were engaged. Easterlund contends, therefore, that vis-a-vis Lambertson, because it did not have to pay any benefits to Peterson, there was no common liability. It cites Hart v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 276 N.W.2d 166 (Minn.1979) as support for its claim that common liability is still essential for contribution.

Plaintiff, in Hart, a wrongful death action, failed to show negligence on the part of an airplane pilot. She then sued the aircraft manufacturer who impleaded the pilot for contribution. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the third-party complaint, reasoning that "only a tortfeasor who is liable for a plaintiff's loss should be required to contribute to the payment for that loss." Id. at 168. However, the Court did state the basis for that conclusion was the fact the pilot was found not negligent in the first action and implied a different result had the pilot been found negligent. In its effort to work equity even under the facts of Hart, the Court did grant some relief to the manufacturer by limiting its liability to that portion of damages attributable only to its own negligence, Id. at 169.

Easterlund also looks to Horton v. Orbeth, 342 N.W.2d 112 (Minn.1984) for support. Horton denied a party found 74% at fault in causing an accident to recover contribution from two other tortfeasors whose negligence had been found to be 8% each compared to the claimant's comparative...