Peterson v. Pollack
Decision Date | 12 February 2020 |
Docket Number | No. 4D19-431,4D19-431 |
Citation | 290 So.3d 102 |
Parties | Scot PETERSON, Appellant, v. Andrew POLLACK and Shara Kaplan, as Co-Personal Representatives of the Estate of Meadow Pollack, decedent, Appellees. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Michael R. Piper and Christopher J. Stearns of Johnson, Anselmo, Murdoch, Burke, Piper & Hochman, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.
Joel S. Perwin of Joel S. Perwin, P.A., Miami, and David W. Brill and Joseph J. Rinaldi, Jr. of Brill & Rinaldi, Weston, for appellees.
ON APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR REHEARING EN BANC, MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION, AND MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION
We deny the deputy's motion for rehearing en banc and motion for certification. However, we grant the deputy's motion to clarify a phrase within our December 18, 2019 opinion, at page 11, to insert the word "alleged" before the word "duty" in the following phrase: "failure to take any action to fulfill his duty of protecting the students and teachers."
We agree with this requested insertion because, according to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(C)(x), the deputy's appeal in this case was limited to our review of the deputy's statutory immunity argument under section 768.29(9)(a), Florida Statutes (2018). The insertion clarifies that we could not, and did not, review the deputy's other argument that he lacked any legally cognizable duty of care in this case.
Based on the foregoing, we substitute the following opinion for the opinion which we issued on December 18, 2019. The insertion appears within the following opinion on page 11.
This appeal arises from the horrific killing of seventeen students and teachers, and the permanent physical and mental injuries which many others suffered, during the shooting rampage at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School.
Meadow Pollack's parents have sued, among others, the sheriff's deputy who served as the school resource officer, alleging as to the deputy that his negligence materially contributed to their daughter's death.
The deputy filed a motion to dismiss the parents' suit against him. The deputy argued he is immune from suit and liability under section 768.28(9)(a), Florida Statutes (2018), which provides, in pertinent part:
No officer, employee, or agent of the state or of any of its subdivisions shall be held personally liable in tort or named as a party defendant in any action for any injury or damage suffered as a result of any act, event, or omission of action in the scope of her or his employment or function, unless such officer, employee, or agent acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property....
§ 768.28(9)(a), Fla. Stat. (2018).
According to the deputy, the parents' allegations regarding his conduct, even if true, are insufficient to show that, during this tragic event, he acted "in bad faith," "with malicious purpose," or "in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights [or] safety."
The circuit court issued an order denying the deputy's motion to dismiss. The circuit court's order stated, in summary fashion, "As a matter of law, [the deputy] is not entitled to statutory immunity under section 768.28(9), Florida Statutes."
The deputy has filed this appeal, seeking this court's de novo review of his motion to dismiss on the ground of section 768.28(9) immunity. We have jurisdiction. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(x).
We conclude that the parents' allegations regarding the deputy's conduct, taken as true as we are required to do in this review, would be sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that the deputy acted "in bad faith," "with malicious purpose," or "in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights [or] safety," as those quoted phrases are defined under Florida law. Thus, we affirm the circuit court's denial of the deputy's motion to dismiss the parents' suit against him.
We present this opinion in two sections, with subsections, as follows:
The parents' allegations against the deputy regarding his conduct are presented in their amended complaint. For purposes of this opinion, we present the allegations in the amended complaint as true, viewing all reasonable inferences arising from the parents' allegations in their favor. See Preudhomme v. Bailey , 211 So. 3d 127, 132 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) ().
Two years before the shooting, police received a report that the shooter had posted a photograph of himself with guns on a social media website, stating that he planned "to shoot up the school." An investigation revealed that the shooter had knives and a BB gun. This information was provided to the deputy. However, no evidence exists to indicate that the deputy further investigated the matter.
Eighteen months before the shooting, a student reported to the deputy that the shooter, while depressed, had cut himself and ingested gasoline in an attempt to kill himself. The student further stated that the shooter wanted to buy a gun for hunting, and had drawn a swastika on his backpack next to the words "I hate n-----s." School personnel called a behavioral health facility for assistance. The facility sent a mobile assistance team to evaluate the shooter. The deputy and other school personnel were present during the evaluation. The facility team contended that the shooter did not meet criteria for further assessment. However, the deputy and two guidance counselors concluded that the shooter should be "Baker Acted," that is, forcibly committed for psychiatric evaluation. The deputy said he would search the shooter's home for a gun, and the Florida Department of Children and Families (DCF) was called to investigate.
However, according to a DCF report, the deputy ultimately refused to share any information with DCF about the shooter. The deputy also changed his mind about "Baker Acting" the shooter. Further, no evidence exists that the deputy went to the shooter's home and searched for any firearms.
At 2:20 pm on the day of the shooting, the deputy, while outside of the school's Building 1, heard a roving campus monitor use the school radio to warn an employee in the school's Building 12,
When the deputy heard this call, he did not immediately order a "Code Red," which would have resulted in the immediate lockdown of all school buildings and indicated a viable active shooting threat on campus. Because the deputy did not order the school to be locked down, the shooter was able to enter Building 12 at 2:21:15 pm.
Seventeen seconds later, at 2:21:32 pm, the shooter began his rampage on Building 12's first floor. The campus monitor radioed the deputy, "There's some crazy shots going on."
Sixty-nine seconds later, at 2:22:41 pm, the deputy began "loping" from Building 1 towards Building 12.
Ten seconds later, at 2:22:51 pm, the campus monitor used a golf cart to pick up the deputy. Somebody using the radio yelled, "Oh, it sounds like fireworks," to which another person responded, "Those ain't fireworks."
Twenty-four seconds later, at 2:23:15 pm, the deputy and the campus monitor arrived at Building 12. They heard more shots. The deputy jumped off the cart and told the campus monitor, "Get out of here ... go back to the front of the school ... we got a shooter on campus." However, the deputy did not enter Building 12. Instead, the deputy remained outside, positioning himself out of harm's way between two concrete walls at the building's corner. By that time, the shooter had killed nine people on Building 12's first floor.
Twenty-eight seconds later, at 2:23:43 pm, the deputy radioed the sheriff's dispatch, "Be advised we have possible, could be firecrackers, I think we have shots fired, possible shots fired, 1200 Building." During those twenty-eight seconds, the deputy remained outside.
Forty-seven seconds later, at 2:24:30 pm, the shooter reached the third floor where Meadow Pollack and others were located. During those forty-seven seconds, the deputy remained outside.
Five seconds later, at 2:24:35 pm, the shooter shot Meadow Pollack multiple times.
Forty-one seconds later, at 2:25:16 pm, the shooter again shot Meadow Pollack multiple times. Meadow Pollack was killed, as were seven others on Building 12's third floor.
While the deputy remained outside Building 12, he heard about seventy shots coming from the building. Sometime during that period, the deputy radioed, on multiple occasions, for the school to be locked down while the shooter remained inside Building 12. On one occasion, the deputy stated, According to the amended complaint, the lockdown prevented students and teachers from escaping Building 12.
Almost two minutes later, at 2:27 pm, the deputy, still in his safe location, advised dispatch, "Make sure I have a unit over in the front of the school, make sure no one comes inside the school." The deputy then advised dispatch, ...
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