Peterson v. Pratt
| Citation | 167 N.W. 101,183 Iowa 462 |
| Decision Date | 04 April 1918 |
| Docket Number | 32264 |
| Parties | WILLIAM PETERSON et al., Appellees, v. FRANK PRATT et al., Appellants |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Iowa |
Appeal from Page District Court.--THOMAS ARTHUR, Judge.
ACTION involving the validity of a contract. The trial court held that said contract was invalid. Defendants appeal.
Affirmed.
Genung & Genung, for appellants.
Denver L. Wilson and Thomas W. Keenan, for appellees.
The board of directors of the defendant Independent School District of Union Grove discontinued the school in that district for the on-coming school year of 1917-18. Thereafter, a contract was entered into between said board and the board of the defendant Independent District of South Liberty, wherein the first agreed to pay to the last $ 600 for tuition of the pupils of the Union Grove District. The first payment was to be made on September 1, 1917. On the petition of the plaintiffs, the district court ordered the officials of the Union Grove District to employ a competent teacher, and maintain a suitable school for said school year. It restrained making any payment under the contract and cancelled said contract.
The appellants contend: First, that the court had no power to act, because appeal to the department of public instruction was the sole remedy; and, second, that, if power to act be assumed, the action had is erroneous. This is a case wherein both contentions may be disposed of by determining whether the district court had jurisdiction. For, if the board had no power to make this contract, then the district court had jurisdiction, and appeal to the department of public instruction is not the remedy. And if the district court has power to act because the contract was beyond the authority of the board, then the contract made is void. So the trial court would get its power to act because the contract is void, and if the contract is void, it was not error to cancel it.
It does not seem to be claimed that there is express authority to make this contract, and the reliance of the appellants seems to be the existence of express powers which cannot be exercised unless there is authority to make the contract in question. We are not called upon to inquire into power by implication, because we are of opinion that what is expressly enacted by statute sustains the action of the trial court. We find that Section 2774 of the Code permits such a contract as this to be made, among other things, when "the board is released from its obligation to maintain a school." This amounts to a legislative declaration that such a contract may not be made unless the conditions specified in the statute exist. And, upon analysis, it will be found the controversy narrows to whether the board has been released from said obligation. It is manifest that Section 2774 assumes the board may be released from such obligation. But it does not say what the obligation to maintain a school is nor who may release the board from it. The only statute which speaks to these points is Section 2773, Code Supplement, 1913. It provides that, in each school year, commencing with the third Monday in March, school...
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