Peterson v. Regina

• Decision Date: 28 March 2013
• Docket Number: No. 10 Civ. 1692(JSR).,10 Civ. 1692(JSR).
• Citation: 935 F.Supp.2d 628
• Parties: Alvin PETERSON, Plaintiff, v. Officer Matthew REGINA, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

935 F.Supp.2d 628

Alvin PETERSON, Plaintiff,

v.Officer Matthew REGINA, et al., Defendants.

No. 10 Civ. 1692(JSR).

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

March 28, 2013.

Alvin Peterson, New York, NY, pro se.

Ryan Glenn Shaffer, New York City Law Department, New York, NY, for Defendants.

ORDER

JED S. RAKOFF, District Judge.

On January 18, 2012, the Honorable Gabriel W. Gorenstein, United States Magistrate Judge, issued a Report and Recommendation (“Report”) in the above-captioned matter recommending that the Court grant in part and deny in part the motion for summary judgment filed by defendants Officer Matthew Regina, the New York City Police Department, and the City of New York. In particular, Judge Gorenstein recommended that the Court grant the motion as to plaintiff Alvin Peterson's claim for malicious prosecution but deny the motion as to plaintiff's claims for false arrest and false imprisonment.

On March 15, 2012, defendants filed objections to the Report, essentially reiterating their argument before Judge Gorenstein that all of plaintiff's claims are barred by a release plaintiff signed in connection with settling a separate action filed against some but not all of the same defendants. Plaintiff filed no objection to the Report, and thus has waived any right to further appellate review. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 147–48, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985); Wagner & Wagner, LLP v. Atkinson, Haskins, Nellis, Brittingham, Gladd & Carwile, P.C., 596 F.3d 84, 92 (2d Cir.2010).

The Court has reviewed defendants' objections and the underlying record de novo. Having done so, the Court finds itself in complete agreement with the cogent and well-reasoned analysis set forth in the Report, which the Court hereby adopts by reference. Accordingly, for the reasons stated in the Report, the Court hereby grants the motion as to plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim, and dismisses that claim with prejudice, but denies the motion as to plaintiff's false arrest and false imprisonment claims.

Consistent with Court's previous order of referral, the remaining claims remain with Judge Gorenstein for all pretrial purposes. The case should be ready for trial by no later than June 28, 2013. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close document number 46 on the docket of this case.

SO ORDERED.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

GABRIEL W. GORENSTEIN, United States Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff Alvin Peterson, proceeding pro se, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Officer Matthew Regina, the New York City Police Department, and the City of New York, alleging violations of his constitutional rights stemming from his arrest in January 2007. Defendants have moved for summary judgment. For the reasons stated below, this motion should be granted in part and denied in part.

I. BACKGROUND

The following facts consist of those asserted by Peterson in sworn statements and facts asserted by the defendants that have not been contested by plaintiff through the submission of admissible evidence. We also reference certain documents filed in another action for the fact of their having been filed and not for the truth of any matters asserted in those filings. See Global Network Commc'ns, Inc. v. City of New York, 458 F.3d 150, 157 (2d Cir.2006) (“A court may take judicial notice of a document filed in another court not for the truth of the matters asserted in the other litigation, but rather to establish the fact of such litigation and related filings.”).

A. The Arrest and Prosecution

On January 21, 2007, Peterson was arrested at 230 Clinton Street in Manhattan. Plaintiff's Local Civil Rule 56.1 Statement of Undisputed Facts, filed Oct. 5, 2012 (Docket # 54) (“Pl. 56.1 Statement”). He was sweeping the lobby of his building that evening when an undercover officer approached him and asked if Peterson could help her buy drugs. See Complaint under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, dated Jan. 22, 2010 (annexed as Ex. F to Declaration of Ryan G. Shaffer in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, filed July 20, 2012 (Docket # 47) (“Shaffer Decl.”)) (“Compl.”), ¶ II.D. Peterson told her he could not and she then left. Id. Minutes later, several police officers emerged from the stairway of the building, grabbed Peterson, and handcuffed and searched him. Id. Peterson then overheard a conversation in which one officer told another that Peterson was clean and did not have “pre-recorded buy money” in his possession. Id. Peterson heard an officer say, “I think we got the wrong guy,” and heard another officer respond, “take him anyway.” Id. Peterson was then placed in a van and taken to the 7th Precinct. Id. On April 17, 2007, Peterson was indicted by a grand jury for criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree. Pl. 56.1 Statement ¶ 2. On August 9, 2007, Peterson went to trial and was found not guilty. Id. ¶ 3.

B. District Court Proceedings

On March 3, 2010, Peterson's complaint in this action was filed. We construe it—as do the defendants, see Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed July 20, 2012 (Docket # 50) (“Def. Mem.”), at 1—to allegeclaims of false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution stemming from Peterson's January 21, 2007 arrest. On the same date the complaint was filed in this action, Peterson filed a complaint in a separate lawsuit, “ Peterson I,” which alleged claims arising out of a different arrest. See Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Peterson v. Mejia, 10 Civ. 1691(SAS) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2010). In Peterson I, Peterson brought claims under section 1983 against police officer John Mejia, the New York Police Department, and the City, alleging that he was falsely arrested and imprisoned on July 15, 2008, for trespass and possession of a controlled substance after being stopped by Officer Mejia outside his home at 230 Clinton Street. See id. ¶ II.D. On April 19, 2011, an attorney appeared in Peterson I as well as in the instant case. See Notice of Appearance, filed Apr. 19, 2011 (Docket # 19); Notice of Appearance, Peterson I, 10 Civ. 1691 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2011) (Docket # 29).

Eventually, plaintiff's counsel and counsel for the defendants in Peterson I signed a stipulation of settlement, which was “so ordered” by the Court on July 14, 2011. See Stipulation of Settlement and Order of Dismissal, dated July 14, 2011 (annexed as Ex. H to Shaffer Decl.) (“Stipulation”); see also Pl. 56.1 Statement ¶ 6. The stipulation provided that Peterson was releasing the City, its agencies, and any of its present or former employees “from any and all liability, claims, or rights of action which were or could have been alleged in this action, including claims for costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees.” Stipulation ¶ 2. A separate paragraph of the stipulation provided that Peterson would be required to sign “a General Release based on the terms of paragraph 2 above....” Id. ¶ 3. The stipulation contained only the caption and docket number for Peterson I.

As required by paragraph 3 of the stipulation, Peterson signed a document on June 30, 2011, that was labeled a “general release.” See General Release, dated June 30, 2011 (annexed as Ex. I to Shaffer Decl.) (“General Release”); Pl. 56.1 Statement ¶ 7. This release stated,

Know that I, Alvin Peterson, date of birth ..., Social Security No ...., plaintiff in the action entitled Alvin Peterson v. Officer John Mejia, et al., 10 Civ. 1691(SAS), in consideration of the payment of Six Thousand ($6,000.00) Dollars to me by the City of New York, do hereby release and discharge the defendants; the defendants' successors or assigns; and all past and present officials, employees, representatives and agents of the City of New York or any agency thereof, from any and all claims that were or could have been alleged by me in the aforementioned action, including all claims for attorneys' fees, expenses and costs. This Release may not be changed orally.

See General Release; Pl. 56.1 Statement ¶ 8. The Peterson I case was closed and litigation continued in the instant case.

On December 21, 2011, Peterson's counsel was relieved. See Order, filed Dec. 21, 2011 (Docket # 31). Peterson then proceeded in this case pro se. After discovery concluded, the defendants filed the instant motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the complaint.¹

II. LAW GOVERNING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). A genuine issue of material fact exists “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, “[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed” and the court must draw “all justifiable inferences” in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. at 255 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158–59, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970)). Nevertheless, once the moving party has shown that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, “the nonmoving party must come forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial,’ ” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (emphasis in original) (additional citation omitted) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)), and “may not rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation,” Scotto v. Almenas, 143 F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir.1998) (citations omitted). In other words, the nonmovant must offer “concrete evidence from which a reasonable juror could return a verdict...