Peterson v. Sheran

• Citation: 474 F. Supp. 1215
• Decision Date: 25 July 1979
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 5-76-73.
• Parties: Gordon C. PETERSON, Plaintiff, v. Robert J. SHERAN et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota

474 F. Supp. 1215

Gordon C. PETERSON, Plaintiff, v. Robert J. SHERAN et al., Defendants.

Civ. No. 5-76-73.

United States District Court, D. Minnesota, Fifth Division.

July 25, 1979.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Gordon C. Peterson, pro se.

Warren Spannaus, Atty. Gen., Richard B. Allyn, Sol. Gen., LeRoy C. Paddock, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, Minn., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

HANSON, Senior District Judge, Sitting by Designation.

This action was brought pro se by Gordon C. Peterson, a disbarred attorney, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343, to obtain declaratory relief and to compel the issuance of a license to practice law in the State of Minnesota. Plaintiff Peterson brought suit against forty named defendants: members of the Minnesota Supreme Court, the Minnesota Supreme Court Clerk, members of the Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board, and members of the State Board of Law Examiners and the Minnesota Bar Association.

The plaintiff alleged that the defendants, who are in charge of licensing Minnesota attorneys, set up a religious test in violation of the First Amendment, and denied him due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. Thirteen of the forty defendants were served, and twelve defendants filed answers. The cause was tried to the Court.

Plaintiff Gordon C. Peterson was disbarred for "reprehensible" conduct based on evidence that Peterson prepared a fictitious criminal information in order to extort $1,000 from a client, and that Peterson sold property belonging to an imprisoned client without giving that client an accounting. In re Application of Peterson, 260 Minn. 339, 110 N.W.2d 9 (1961). Peterson now claims that the forged information was an office joke, and that the charge of improper accounting is false. Since his disbarment, Peterson has filed four petitions for reinstatement. One petition was voluntarily withdrawn in 1965, and the other three petitions were denied. In re Application for Reinstatement of Peterson, 275 Minn. 559, 146 N.W.2d 768 (1968); In re Application for Reinstatement of Peterson, 288 Minn. 550, 181 N.W.2d 341 (1970); In re Application of Peterson, 274 N.W.2d 922 (Minn.1979).

Peterson's latest petition for reinstatement was filed in 1974. From the time the petition was filed in 1974 to the time it was denied in 1979, Peterson was given three hearings, and the hearing officers from each hearing recommended denial of Peterson's petition for reinstatement. The Minnesota Supreme Court originally denied the latest petition on March 29, 1976, then agreed to a rehearing en banc. Before the hearing was held, however, Peterson instituted this suit in federal court. The Minnesota Supreme Court postponed the rehearing pending the outcome of this federal lawsuit.

In federal court the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that the federal court lacked jurisdiction and that the plaintiff failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. This Court (per Judge Miles W. Lord) ruled on February 13, 1978 that it would have jurisdiction over those claims the state court did not consider; that the Minnesota Supreme Court justices are immune from monetary damages but are not immune from equitable relief; and that in the interests of comity and federalism, the federal proceedings should be stayed pending a decision by the Minnesota Supreme Court. Subsequently, the Minnesota Supreme Court denied Peterson's petition for reinstatement. Trial was set in the federal action.

I. Preliminary Matters

At trial this Court preliminarily dealt with two motions: first, defendants' motion to dismiss; and second, defendants' motion to quash two subpoenas issued at the request of the plaintiff.

Motion to Dismiss

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss 20 days before the trial date, and filed a supporting brief several days later; plaintiff submitted a memorandum in opposition to the motion. Because of the relatively late date of the filing of the motion and because of the logistics involved in this Court's trial of the matter by special designation, a preliminary ruling on the motion was issued limiting the litigation to the trial of the equal protection claim with leave for the parties to orally argue the issues at the time of trial. This Court heard oral arguments the day of trial and reaffirmed its preliminary ruling that the triable issue was limited to the equal protection claim.

The defendants' motion to dismiss was based on two grounds: first, that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction; and second, that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim for which relief may be granted, on the theory that the state court decision is res judicata.¹

Jurisdiction. This Court has entertained serious doubts about its jurisdiction to hear the cause. A lower federal court is wholly without jurisdiction to review, in an appellate capacity, the merits of a state disciplinary proceeding. See Doe v. Pringle, 550 F.2d 596, 597 (10th Cir. 1976); MacKay v. Nesbett, 412 F.2d 846, 846 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 960, 90 S.Ct. 435, 24 L.Ed.2d 425 (1969); Jones v. Hulse, 391 F.2d 198, 201 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 889, 89 S.Ct. 206, 21 L.Ed.2d 167 (1968); In re Rhodes, 370 F.2d 411, 413 (8th Cir. 1967); Ginger v. Circuit Court for the County of Wayne, 372 F.2d 621, 625 (6th Cir. 1967); In re Noell, 93 F.2d 5, 7 (8th Cir. 1937). As defendants point out, the United States Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction to review final judgments of a state court. 28 U.S.C. § 1257. Even review by the United States Supreme Court is limited to narrow constitutional issues. See Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 281, 77 S.Ct. 1274, 1 L.Ed.2d 1342 (1957); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239, 77 S.Ct. 752, 1 L.Ed.2d 796 (1957); Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252, 273, 77 S.Ct. 722, 1 L.Ed.2d 810 (1957). Although the case law overwhelmingly supports very limited federal court review of state court disciplinary proceedings, the Eighth Circuit, in a footnote in Goodrich v. Supreme Court of South Dakota, 511 F.2d 316, 318 n.8 (8th Cir. 1975), indicated that a federal court is not entirely without jurisdiction to consider some claims arising out of a state disciplinary proceeding:

8 In Jones v. Hulse, . . . we declined to entertain an action alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 where the claims raised had been previously decided by the state court on the ground that federal courts are without jurisdiction to review, in an appellate capacity, state courts. It is clear from the cases cited in Jones, however, that where the federal action is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the federal court does have jurisdiction to consider the constitutional claims not previously decided by the state court. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3). (Citations omitted.)

This Court reads the Goodrich footnote to mean that it has jurisdiction to review those constitutional claims not "previously decided" by the state court. In the preliminary order of June 11, 1979, this Court said:

In this jurisdictional context in which comity concerns predominate, the question is not whether the legal and factual issues in this Court and state court are identical in the res judicata/collateral estoppel sense, . . . but whether the constitutional issues sought to be litigated in federal court are inherent in the decision of the state court decision . .. If the constitutional issues are inherent in the decision of the state court, then in reaching its decision it is appropriate to presume that the state court decided the issues adversely to plaintiff, especially where, as here, the state court was fully aware of plaintiff's pending federal constitutional claims at the time it denied reinstatement.

June 11, 1979, Preliminary Memorandum and Order, p. 6.

The Minnesota Supreme Court summarized the events that led to the plaintiff's original disbarment and his subsequent attempts to be reinstated, and outlined the procedural protection afforded the plaintiff in his latest petition for reinstatement. In light of the thorough review by the Minnesota Supreme Court, it is reasonable to presume that the state court would have recognized a procedural or substantive due process violation in the denial of the petition for reinstatement. The finding that there was no denial of substantive or procedural due process inheres in the state court opinion. The litigation of the due process issue in the federal litigation would require an examination of the records already thoroughly reviewed by the Minnesota Supreme Court, and such an examination by this Court would be similar to a review of the merits. See Schware, Konigsberg, supra. A federal district court lacks jurisdiction for such appellate review.

In much the same way, the Minnesota Supreme Court discussed the standards by which it would review a petition for reinstatement; in particular, the Minnesota court carefully distinguished the standard of "professional moral character" from a standard of "personal moral character." This explanation of the required "moral" standard eliminates any reasonable basis to presume that an applicant must pass an impermissible religious test in seeking reinstatement. As with the due process issue, any examination of this establishment of religion claim would require improper review of the state court decision by a federal district court.

This Court, therefore, lacks jurisdiction to consider either the due process or establishment of religion claims inherent in the Minnesota Supreme Court opinion. An examination of those claims would require appellate review of the state court judgment, and this Court lacks jurisdiction to conduct such review.

As to the equal protection claim, however, it is not clear that the Minnesota Supreme Court examined this issue. In fact, the plaintiff's equal protection claim would require the introduction of additional evidence not ordinarily...