Peterson v. Village of Cokato
| Decision Date | 18 October 1901 |
| Docket Number | 12,756 - (59) |
| Citation | 87 N.W. 615,84 Minn. 205 |
| Parties | EMMA H. A. PETERSON v. VILLAGE OF COKATO |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Action in the district court for Wright county to recover $10,000 for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by a defective sidewalk in defendant village. The case was tried before Giddings, J., and a jury, which rendered a verdict in favor of plaintiff for $1,500. From an order denying a motion for judgment in its favor notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial, defendant appealed. Affirmed.
Village -- Statutory Control of Streets.
The general statutes providing for the incorporation of villages confer upon the municipalities the exclusive control and supervision of all streets and public grounds within their limits, invest the authorities with power to levy and collect taxes to keep and maintain the same in repair, and from this follow the duty and obligation to do so. The court takes judicial notice of this statutory duty, and it is not necessary to plead or prove the statutes.
Incorporation under General Statutes.
It is held in this action that it sufficiently appears from the record that defendant was incorporated as a village under the general statutes of the state.
Personal Injury -- Service of Notice -- Village Recorder.
To be effectual as a notice to the common council of an incorporated village, the notice of claim for damages required to be given by Laws 1897, c. 248, where served upon the village recorder, as custodian of the records and files of the council, must be served upon that officer at his office or place of transacting the official business pertaining to his office. It is held in this case that the evidence is sufficient to justify a finding of a proper service of such notice.
Personal Injury -- Village Council.
Where the notice is thus properly served, it is immaterial, in so far as the right of recovery against the municipality is concerned, whether the recorder presented the same to the village council for their action or not.
Verdict Sustained by Evidence.
Evidence examined and considered, and held to sustain the verdict of the jury.
A. T Larson and James C. Tarbox, for appellant.
F. E Latham, for respondent.
Action for damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the defective condition of a sidewalk in defendant village. Plaintiff had a verdict in the court below, and defendant appeals from an order denying a new trial. There are several assignments of error, but counsel for appellant discuss in their brief only four propositions.
1. It is contended that there was no evidence to show that defendant was charged by law with the duty to keep and maintain its streets and highways in good repair for public use, and that because of the absence of this evidence the action should have been dismissed by the court below.
The duty imposed upon a municipality to keep and maintain its streets in reasonably good condition for public use is, of course, statutory, and, unless defendant in this case was charged by its incorporation with that duty, no recovery can be had against it. The general statutes providing for the incorporation of villages expressly confer upon the municipalities the exclusive control and supervision of all streets, highways, and public grounds within their limits, and invest the authorities with power to levy and collect taxes to keep and maintain such streets and public grounds in good repair for public use; and from this follows the duty on the part of the corporation to do so. The court takes judicial notice of this statutory duty and obligation, and it is not necessary to plead or prove the statute.
The only question in this connection is whether it sufficiently appears from the pleadings and evidence that defendant was incorporated under the general statutes providing for the incorporation of villages. It seems to us that there can be no serious controversy but that such fact is shown. It is alleged in the complaint that "Defendant was, and still is, a municipal corporation duly organized, created, and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the state of Minnesota for the general purposes of municipal government, including the purpose, among other things, of maintaining streets, highways, and side walks thereon."
The answer expressly admits that defendant is a municipal corporation organized and existing under the laws of the state.
Under these allegations of the complaint and admissions of the answer it must be presumed that defendant was incorporated under the general statutes, for at the present time there is no other mode of becoming incorporated as a village. As noted above, the general statutes impose upon a village the duty and responsibility of keeping its streets and highways in reasonably safe repair for public use, and if the defendant was for any reason relieved of that responsibility by the manner of its incorporation or otherwise the burden was under by the manner of its incorporation or otherwise the burden was, under the pleadings, upon it to show the fact. If defendant was so incorporated (and it must be presumed under the pleadings that it was), it could not be relieved of that duty. It was bound to assume and perform all duties and obligations imposed by the provisions of the statute under which...
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