Petition of Board of School Directors of the Hampton Tp. School Dist. for Approval of a Private Sale of Real Estate to Graziano Const. & Development Co., Inc.
| Citation | 688 A.2d 279 |
| Parties | 115 Ed. Law Rep. 985 In re Petition of the BOARD OF SCHOOL DIRECTORS OF THE HAMPTON TOWNSHIP SCHOOL DISTRICT FOR APPROVAL OF A PRIVATE SALE OF REAL ESTATE TO GRAZIANO CONSTRUCTION & DEVELOPMENT CO., INC. (Two Cases). Appeal of Walter J. BLENKO, Jr. and Cathy J. Mall, Appellants. Appeal of Amber F. BIERKAN and Barbara Millerschoen, Appellants. |
| Decision Date | 31 January 1997 |
| Court | Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court |
Robert L. Byer, Pittsburgh, for appellants, Walter Blenko and Cathy Mall.
John H. Riordan, Jr., Pittsburgh, for appellants, Amber Bierkan and Barbara Millerschoen.
Donald J. Palmer, Pittsburgh, for appellee.
Before FRIEDMAN and KELLEY, JJ., and RODGERS, Senior Judge.
Walter J. Blenko, Jr. and Cathy Mall (objectors) appeal from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County (trial court), which granted the Hampton Township School District's (school district) petition for approval of private sale of real property to Graziano Construction & Development Co., Inc. (Graziano).
On July 19, 1995, the school district's board of directors (school board) issued a resolution, stating that the subject property was unused and unnecessary, and entered into an agreement to sell the property to Graziano by private sale for the sum of $950,000. The July 19, 1995 resolution further directed the officers of the school board to petition the trial court for approval of the proposed sale, pursuant to the requirement set forth in section 707(3) of the Public School Code of 1949. 1
Thereafter, the school district filed with the trial court a petition for approval of private sale of real estate (petition for approval of sale). Attached to the petition were two affidavits from real estate appraisers, who attested to the reasonableness of the price. A hearing on the school district's petition for approval of sale was scheduled for December 14, 1995.
Members of the public who opposed the sale attended the December 14, 1995 proceeding. The trial court asked what authority the objectors had to stop a sale of property that had been approved by a majority of the school board. Reproduced Record (R.) at 27a. Counsel for the objectors responded that the objectors were entitled to a hearing as to the fairness and reasonableness of the sale price of the property, pursuant to section 707(3) of the Public School Code of 1949. The trial court then asked: "Do you have to have a hearing on this?" Id.
Counsel for the objectors referred the trial court to section 707(3) of the Public School Code of 1949. The trial court stated that "[the statute is] just saying that you have to have a public sale if this property isn't a reasonable price." Id. Counsel for the school district reminded the trial court that it had provided the affidavits of two real estate experts indicating that the price was fair. R. at 27-28a. However, counsel for the objectors advised the trial court that the fairness of the sale was at issue. R. at 29a. Counsel for the objectors further explained that he believed that the appraisers had based their evaluation on an inappropriate zoning classification and that the price, therefore, was not fair and reasonable. R. at 29a. As such, counsel for the objectors stated that he wished to question the appraisers. R. at 33a. The trial court subsequently informed the parties that it would review the matter and determine whether the objectors were entitled to a public hearing. R. at 34a.
Thereafter, the trial court issued an order granting the school district's petition for approval of sale. In an opinion in support of its order, the trial court stated that the school district had satisfied its burden by adopting the resolution and by complying with the statute. The trial court further concluded that the objectors had failed to establish that a higher bid was offered or that the purchase price was unreasonable. In addition, the trial court noted that it would have the discretion to approve the proposed sale even if the school district had received a higher offer for the subject property, pursuant to Divine Providence Hospital Appeal, 31 Pa.Cmwlth. 431, 376 A.2d 1009 (1977). The objectors appealed the trial court's order to this court. 2
In this appeal, the objectors present the following issue for our review: In granting a contested petition by a school board for approval of a private sale of real estate, did the trial court commit reversible error by failing to conduct a hearing as required by section 707(3) of the Public School Code of 1949? 3
The objectors argue that a trial court cannot approve a private sale without first conducting a hearing to determine whether "the price offered" for the property "is a fair and reasonable one and ... a better price than could be obtained at a public sale...." 24 P.S. § 7-707(3). The objectors further contend that the December 14, 1995 proceeding did not constitute a hearing for purposes of section 707(3) of the Public School Code of 1949, and that the trial court, therefore, failed to satisfy a condition precedent to its approval of the sale.
In support of their position, the objectors cite our Supreme Court's decision in Unora v. Glen Alden, 377 Pa. 7, 104 A.2d 104 (1954). In Unora, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed a decision of the former Workmen's Compensation Board, which had determined a disability issue without conducting a statutorily required hearing. In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court reasoned that:
A hearing is not granted to a litigant simply to provide him with a forum for rhetorical expression. The right to be heard constitutes not only the right to talk; it includes the right on the part of the litigant to listen to what the tribunal has to say and to offer advice and counsel. The right to be heard encompasses the right also to give ear to one's adversary and to object, if necessary.
Id. at 11-12, 104 A.2d at 106; see also Kurren Appeal, 417 Pa. 623, 208 A.2d 853 (1965) () (emphasis in original). The objectors further rely on Petition of Fried-El Corporation, 81 Pa.Cmwlth. 493, 474 A.2d 713, 718 (1984) ().
Although the cases cited in the preceding paragraph are based on statutes other than the one at issue, they offer guidance as to the purposes of a statutorily mandated hearing. In the matter herein, the December 14, 1995 proceeding did not satisfy these purposes. The public did not have the opportunity to offer evidence or to be heard. 4
The school district maintains that the objectors had a full opportunity to participate at the December 14, 1995 proceeding, but failed to: offer a higher bid, proffer affirmative substantive evidence of unreasonableness of price, or allege fraud or an abuse of discretion on the part of the school board. Furthermore, the school district contends that the trial court properly recognized that the objectors' position was based on the desirability or wisdom of the sale, which are discretionary matters, and believed that the requested "testimonial proceedings" would have been irrelevant. These arguments are without merit.
The hearing in question was not discretionary, but statutorily required. As such, it is inappropriate to suggest that objectors were required to prove their entitlement to a hearing by presenting offers of proof or to speculate that the objectors would have presented irrelevant testimony if a hearing had been held.
Finally, the trial court's reliance on Divine Providence Hospital Appeal is misplaced. In Divine Providence Hospital Appeal, we vacated a trial court's order disapproving a private sale of property on the basis of an insufficient record. Id. 376 A.2d at 1011. In the course of our analysis, we acknowledged that in some circumstances, a trial court would have to approve a private sale even in the face of a higher offer. Id. at 1011 n. 1. A reading of our opinion in Divine Providence...
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