Petition of Centracchio

• Decision Date: 16 January 1963
• Citation: 345 Mass. 342,187 N.E.2d 383
• Parties: Petition of Anthony A. CENTRACCHIO.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 383

187 N.E.2d 383

345 Mass. 342

Petition of Anthony A. CENTRACCHIO.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued Dec. 5, 1962.

Decided Jan. 16, 1963.

George A. McLaughlin, Boston (Charles S. McLaughlin, Boston, with him), for petitioner. petitioner.

Joseph W. Bartlett and Claude B. Cross, Boston, for Boston Bar Ass'n.

Before WILKINS, C. J., and SPALDING, WHITTEMORE, CUTTER, SPIEGEL and REARDON, JJ.

WILKINS, Chief Justice.

The petitioner, a former special justice of a District Court, was disbarred by an order of this court on which judgment was entered on April 21, 1954. On May 15, 1961, after more than five years had elapsed, he filed this petition for readmission to the bar which was referred to the Board of Bar Examiners pursuant to Rule 1(7) of the General Rules (1952), 328 Mass. 732-733. The petitioner received a passing mark in one of the regular bar examinations, and the board determined that he possesses 'sufficient intellectual acquirements and qualifications to warrant his admission to the bar.'

As required by Rule 1(7), ¹ the board conducted a hearing on the moral character of the petitioner at which the petitioner and twenty-two witnesses testified. The report of the board contained a summary of findings of a single justice in the disbarment case. 'The respondent [the petitioner here] filed fraudulent federal income tax returns for the years 1945, 1946, 1947 and 1948. An indictment returned in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts alleged understatements of taxable income in the amount of $2965.98 for the year 1945 as against a true figure of $10,052.39, and discrepancies for the three following years, which, added to the 1945 figures amounted to a stated total of $26,434.22, whereas the true figure for the four years together was $84,297.01. * * * The taxes paid for the four years were $22,027.11 less than should have been paid.' At the trial 'the only defense was that of a voluntary disclosure * * *. ² The jury found the defendant not guilty by reason of the disclosure. The acquittal had no bearing on the inquiry into the conduct of a member of the bar as an officer of the court.'

The respondent (the petitioner here) had fee splitting arrangements with doctors and claimed as credits on his tax returns payments to them in currency. Thirteen doctors participated in arrangements whereby each in return for referring tort cases received one half of the total of the lawyer's fee and the doctor's charges. In the period from 1945 to 1949 there were 374 such transactions, the doctors being paid a total of $22,993.50 by check for their services and $30,718.75 in cash for the referrals. The petitioner made a full settlement of the fraudulently withheld Federal taxes. He resigned his judicial office during the hearing of the disbarment petition. The single justice considered these mitigating acts and noted the petitioner's regret for his conduct, but found that the offences were so flagrant that nothing short of separation from the bar would suffice.

In its report the board made certain findings, namely: Since his disbarment the petitioner has not practised law. His principal source of income has been commissions on the sale of life and other insurance. He holds a State broker's license. In his dealings with two brokerage firms he has acted in good faith and has not engaged in unethical practices. Not long after his disbarment he underwent a decided change of personality. Whereas previously he was described as 'cocky' and 'arrogant,' he became quiet and remorseful. He sought help from his pastors. He did not attend meetings of societies to which he belonged. He avoided his former friends. He was not critical of the court. He coperated with the authorities in the hearings which led to the disciplining of the doctors.

The board concluded that the evidence before it affirmatively established that at the date of the report, which was December 14, 1961, the petitioner was of good moral character. The final paragraph of the board's report is as follows: 'The opinion in re Keenan, 313 Mass. 186 and earlier cases state the principle that judgment of removal from office continues to be evidence against a former officer with respect to moral character at later times. Whether, in the instant case it should be held that * * * [the petitioner's] previous offenses were so serious that good moral character at present cannot be found, the board does not consider to be within its province. It is to be noted in this connection, however, that the evidence showed that none of the tort cases on which the disbarment was based, was considered by the insurance companies to be, or suspected of being a fraudulent case and that the plaintiffs received what they were entitled to. ³ The offenses were offenses against [the] government and taxpayers generally and statutory offenses set out in statutes for the protection of the bar and the courts.'

With respect to the last sentence in the foregoing quotation it should be emphasized that there was also a breach of professional duty to the clients of the petitioner, who, of course, were the patients of the doctors. As the single justice in the disbarment case found, the payments to the doctors 'would ordinarily greatly exceed any sum which could legitimately be charged for medical services.' And as was said of one of the doctors who referred cases to the petitioner, 'The whole scheme was in violation of the trust and confidence reposed in both the lawyer and the doctor. It tended to increase expenses unduly. It was an inducement to the fomenting of litigation, to the exaggeration of claims, to false testimony, and even to the lessening of the proper interest of the doctor in promptly curing his patients, and it diverted patients from honest lawyers to the detriment of the administration of justice.' Forziati v. Board of Registration in Medicine, 333 Mass. 125, 128, 128 N.E.2d 789, 791. The report was filed on January 23, 1962, and in accordance with General Rule 1(7) a single justice, who had not entered the disbarment order, was designated to hear the matter. The rule provides: 'At such hearing the report shall have the weight and effect of an auditor's report in an action at law.' This means 'prima...