Petition of Colonial Trust Company

• Decision Date: 17 September 1954
• Docket Number: No. 4530.,4530.
• Citation: 124 F. Supp. 73
• Parties: In the Matter of the Petition of the COLONIAL TRUST COMPANY and Elizabeth Deborah Steele Elton, as owners of the pleasure yacht, "Charlotte" her engines, etc. in a cause of exoneration from or limitation of liability.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut

124 F. Supp. 73

In the Matter of the Petition of the COLONIAL TRUST COMPANY and Elizabeth Deborah Steele Elton, as owners of the pleasure yacht, "Charlotte" her engines, etc. in a cause of exoneration from or limitation of liability.

No. 4530.

United States District Court D. Connecticut, Admiralty Division.

September 17, 1954.

Walter F. Torrance, Jr., Carmody & Torrance, Waterbury, Conn., for petitioner.

John J. Kinney, Jr., New Haven, Conn., and Frederick R. Houde, Branford, Conn., for claimant.

ANDERSON, District Judge.

The parties, by stipulation, have presented to the court a statement of facts and three questions to be answered in relation to them. These questions are: (1) does admiralty jurisdiction apply; (2) is the Colonial Trust Company, as trustee, an owner within the meaning of the provisions of the limitation of liability statute 46 U.S.C.A. § 183(a); and (3) is the petitioner Mrs. Elizabeth Deborah Steele Elton an "owner" within the provisions of the same statute.

At the time of his death on March 8, 1948, John P. Elton, of Waterbury, Connecticut, owned a gasoline-screw, cabin-cruiser, the "Charlotte," which was twenty-five feet nine inches in length. The "Charlotte" formed a part of the said John P. Elton's residuary estate, which under the terms of his will, was left to the Colonial Trust Company, of Waterbury, Connecticut, in trust, for the use of his wife, Elizabeth Deborah Steele Elton, the petitioner, during her life with the remainder to other persons. From the date of Mr. Elton's death to the date of this action, the "Charlotte" was held in the name of the Colonial Trust Company as trustee. Mrs. Elton had the sole possession, custody and control of the boat which was used by her for pleasure. The boat was operated and maintained for her by her employee, one Ezekiel Acebo.

The remaining facts set forth in the stipulation are as follows:

"On November 15, 1952, the `Charlotte' was placed in storage for the winter in a boat house in Stony Creek, Branford, Connecticut. This boat house was privately owned and operated and charged boat owners a fee for winter storage therein. On November 17, 1952, the Claimant, Elmer E. Reff of the Town of Branford, entered into said boat house and upon the `Charlotte' for the purpose of winterizing her engine. While the Claimant was within the `Charlotte', an explosion and fire occurred causing extensive damage to the boat and personal injuries to the Claimant. The Claimant alleges that negligence on the part of Captain Acebo in the preparation of the `Charlotte' for storage was the proximate cause of his injuries.

"The `Charlotte' was owned and used solely as a pleasure yacht and at no time was ever used for hire. The operation of this boat when in the waters was normally restricted to the waters of Long Island Sound in the immediate vicinity of Stony Creek."

On November 13, 1953, a civil negligence action was brought by Elmer E. Reff against the petitioners in the Superior Court of the State of Connecticut in which Reff sought $25,000 damages for his personal injuries. In the present proceeding the petitioners seek to have that action enjoined upon the taking of jurisdiction by the admiralty court and to have liability limited under the statute, 46 U.S.C.A. § 183(a).

The three questions propounded in the stipulation are all answered in the affirmative.

In connection with the first question, the claimant urges that admiralty jurisdiction should not apply in a case such as this where the vessel is completely upon dry land and in storage in a boat house. While there might be some merit in that argument if this were an ordinary claim in admiralty, it cannot prevail where the purpose of taking jurisdiction in admiralty is the application of the limitation of liability statute.

"Proceedings by vessel owners to limit their liability as permitted by the Acts of Congress relating thereto are within the general maritime law and admiralty jurisdiction, and form an independent head of jurisdiction without regard to whether the claims limited against are such as might be sued upon in admiralty or not." Benedict on Admiralty, 6th Edition, Volume 1, page 332.

A very similar case was ruled upon in The Trim Too, D.C., 39 F.Supp. 271 in which the above quoted paragraph from Benedict was cited together with the leading cases which have enunciated and reiterated the policy that the statute should be liberally construed to encourage the building, maintenance and operation of sea-going vessels, and that it applies to non-maritime as well as maritime torts. The Main v. Williams, 152 U.S. 122, 14 S.Ct. 486, 38 L.Ed. 381; Richardson v. Harmon, 222 U.S. 96, 32 S.Ct. 27, 56 L.Ed. 110; Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383, 668, 61 S.Ct. 687, 85 L.Ed. 903. See also Evansville & Bowling Green Packet Co. v. Chero Cola Bottling Co., 271 U.S. 19, 46 S.Ct. 379, 70 L.Ed. 805.

In Coryell v. Phipps, 317 U.S. 406, at page 411, 63 S.Ct. 291, at page 293, 87 L.Ed. 363 the Supreme Court referred to "the well settled policy to administer the statute not `with a tight and grudging hand' (Mr. Justice Bradley in Providence & New York S. S. Co. v. Hill Mfg. Co., 109 U.S. 578, 589, 3 S.Ct. 379, 386, 617, 27 L.Ed. 1038) but `broadly and liberally' so as `to achieve its purpose to encourage investments in shipbuilding and to afford an opportunity for the determination of claims against the vessel and its owner.'" That this was a small pleasure craft does not preclude the operation of the statute. The Francesca, D.C., 19 F.Supp. 829.

Congress has made no exception of pleasure craft either afloat or hauled out on ways or in storage. It is well nigh the universal practice in the northern half of the Atlantic sea-board to place craft of sixty feet or less on land on poppets or in cradles and covered for winter storage. For the purpose of the limitation of liability statute it should not be held that they lose their maritime character as sea-going vessels because they are temporarily stored ashore as a regular part of their maintenance. There is reason behind a policy of encouraging the building of pleasure craft as well as larger commercial vessels. It gives additional work to...