Petition of Dade County Bar Ass'n President's and State Attorney's Special Committee

Decision Date25 November 1959
Citation116 So.2d 1
PartiesPetition of DADE COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION PRESIDENT'S AND STATE ATTORNEY'S SPECIAL COMMITTEE.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

William J. Pruitt, Miami, for appellant.

Reginald L. Williams, C. Clyde Atkins, Perry Nichols and Murray Sams, Jr., Miami, for appellee.

DREW, Justice.

The question here is whether a circuit judge has the power to appoint a committee of lawyers to conduct an investigation of alleged unethical practices by officers of his court within his jurisdiction 1 and to empower such committee so appointed by him to procure the attendance of witnesses before it by subpoena.

The committee appointed by the circuit judge to conduct the investigation (whose authority to do so is here being questioned) issued a subpoena duces tecum to a member of the Bar of Dade County requiring him to appear before the committee on a designated date and to bring with him certain files including employment contracts, settlement statements and records and all financial transactions relating to certain specified matters described in the subpoena. The attorney to whom the subpoena was directed moved to quash the subpoena and to require the committee appointed by the circuit judge to show cause why the order appointing said committee should not be vacated, set aside and held for naught and the subpoena so served upon the attorney should not be quashed. After hearing the motion and considering the same, the circuit judge entered an order denying the motion to quash and the other relief prayed for therein. In said order he observed that '* * * [t]he court is of the opinion that it has the inherent power to conduct a general investigation of unethical conduct of attorneys and can by order delegate such investigation to others. * * *' On the same day the order denying the motion to quash was entered, the attorney filed his notice of appeal to this Court and immediately thereafter filed in this Court a certified copy of such notice and a motion to stay further proceedings before the circuit judge pending the disposition of the matter in this Court. Upon consideration of the matter here, this Court determined to treat the petition and the notice of appeal as a petition for review and stayed further proceedings pending a determination of the cause on the merits.

The questioned order is obviously not one subject to review by appeal in the technical sense. The circuit court and the committee appointed by it are arms of this Court exercising jurisdiction in a field exclusively ours. Under the present Constitution and rules we hold that their acts may be reviewed at any time on informal motions such as was filed in this case and that this Court may stay further action whenever, in our judgment, it should be done.

The Constitution 2 provides that this Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the discipline of persons admitted to the Bar of this State and that it may provide for the handling of disciplinary matters in circuit courts and the district courts of appeal or by commissions consisting of members of the Bar to be designated by it, subject to its supervision and review. Prior to the effective date of the present Article V, which vested in this Court the power above delineated, certain officers of the Florida Bar were authorized to conduct and carry on disciplinary proceedings under the applicable provisions of the integration rule 3 and the circuit judges of this State were vested with the same power under certain ancient applicable state statutes and their inherent powers. The integration rule, prior to the effective date of Article V, contained a provision that nothing in said rule should be construed as limiting or altering the power of the circuit court to discipline attorneys as that power existed at the time of the adoption of said rule. 4 The rule did require any judgment of disbarment or suspension entered by any circuit court to be filed in the Supreme Court of the State of Florida and one copy to be furnished to the Executive Director of the Florida Bar for filing in its records. 5 Following the effective date of present Article V, the integration rule relating to disciplinary proceedings was amended for the purpose of delegating to the district courts as well as the circuit courts authority in connection with disciplinary matters which were brought to their attention. 6 This was accomplished by amending paragraph 6 of Article XI of the rule to read substantially the same as Section 454.24, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., the only change being to expand the scope of the rule to include the district courts of appeal as well as the circuit courts and to make minor changes in the rule to conform to and be in harmony with other provisions of said rule and the pertinent portions of the recently amended Article V.

The history which we have related clearly demonstrates the purpose of this Court to preserve intact the jurisdiction of the circuit courts in disciplinary proceedings and to make the jurisdiction and powers of the circuit court and the designated officers of the Florida Bar concurrent in these proceedings. The rule provides that the first to take jurisdiction shall retain the same to the exclusion of the other until the final determination of the cause. The obvious purpose and intent of the rules of this Court adopted subsequent to the effective date of Article V was to continue the same power in the circuit courts over this subject that these courts had always exercised and that we had held was inherent in them. And so it is that at the time these proceedings were commenced before the circuit court and its committee appointed to conduct the investigation, the circuit court was vested with substantially the same power it had historically exercised in matters of this kind. 7

We now direct our attention to the question of whether the power of the circuit courts to disbar and discipline attorneys carries with it the power to conduct investigations or cause such to be conducted by its duly appointed officers. In 1936 this Court authorized circuit judges to appoint commissioners to investigate complaints of alleged misconduct of attorneys and held that the action of circuit courts in disciplinary proceedings were judicial in character and necessarily contemplated that an inquiry be made at any time by the court in the nature of an investigation and that an order for such investigation is but the exercise of an inherent disciplinary jurisdiction which the court has over its officers. 8 Nothing that has happened since then, either by constitutional amendment, decisions or rules of this court, 9 in any way alters the validity of that pronouncement. It is clearly applicable at the present time and in the present case. Moreover, it is significant that the integration rule provides for investigations of the nature now being conducted by the circuit court and by the Board of Governors of the Florida Bar. The rule provides, in express terms, that the Board of Governors or its duly appointed committees, 'shall have power to investigate or cause to be investigated all misconduct by members of the Florida Bar, active or retired, that may be brought to the attention of the Board or such committees for the purpose of determining whether there is probable cause to believe that a member or members have been guilty of misconduct justifying disciplinary action. Such investigating body may initiate investigations at any time and place deemed by it advisable, and it shall have power to summons witnesses, to administer oaths, and to order the production of books, records, or other documentary evidence.' Provision is made in the rule for enforcing compliance with proper orders and directions of the Board of Governors by circuit judges. There is no reasonable basis to contend that the circuit courts of this State, whose power in these matters has been so carefully and meticulously preserved in our rule, would not now have the power that we said they had in 1936 and which, by specific rule in this Court, has been extended to officers of the Florida Bar.

Moreover, traditional concepts of due process and fair play, so important in our scheme of government, clearly comprehend a full and complete investigation before charges are preferred against an officer of the court. The petitioner here does not question the authority of a circuit judge to require the state's attorney to file a motion to disbar but by some strange process of reasoning seems to conclude that such circuit judge does not have the power to appoint its officers to conduct an investigation and determine in advance whether probable cause exists to warrant the exercise of his power to instruct the state's attorney to make such a serious accusation. This process of investigation before charges are made assures a far greater degree of protection to the members of the Bar and undoubtedly will tend to prevent the accusation of innocent individuals. In the profession of the law, a good reputation is the practitioner's most valuable asset. It is unfortunate, but nevertheless true, that public accusation of dishonest or unethical conduct, whether valid or not, leaves an everlasting scar. Whatever may be reasonably done to prevent such damage and unwarranted publicity, should be done. We think the procedure adopted in this case is a step in that direction.

The circuit judge did not vest in the committee appointed unlimited or unbridled power to conduct unlimited investigations or, as has been suggested, 'witch hunts.' The petition of the Bar concerns itself with 'the unethical solicitation of personal injury litigation.' It brings to the court's attention newspaper articles concerning attorneys and doctors and other offending parties involved in this specific course of alleged misconduct and it prays for the appointment of a committee to investigate complaints of professional misconduct of attorneys at the Bar of the Circuit Court of Dade County ...

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5 cases
  • Bannister, Matter of
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • December 4, 1975
    ...808, 811, 420 P.2d 374 (1966); In re Supreme Court License Fees, 251 Ark. 800, 483 S.W.2d 174, 175 (1972); Petition of Dade County Bar Ass'n, 116 So.2d 1, 4--5 (Fla.1959). This court also has inherent power to order an investigation of grievances if it considers the information it receives ......
  • The Florida Bar v. Massfeller, 33380
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • July 15, 1964
    ...court are but a recognition of the inherent power of the judiciary to discipline members of the Bar. See Petition of Dade County Bar Ass'n, etc., Sp. Committee, Fla., 116 So.2d 1. The power of courts to discipline attorneys at law is as ancient as the common law itself. As early as the 13th......
  • Murrell v. Florida Bar
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • July 20, 1960
    ...ordered and directed to cease and desist from taking disciplinary action against petitioner. Petition of Dade County Bar Association President's and State Attorney's Special Committee, 116 So.2d 1. As reasons therefor, he alleges the 1. That the complaint of Hudson Thomas and Roman Proske, ......
  • Hodkin v. State
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • December 16, 1970
    ...PER CURIAM: The appeal and petition for certiorari heretofore filed herein are considered to be a petition for review (Petition of Dade County Bar, etc., Fla., 116 So.2d 1) and the cause is hereby set for oral argument before this Court at 9:30 o'clock a.m., Wednesday, March 10, 1971 with t......
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