Petitioner F. v. Respondent R.

• Decision Date: 29 April 1981
• Citation: 430 A.2d 1075
• Parties: PETITIONER F., Petitioner Below, Appellant, v. RESPONDENT R., Respondent Below, Appellee.
• Court: Supreme Court of Delaware

Page 1075

430 A.2d 1075

PETITIONER F., Petitioner Below, Appellant, v. RESPONDENT R., Respondent Below, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Delaware.

Submitted Nov. 13, 1980.

Decided April 29, 1981.

Upon appeal from Superior Court. Affirmed.

Joel D. Tenenbaum (argued) and Eliot Alazraki of Woloshin & Tenenbaum, P. A., Wilmington, for petitioner below-appellant.

Alene S. Berkowitz (argued) and Garry G. Greenstein of Knecht, Greenstein, Schagrin & Berkowitz, Wilmington, for respondent below-appellee.

Before HERRMANN, C.J., DUFFY and HORSEY, JJ.

HERRMANN, Chief Justice:

In this appeal we are required to decide whether a man claiming to be the natural father has standing to petition for custody or visitation rights with regard to a child conceived and born during the marriage of the natural mother to another who claims the child as his own. The mother and her husband have jointly acknowledged parentage of the child, and oppose the petition.

I.

On December 6, 1977, the respondent ("mother") gave birth to a child. On the birth certificate, her husband ("husband") is named as the father of the child.

On December 8, 1977, the petitioner ("putative father") filed a petition in Family Court seeking custody or visitation rights with regard to the child, under 13 Del.C. §§ 721 and 727. ¹ In his petition he alleged that he was the natural father of the child and that he was seeking custody of the child so that he might better provide for the needs of the child. In effect, his action was for a determination of his parentage of the child.

In response, the mother moved to dismiss the petition, alleging that, at the approximate time the child was conceived, she was married to and cohabiting with her husband; that she cohabited with her husband at the time of the birth of the child and that they continue to live together with the child and other children as a family unit; and that both she and her husband filed with the Prothonotary an affidavit, on February 13, 1978, certifying their parentage of the child.

The Family Court granted the mother's Motion to Dismiss, holding that the putative father lacked standing to file the petition for custody or visitation rights. The putative father appealed to the Superior Court, which likewise found him to be without standing. He now brings this appeal, claiming that the denial of standing deprives him of protections afforded by the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.

II.

Initially, we must determine whether the Family Court and Superior Court were correct in their conclusions that the putative father lacks standing to assert his claim under the pertinent statutory law.

As has been indicated, under our Custody Statute (13 Del.C., ch. 7, Subchapter II), only a "parent" has standing to initiate a child custody proceeding under § 721 and only a "parent" denied custody is entitled to visitation privileges under § 727. The word "parent" is undefined anywhere in the Custody Statute. Since it is ambiguous in that Statute, we must interpret the word in the context of the Statute: Did the General Assembly intend to include a putative father, under the circumstances of this case, within the word "parent" as used in §§ 721 and 727?

We think it unreasonable to assume that such was the legislative intent. Unfortunately, we must construe the Statute without benefit of any record of legislative intent. Nevertheless, to assume otherwise would be to conclude that the General Assembly intended to open the door to the invasion of continuing family stability by any man, whatever his motive, who may choose to claim an illicit paternity, thereby not only endangering that stability but also refuting the time-honored presumption of legitimacy of a child born during wedlock. See 10 Am.Jur.2d, "Bastards" § 11 (1963). ² Any such assumption of legislative intent would be incredible on its face; it is also contrary to the governmental interest of insulating a continuing marital and family relationship from the potentially ruinous effects of an outsider's claim to parentage of a child born ostensibly within wedlock.

The putative father here makes no distinction between biological parenthood and legal parenthood; he asserts that his claim of biological parenthood suffices to afford him standing to adjudicate that parenthood and to seek custody or visitation. We find this contention unacceptable. We hold that the word "parent," as used in § 721 and § 727, means a person standing in the legal relationship of parent to the child, i. e., one who is charged with the legal duties and responsibilities of parenthood and who is entitled to all the rights thereof. In the case of a married woman who bears a child her husband is the legal father and parent, under the presumption of legitimacy, carrying the duties and responsibilities and entitled to the rights of parenthood. It is in that legal sense, we conclude, that the word "parent" is used in §§ 721 and 727. The General Assembly has demonstrated throughout the Statutes governing parents and children its distinction between a "parent" in the ordinary sense of the word, and a "natural father," a status which required an explicit definition. See 13 Del.C. § 901 and § 1101. ³ It may be reasonably assumed that the General Assembly could and would have made that distinction in the drafting of §§ 721 and 727 if it had intended to do so.

We conclude that the putative father has no standing, under §§ 721 and 727 and the facts and circumstances of this case, to seek custody or visitation.

III.

Our conclusion presents the constitutional issues raised by the putative father.

A.

He asserts that he is constitutionally entitled to a hearing on the issue of his paternity because the right of a natural father to custody of his children is a substantial liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. In support of this proposition, he relies solely upon Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972).

Stanley involved an Illinois statute which, upon the death of an unwed mother, made her children wards of the state, conclusively presuming the unfitness of the father and denying him any right to be heard. Stanley, the acknowledged unwed father, had lived intermittently with his illegitimate children and their mother for eighteen years. When the mother died, the children were taken from his custody to become wards of the state, without any determination that he was an unfit parent. The United States Supreme Court struck down the statutory presumption and held that due process guaranteed Stanley a hearing on his fitness, stating: "The private interest here, that of a man in the children he has sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection." 405 U.S. at 651, 92 S.Ct. at 1212, 31 L.Ed.2d at 558. Acknowledging that the state had a legitimate interest in protecting the children's welfare, the Court in Stanley nevertheless found this interest outweighed by the "cognizable and substantial" interest of Stanley in maintaining a parental relationship with his children. ⁴ Id. at 652, 92 S.Ct. at 1213, 31 L.Ed.2d at 559.

In the present case, the putative father contends that Stanley affords due process protection to unwed fathers and that, consequently, he is entitled to an adjudication of his claim of parentage here. Stanley has been broadly interpreted as recognizing that unwed fathers are generally entitled to the protection of the Constitution. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 99 S.Ct. 1760, 60 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 98 S.Ct. 549, 54 L.Ed.2d 511 (1978); "Putative Fathers: Unwed, But No Longer Unprotected," 8 Hofstra L.Rev. 425 (1980). We fully agree with that concept as a general principle. It does not follow from Stanley, however, and the Supreme Court has not held in our view, that a man claiming paternity has a constitutionally protected interest in a determination of his parental status for purposes of obtaining custody or visitation rights with respect to a child conceived and born during the marriage and cohabitation of the child's mother to and with another who has not disavowed the child's legitimacy. Compare In re Lisa R., Calif.Supr., 13 Cal.3d 636, 119 Cal.Rptr. 475, 532 P.2d 123, cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1014, 95 S.Ct. 2421, 44 L.Ed.2d 682 (1975). ⁵ Unlike the instant case, Stanley did not involve the potentially uncertain and often turbulent issue of determining paternity; there, the unwed mother was deceased, the children had become wards of the State, and the unwed father was conceded by all parties to be the natural father. Stanley afforded constitutional recognition to the interest of a putative father "in the children he has sired and raised." That interest is certainly distinguishable from that of the putative father in this case who, in the eyes of the law and in actuality, is a stranger to the child. Most significantly, Stanley held that an unwed father's interest warranted due process protection "absent a powerful countervailing interest." In Stanley, there was no such interest; in this case, however, there exists the very powerful countervailing public interest in promoting the marital relationship, preserving intact an existing family unit, and protecting the minor child from confusion, torn affection, and the life-long stigma of illegitimacy. Thus, even assuming arguendo that the putative father has a constitutionally cognizable interest, that interest would be outweighed by the competing public interest and public policy in this case, and he must be denied judicial access.

In a related vein, the putative father argues that the denial of standing terminates his parental rights, in contravention of the procedural rights afforded by Chapter 11 of Title 13, dealing with the termination and transfer of parental rights. 13 Del.C. §§ 1101-1113. The putative father correctly notes that that chapter...