Petrello v. Prucka
| Decision Date | 27 January 2011 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. H-08-1933 |
| Parties | ANTHONY G PETRELLO, Plaintiff, v. MATTHEW W PRUCKA, et al, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
This preferentially set housing discrimination case is before the Court, following a final pretrial conference in advance of a second trial. See [Document No. 230]. Earlier a mistrial was declared when the jury failed to reach a verdict. However, on the eve of the trial the presiding judge recused himself, causing the case to be reassigned to the undersigned. Now having reviewed the Court's orders, pending motions, the record and the opinion of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Court is of the opinion that the plaintiffs cannot and have failed to establish a federal claim, as a matter of law. Therefore, this case should remanded to the 55th Judicial District Court of Harris County, Texas.
In late October 2007, Anthony Petrello learned that his next-door neighbors, Matthew and Sherry Prucka, would be selling their house. He wanted to purchase the Pruckas' house, and engaged Mr. Prucka in discussions about buying it. The parties' dispute a number of facts, but the essentials facts of their discussions are not in dispute. It is undisputed that the parties did not enter into a written agreement and that the Petrellos were intent on being excluded from anylisting agreement that the Pruckas might consummate with their own broker. Hence, when Peggy McGee, the Pruckas' broker who was also an employee of Heritage Texas Proeprties, L.P., completed a listing agreement with the Pruckas, the Petrellos were specifically excluded as persons of interest. However, the Petrellos made an oral offer of $6.5 million to the Pruckas for the house. The Pruckas promptly rejected the offer, expressing the desire to test the housing market.
The property was listed by the broker for $8,299, 500. Shortly thereafter, an offer of $7.6 million was made by Rahul and Usha Nath. The Petrellos were informed that the Pruckas had an offer that was in the range of their asking price. However, they refused to disclose the details of the offer. The Petrellos then made an offer of $8.2 million, net of commission. However, the Pruckas entered into an earnest money contract with the Naths and proceeded to close on the sale of their house to the Naths, which closing occurred on or about January 16, 2008. Earlier, on December 11, 2007, the Petrellos had filed a suit against the Pruckas and a lis pendens notice was filed against their house.
As stated, on December 11, 2007, the Petrellos filed a lawsuit in the 55th Judicial District Court of Harris County against the Pruckas and also filed a notice of lis pendens against the house. They allege that the Pruckas breached an oral agreement with them concerning the sale of their house, and sought, by their suit, to unwind the sale to the Naths so that they might purchase the house.
On July 8, 2008, the Petrellos amended their petition to allege that the Pruckas discriminated against them in the sale of their house. They allege that they desired to purchase the Prucka house so their daughter, who is disabled, and her medical team, would have space forher rehabilitation. They explained to the Pruckas that certain structural modifications would be necessary so that the house would meet their daughter's needs. The Petrellos claim that Mr. Prucka's statement that he preferred to sell the home to someone who would preserve the historical architectural integrity of the house, constituted discrimination against their disabled daughter.
In a volley of allegations and contentions, the Petrellos claim that the Pruckas, Heritage, McGee and the Naths, violated the Federal Fair Housing Act ("FHA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631, the Texas Fair Housing Act ("TFHA"), Tex. Prop. Code §§ 301.001-.171; the Houston Fair Housing Ordinance ("HFHO"), Title 17, 17-1 to 17-80; committed civil conspiracy, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1988; and breach of contract for which they sought equitable relief such as estoppel, constructive trust, tortious interference with existing contracts and with business relations, aiding and abetting, breach of auction and for declaratory relief.
On January 24, 2008, the Naths intervened in the case asserting separately, against the Petrellos, claims of tortious interference with the Prucka/Nath contract, violations of the TFHA and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Five months into the suit, and after an amended pleading a Notice of Removal was filed by both the Petrellos and the defendants.
Pursuant to Rule 50(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, judgment as a matter of law is warranted when "a party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial and the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue." Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1). Hence, "[a] motion for judgment as a matter of law is appropriate if, after considering the evidence presented and viewing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, the facts and inferences point sostrongly in favor of the movant that a rational jury could not arrive at a contrary verdict." Murray v. Red Kap Indus., Inc., 124 F.3d 695, 697 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing London v. MAC Corp. of Am., 44 F.3d 316, 318 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 829, 116 S. Ct. 99, 133 L. Ed.2d 53 (1995)). However, "if reasonable persons could differ in their interpretations of the evidence, then the motion should be denied." Bryant v. Compass Group USA Inc., 413 F.3d 471, 475 (5th Cir. 2005) Thomas v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, 220 F.3d 389, 392 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Baltazor v. Holmes, 162 F.3d 368, 373 (5th Cir. 1998)). While examining the record as a whole, "the Court 'should give credence to the evidence favoring the nonmovant as well as that evidence supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached, at least to the extent that that evidence comes from disinterested witnesses.'" U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Com'n v. Dizona, 594 F.3d 408, 413-14 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 151, 120 S. Ct. 2097, 147 L. Ed.2d 105 (2000)).
The Petrellos contend that the defendants engaged in a conspiracy to violate the rights of their mentally and physically disabled daughter in violation of the FHA, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et. seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). At this stage of the proceedings, the sole basis for federal question jurisdiction rests on whether the Petrellos can establish a viable claim of housing discrimination against the Pruckas, McGee and/or the Naths.1 The Court is of the opinion that the Petrellos' conspiracy claim under section 1985(3) is maintainable only if there exists a sustainable federal cause of action based in a federal statute or the federal Constitution.
Here, the basis for the Petrellos' conspiracy claim rests on allegations of a violation of the FHA, specifically § 3604(f)(1). Section 3604(f)(1) provides, in relevant part:
... it shall be unlawful to discriminate in the sale... or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer... because of a handicap...
(A) [of] that buyer...;
(B) a person... intending to reside in that dwelling after it is sold,...; or
(c) any person associated with that buyer...
The FHA prohibits property owners from refusing to sell a house to a person because of that person's disability in specific circumstances. See § 3604(f)(1)(A-C). Any such claim of discrimination or disparate treatment may be brought by a person in behalf of a disabled person who intends to live in the house. Id. Where, as here, the Petrellos' suit is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the necessary proof and analysis required follows the McDonnell Douglas test. See Mitchell v. Century 21 Rustic Realty, 233 F. Supp. 2d 418, 432 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
Under the McDonnell Douglas test, to establish a prima facie case, a plaintiff must establish that he is a member of a protected class, he sought to purchase and were qualified to purchase the dwelling at issue, he was denied the right to purchase the dwelling, and the dwelling, remained available after he was denied the opportunity. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green 411 U.S. 792 (1973); see also Holt v. JTM Indus., Inc., 89 F.3d 1224, 1229 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1229 (1997). The Court will address these elements of proof in turn in light of the trial evidence and the briefs on file.
The Petrellos cannot establish a prima facie case against the Pruckas, McGee or the Naths. It is undisputed that the Petrellos are members of the protected class protected by the fact that their daughter suffers with a handicap. However, they cannot establish that they werequalified to purchase the Pruckas' house. Traditionally, the requirement of qualification to purchase is addressed to an approved loan or having sufficient legal capacity. Here, however, the Petrellos lacked a qualification that is necessary to the purchase of real estate. There was no written offer to purchase executed by the Petrellos. See Ward v. Ladner, 322 S.W.3d 692, 700 (Tex. App.—Tyler, 2010). Hence, they lacked the legal capacity to invoke the FHA, the TFHA or the HFHO.
Under state law, the statute of frauds is an affirmative defense requiring that specified classes of contracts be in writing to be enforceable. A contract for the sale of real estate falls within the class of contracts that must be in writing to be enforceable. Id. (citing Gerstacker v. Blum Consulting Engr's, Inc., 884 S.W.2d 845, 850 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, writ denied); See also Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 26.01(a), (b)(4) (Vernon 2009). It is undisputed that the Petrellos and the Pruckas did not enter into a written agreement.
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