Petron v. State
| Decision Date | 26 June 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. 5724,5724 |
| Citation | 481 S.W.2d 722,252 Ark. 945 |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
| Parties | Earl W. PETRON and Robert Lee Baker, Appellants, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee. |
Chambers & Chambers, McKay, Chandler & Choate, Magnolia, for appellants.
Ray Thornton, Atty. Gen., by Jay N. Tolley, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, for appellee.
Appellants Earl W. Petron and Robert Lee Baker were convicted of burglary and grand larceny committed on Thanksgiving day s971. For reversal they contend:
'1. The court erred in ruling that the consent to search was valid;
2. The trial court erred in refusing a severance;
3. The value of the stolen goods was not proven;
4. The testimony of the accomplice was not corroborated as to appellant Earl W. Petron; and
5. The court erred in giving Instruction No. 3.'
POINT 1. The record shows that Thomas Bryan had rented a house at 915 North Jefferson, Magnolia, Arkansas. At the time the stolen goods involved were recovered from Bryan's residence it was occupied by Earl W. Petron and Robert Lee Baker and his wife. Petron slept on a couch in the living room and Baker and his wife occupied one of the two bedrooms. The officers had been looking for Bryan's station wagon from the time the burglary was discovered on November 25th until the early morning of November 29 when it was observed at his house. When Bryan started after some beer for his father-in-law, he was stopped by some officers who observed a flashlight in the back seat which was identified by Mark Hanson as one taken from his home in the burglary. Bryan testified that after the officers gave him the Miranda warnings, they told him they would have to get a search warrant to search his house. He told them that was not necessary because he would give them permission. When the officers and Hanson entered the house they saw several items recognizable as belonging to Hanson--one of which was a sewing machine in the bedroom occupied by the Bakers but readily observable through an open door.
Testimony at the hearing to suppress leaves some doubt as to the status of Petron and Baker--i.e., whether they were subtenants or guests. It is clear from the testimony, however, that the portion of the house searched by the officers, other than recovery of the visible sewing machine, was that part of the house used in common by all the occupants or exclusively by Bryan. Thus so far as the record is concerned the officers entered no place for search that they would not have been entitled to enter as guests of Bryan.
In Asher v. City of Little Rock, 248 Ark. 96, 449 S.W.2d 933 (1970), we held that one having co-equal authority over premises may authorize a search of them. We uphold the search in question for the same reason.
Appellants also suggest that Bryan's permission was coerced. In this connection they point out that Bryan was also charged with the burglary and grand larceny; that he became a witness for the State; and has not yet been brought to trial. However, there is evidence by Bryan showing that his permission was voluntarily given without fear of punishment or hope of reward. On the record we cannot say that the trial court's finding on the issue of voluntariness is contrary to the evidence.
POINT 2. Witness Hanson was present when the officers entered Bryan's house where appellants were arrested and some of the goods taken in the burglary were recovered. The following occurred on direct examination:
'Q. Would you tell me as to the defendant Baker? What was his response?
'A. His response was that 'I done it.' He robbed my house.
'MR. CHANDLER:
I object to that, your Honor.
'THE COURT:
The objection will be overruled.'
In a 'Denno hearing,' the voluntariness of Baker's confession had been determined. Appellants now argue that there was no protection furnished Petron because the jury was not admonished that the statement could be considered only as to Baker. In Ballew v. State, 246 Ark. 1191, 441 S.W.2d 453 (1969), we pointed out that the granting of a severance is within the discretion of the trial court and in Ballew v. State, 249 Ark. 480, 459 S.W.2d 577 (1970), that one who failed to ask for a cautionary instruction was...
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Perry v. State
...testimony or the purpose for which it may be considered, is not prejudicial error, in the absence of a request therefor. Petron v. State, 252 Ark. 945, 481 S.W.2d 722; Steel v. State, 246 Ark. 75, 436 S.W.2d 800; Clark v. State, 246 Ark. 1151, 442 S.W.2d 225. Fielder v. State, 206 Ark. 511,......
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