Petrone v. Mazzone

• Decision Date: 16 February 2001
• Citation: 725 N.Y.S.2d 752
• Parties: (A.D. 3 Dept. 2001) SANDI PETRONE, Appellant, v FRED MAZZONE et al., Respondents. 88501 : THIRD JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT Calendar Date:
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 752

725 N.Y.S.2d 752 (A.D. 3 Dept. 2001)

SANDI PETRONE, Appellant, v FRED MAZZONE et al., Respondents.

88501

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE DIVISION: THIRD JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Calendar Date: February 16, 2001

Decided and Entered: June 7, 2001

Finkelstein, Levine, Gittelsohn & Partners (Lawrence D. Lissauer of counsel), Newburgh, for appellant.

Bohl, Della Rocca & Dorfman P.C. (John T. Casey Jr. of counsel), Albany, for respondents.

Before: Cardona, P.J., Mercure, Mugglin, Rose and Lahtinen, JJ.

Mugglin, J.

Appeals (1) from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Connor, J.), entered February 14, 2000 in Albany County, upon a verdict rendered in favor of defendants, and (2) from an order of said court, entered January 24, 2000 in Albany County, which denied plaintiff's motion to set aside the verdict.

Plaintiff commenced this action to recover for injuries she sustained in a September 13, 1995 motor vehicle collision on State Route 2 in the Town of Colonie, Albany County. It is undisputed that, as plaintiff began a left turn from a dedicated turn lane, she drove into the path of and collided with an oncoming vehicle operated by defendant Jordan Vener (hereinafter defendant). Following a trial, the jury concluded that defendant was negligent but that his negligence was not a proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. Plaintiff appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury's verdict and from the order denying her motion to set aside the verdict. Because we conclude that the jury's determination that defendant was negligent but that his negligence was not a proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries cannot be reconciled with the evidence presented at trial, we are constrained to reverse the judgment and order appealed from, and remit the matter for a new trial.

In our view, the evidence adduced at this very short and simple trial presented the jury with a choice between two basic scenarios. According to plaintiff, she had come to a full stop in the eastbound left-turn lane and, when she saw that an oncoming white van had come to a stop at the intersection and the traffic light controlling her lane had turned green, she began her left turn and immediately collided with another vehicle, assumedly the one operated by defendant. Plaintiff acknowledged that, before proceeding into the intersection, she did not look ahead to see if any vehicles were coming her way.

Defendant, on the other hand, testified that he entered the intersection in the left-hand westbound lane under a green light. He saw plaintiff's vehicle stopped in the opposite left-turn lane and therefore slowed down a little bit as he entered the intersection. According to defendant, "[r]ight as [he] approached that part of the intersection [plaintiff] decided to go right then".

Given the investigating police officer's uncontradicted testimony that the traffic lights were functioning properly and that both lights could not have been green at the same time, the jury had no alternative but to conclude that one of the parties gave inaccurate testimony and that either plaintiff or defendant entered...