Petsch v. Dispatch Printing Company
| Decision Date | 20 March 1889 |
| Citation | 41 N.W. 1034,40 Minn. 291 |
| Parties | Charles H. Petsch v. Dispatch Printing Company and others |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Appeal by defendants (the Dispatch Printing Co., and Geo. Thompson and Carroll S. Bartram, two of its officers, the former being also manager of the company, and the latter one of the editors and managers of the St. Paul Dispatch, a daily newspaper published by it) from an order of the district court for Ramsey county, Simons, J., presiding, overruling their joint demurrer to the complaint, the grounds of demurrer being defect of parties defendant and failure to state a cause of action.
The complaint alleges that on April 7, 1888, there was holden in St. Paul a democratic convention for nominating and which nominated candidates for city offices, to be elected in the ensuing May. Plaintiff was not a delegate to the convention and took no part in it. He has lived in St. Paul with his family more than 20 years, being well known to all its citizens, enjoying their confidence and approval; and has for many years been an alderman of the city, and was a nominee of the convention for alderman at large, and has never been guilty of any dishonesty or improprieties of any kind. The complaint then alleges that on the day of the convention the defendants composed and published in the St. Paul Dispatch the article complained of, (setting it forth at large as in the opinion,) and avers that the defendants and each of them in composing, publishing, and circulating it, "intended to be understood and were understood to charge that this plaintiff, who was named in said article as Alderman Petsch together with other citizens named in said article, had theretofore wrongfully, unlawfully, and wickedly conspired together to prevent the election of the city comptroller John Roche, named in said article and then the incumbent of the office of the city comptroller of the city of St. Paul, with the design and intent of thereafter wrongfully, unlawfully, and feloniously taking and converting to their own use the public moneys of the city of St. Paul contained in the treasury of said city," and that the article "is generally understood by the citizens of said city to make such charge and accusation against this plaintiff." The residue of the complaint consisted of averments of the falsity of the charge, of plaintiff's demand for a retraction and defendants' refusal, and of damage in the sum of $ 10,000, no special damages being alleged.
Order affirmed, and case remanded for further proceedings.
J. M. Gilman, for appellants.
C. D. & Thos. D. O'Brien, for respondent.
The questions presented for consideration in this case arise upon demurrer to the complaint. The statute provides that in cases of libel it shall not be necessary to state in the complaint any extrinsic facts for the purpose of showing the application to the plaintiff of the defamatory matter out of which the cause of action arose, but it shall be sufficient to state generally that the same was published concerning the plaintiff. This, however, does not dispense with the necessity of alleging extrinsic facts by way of inducement to show that the publication is libellous, or at least susceptible of a defamatory meaning under the circumstances, and so calculated to affect the plaintiff injuriously. Fry v. Bennett, 5 Sandf. 54. The actionable character of the charge must be made to appear, and the complaint must show that it was published of some person or persons in some way designated or indicated, so that reference may be made to it by the pleader as applicable to the plaintiff. Smith v. Coe , 22 Minn. 276. Cases may arise in which the words are in themselves so vague and uncertain that it could not be intended that they were spoken of any particular person. But there are other cases in which the words amount to a libellous charge upon some person, but that person is so ambiguously described that, without the aid of extrinsic facts, his identity cannot be ascertained. Under the old practice it was necessary in such cases to show the application of the charge to the plaintiff by the introduction of the proper averments and a colloquium. Van Vechten v. Hopkins, 5 John. 211, 222, (4 Am. Dec. 339.) But the change in this rule made by the statute is a very material one, and the averments and colloquium which were formerly necessary to connect the libel with the plaintiff may be dispensed with. The rule as existing in the practice before the Code is well illustrated by the case of Miller v. Maxwell, 16 Wend. 9. The change in the rule was made to simplify the pleadings, and obviate the technical difficulties and embarrassments which frequently arose under the former practice. Pike v. Van Wormer, 5 How. Pr. 171.
The...
To continue reading
Request your trial