Petsch v. Slator

• Decision Date: 18 October 1978
• Docket Number: No. 12748,12748
• Citation: 573 S.W.2d 849
• Parties: Joe Slator PETSCH et al., v. C. H. SLATOR.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 849

573 S.W.2d 849

Joe Slator PETSCH et al., v. C. H. SLATOR.

No. 12748.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, Austin.

Oct. 18, 1978.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 5, 1978.

Joe Slator Petsch, Del Rio, C. C. Small, Jr., Richard S. Donoghue, Small, Craig & Werkenthin, Austin, for Harold Petsch Brelsford, Diana Brelsford, Susanna Brelsford, Madge Brelsford and John Brelsford.

John W. Stayton, Jr., McGinnis, Lochridge & Kilgore, Austin, for appellee.

SHANNON, Justice.

This appeal is from a judgment entered by the district court of Llano County in a will construction case. The important question is whether certain lapsed gifts passed by intestacy to the testator's heirs or by the terms of the residuary clause of the will to the residual beneficiaries. The court overruled appellants' motion for summary judgment and entered summary judgment for appellee. The judgment declared that the lapsed gifts passed to the testator's heirs by intestacy.

The will in question was signed by the testator, J. D. Slator, Jr., on August 14, 1959. The testator owned ranch land in Llano and Blanco Counties and certain oil producing property in Ector County. At death the testator possessed large sums of cash, United States Government Bonds, and United States Treasury Bills. He also held life insurance stock and stock in a Llano savings and loan association.

The testator died on February 25, 1973. His wife, Josephine Pehl Slator, had died earlier. The testator and his wife were childless. He was survived by three brothers and one sister. A brother, C. H. Slator, is appellee. The testator left at least one nephew and two nieces and several grandnephews and grandnieces. A number of these persons were residual beneficiaries under the will. The nephew, the grandnephews, and grandnieces are appellants.

The will was admitted to probate in 1973 by order of the County Court of Llano County. The testator's nephew, Joe Slator Petsch, was appointed independent executor, but he later filed his resignation. E. H. Slator, the testator's brother, was appointed administrator with will annexed. An inventory and appraisement and list of claims was filed and approved by order of the court.

Appellants raise a threshold problem by their point of error that the district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the will construction suit. Appellants' contention is based upon Tex.Prob.Code Ann. § 5(b) and § 5(d) (Supp.1978). Section 5(b) provides in part as follows "In those counties where there is no statutory probate court, county court at law or other statutory court exercising the jurisdiction of a probate court, all applications, petitions and motions regarding probate, administrations, guardianships, and mental illness matters shall be filed and heard in the county court, except that in contested probate matters, the judge of the county court may on his own motion, or shall on the motion of any party to the proceeding transfer such proceeding to the district court, which may then hear such proceeding as if originally filed in such court. . . . "

The applicable portion of § 5(d) provides as follows:

"All courts exercising original probate jurisdiction shall have the power to hear all matters incident to an estate, including but not limited to, all claims by or against an estate, all actions for trial of title to land incident to an estate and for the enforcement of liens thereon incident to an estate, all actions for trial of the right of property incident to an estate, and actions to construe wills. . . . "

Appellants argue that under § 5(b) a district court for a county such as Llano County cannot exercise jurisdiction over a probate matter until the county court probate proceedings have been transferred to district court. Since the county court proceedings had not been transferred to district court in the manner provided by § 5(b), appellants maintain that the district court did not have jurisdiction to entertain appellee's suit to construe the will.

Although § 5 was intended to broaden jurisdiction of the probate court, the section has not been construed to exclude jurisdiction of the district court in suits to cancel deeds to lands of an estate, Folliott v. Bozeman, 526 S.W.2d 577 (Tex.Civ.App.1975, writ ref'd n. r. e.), and Nolan v. Bettis, 562 S.W.2d 520 (Tex.Civ.App.1978, no writ), or in suits to impose a constructive trust upon the assets of estate, Gordy v. Alexander, 550 S.W.2d 146 (Tex.Civ.App.1977, writ ref'd n. r. e.). Likewise, § 5 has not been construed to exclude jurisdiction of the district court in suits to construe wills. Boyd v. Ratliff, 541 S.W.2d 223 (Tex.Civ.App.1976, writ dism'd). Appellants' point of error is overruled.

Appellants' points of error two and three present the question whether the lapsed gifts to Josephine Slator passed to the testator's heirs or to the residual beneficiaries. The relevant paragraphs of the will are either described or quoted below.

Paragraph two provided that Josephine, the testator's wife, take the cash on hand and the United States Government Bonds. In paragraph three the testator devised to Josephine the "M. C. Winters Ranch," a ranch of 3557.2 acres located in Llano and Blanco Counties, along with the livestock on that ranch.

In paragraph four the testator devised to his brothers, E. H. Slator and C. H. Slator, the "Six Mile Ranch," composed of 3754.67 acres located in Llano County, along with the livestock on that ranch.

Paragraph five is the residuary clause and is set out below:

"All of the rest, residue and remainder of my property and estate, after the delivery of the specific bequests made in Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of this will, such rest, residue and remainder of my property and estate to include all of the property and estate of every nature, character and description, whether real, personal or mixed and wheresoever the same may be situated, exclusive of the specific bequests in said Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 hereof, I hereby give, will, devise and bequeath unto the following named persons, in equal portions, share and share alike, to-wit:

(1) My wife, Josephine Slator;

(2) Harold Petch (Sic ) Brelsford;

(3) Diane Brelsford;

(4) Suzan (Sic ) Brelsford;

(5) Madge Brelsford;

(6) John Brelsford;

(The said Harold Petch (Sic ), Diane, Suzan (Sic ), Madge and John Brelsford being children of my Niece, Peggy Petch (Sic ) Brelsford) (7) Debra Lou Slator, daughter of my brother, C. H. Slator;

(8) Joe Slator Petch (Sic ) ; son of my sister Myra Petch (Sic );

"To have and to hold the said rest, residue and remainder of my property and estate unto the above named Josephine Slator, Harold Petch (Sic ) Brelsford, Diane Brelsford, Suzan (Sic ) Brelsford, Madge Brelsford, John Brelsford, Debra Lou Slator, and Joe Slator Petch (Sic ), in equal portions, share and share alike, and to their heirs and assigns forever."

Paragraph six provides as follows:

"By my property disposed of by this will, I intend to dispose of all my property of whatever kind, real, presonal (Sic ) or mixed, in my possession, and to which I am entitled at the time of my death, including not only my separate property but also all the community estate existing between myself and my wife Josephine Slator at the time of my death, and therefore the said bequests to my said wife Josephine Slator under this will are made upon the condition that she waive any and all claims to any interest she may have in our community property, and thereby recognize the disposition of said Community property of said community estate as herein made, and upon the execution of such a release and waiver of such a release and waiver of such claim to said Community estate, said bequests are to be delivered to her as such beneficiary, otherwise my said wife shall only receive all of my interest in the Community Estate existing between us at the time of my death, and my Separate Estate shall pass to and vest in the beneficiaries, other than my said wife Josephine Slator, as named in Paragraphs 4 and 5 hereof, in equal portions, share and share alike, and their heirs and assigns, forever."

Josephine Slator died before the testator. As a result, the gifts to her in the will lapsed. The usual rule is that a lapsed legacy falls into the residue of the estate and passes to the residual beneficiary unless it appears that the testator intended otherwise. Moss v. Helsey, 60 Tex. 426 (1883); Jordan v. Virginia Military Institute, 296 S.W.2d 952 (Tex.Civ.App.1956, no writ).

Appellee's argument is that the lapsed gifts to Josephine did not pass under the residuary clause of the will because of the wording of two phrases in paragraph 5, " . . . after the delivery of the specific bequests made in Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of this will . . . " and " . . . exclusive of the specific bequests in said Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 hereof . . . " Appellee claims that the quoted phrases remove the specific bequests in paragraphs two and three from the operation of the residuary clause. For authority appellee relies upon Moss v. Helsey, supra; Bittner v. Bittner, 45 S.W.2d 148 (Tex.Comm'n App.1932, judgmt adopted); Lenz v. Sens, 27 Tex.Civ.App. 442, 66 S.W. 110 (1901, writ ref'd); and Neinast v. Brauckmuller, 401 S.W.2d 113 (Tex.Civ.App.1966, no writ).

Appellants list many out-of-state cases which they claim support the position that phrases such as those in paragraph five do not, standing alone, operate to keep lapsed gifts from passing as part of the residue.

A statement of the rule with respect to similar phrases is found in 80 Am.Jur.2d Wills § 1690 (1975):

"Where a residuary clause contains some such phrase as 'not hereinbefore disposed of,' 'not hereinbefore specified,' or 'not otherwise disposed of,' as in a gift of 'the residue of my estate not before disposed of,' it has frequently been contended that the addition of such language indicates an intention that the residuary clause is not to apply to prior gifts in the event of their lapse or other failure, but this contention has...