Petteway v. Galveston Cnty.
| Docket Number | 3:13-cv-308 |
| Decision Date | 31 October 2023 |
| Parties | Honorable Terry Petteway, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS, v. Galveston County, Texas, ET AL., DEFENDANTS. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
This matter was recently reassigned to this court from Judge Gregg Costa, who was sitting by designation before he returned to private practice last year. The court now takes up a motion for costs and attorneys' fees and a bill of costs. Dkts 83, 84. The court will deny the motion for attorneys' fees, experts fees, and other litigation expenses. Dkt. 84. Further, the court will sustain in part and overrule in part the plaintiffs' objections to the defendants' bill of costs. Dkt. 83.
In August 2013, the plaintiffs[1]-the Honorable Terry Petteway, Derrick Rose, Michael Montez, Penny Pope, and Sonny James-sued the defendants-Galveston County and Judge Mark Henry-after the Galveston County Commissioners Court adopted an electoral plan in 2013 that reduced the number of constable and justice-of-the-peace precincts. Dkt. 1. They alleged that the 2013 plan illegally diluted the voting power of Galveston County's Black and Latino voters under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Id. ¶¶ 57-59. They also averred that the defendants violated the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments by intentionally discriminating against the county's Black and Latino residents. Id. ¶¶ 60-64.
The plaintiffs requested an expedited trial setting and docket-control order, Dkt. 5, and the court entered an order setting trial in January 2014. Dkt. 14. In October 2013, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Dkt. 16. The motion was not ruled on before trial.
The court convened a bench trial on January 14, 2014. Dkt. 74. Before beginning trial, the defendants re-urged the arguments in their Rule 12 motion, but the court announced it would carry the motion until making its final rulings. Id. at 21-25; see also Minute Entry (Jan. 16, 2014). After the plaintiffs rested and the defendants orally moved for a partial judgment, the court entered judgment against the plaintiffs' vote-dilution claim. Dkt. 76 at 88-90; see also Dkt. 78 at 1. But the court allowed the intentional-discrimination claims to proceed. Dkt. 76 at 90-91. The bench trial concluded on January 16. Id. at 312. After trial, the court ordered the parties to submit post-trial briefs by January 31. Dkt. 41. Both parties timely filed their briefs. Dkts. 50, 51.
Following the bench trial eight years later, the court concluded that the defendants were not motivated by discriminatory intent when adopting the 2013 plan. Dkt. 78. It separately rendered judgment for the defendants on the plaintiffs' intentional-discrimination claim. Dkt. 79.
District courts may enter a post-judgment award for attorneys' fees. Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d)(2). The parties seeking a fee award must (1) “specify the judgment and the statute, rule, or other grounds entitling [them] to the award;” (2) “state the amount sought or provide a fair estimate of it;” and (3) “disclose, if the court so orders, the terms of any agreement about fees for the services for which the claim is made.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d)(2)(B)(ii)-(iv). In federal-question cases, federal law governs awards of costs and fees. Mathis v. Exxon Corp., 302 F.3d 448, 461 (5th Cir. 2002) (). The party seeking attorneys' fees bears the burden of establishing entitlement to such an award. Amawi v. Paxton, 48 F.4th 412, 412 (5th Cir. 2022).
Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 54, “costs-other than attorney's fees-should be allowed to the prevailing party.” As defined by statute, recoverable “costs” are limited to:
28 U.S.C. § 1920. “The Supreme Court has indicated that federal courts may only award those costs articulated in section 1920 absent explicit statutory or contractual authorization to the contrary.” U.S. ex rel. Long v. GSDMIdea City, L.L.C., 807 F.3d 125, 130 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Gagnon v. United Technisource, Inc., 607 F.3d 1036, 1045 (5th Cir. 2010)).
A district court has wide discretion when determining whether the prevailing party is entitled to an award of costs. Edwards v. 4 JLJ, L.L.C., 976 F.3d 463, 466 (5th Cir. 2020). But there is a “strong presumption” that the prevailing party is entitled to costs, and the Fifth Circuit has described the denial of costs as “in the nature of a penalty.” Pacheco v. Mineta, 448 F.3d 783, 793-94 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting Schwarz v. Folloder, 767 F.2d 125, 131 (5th Cir. 1985)).
The defendants ask the court to award them the $375,731.00 in attorneys' fees, $80,099.26 in expert fees, and $46,486.42 in other litigation expenses they incurred as the prevailing parties in this case. Dkts. 84. They also ask the court to award them other costs as the prevailing party: $12,770.84 for deposition and trial transcripts as well as $48.88 for copies and printing. Dkt. 83.
After reviewing the record and the pleadings, the court holds that the defendants are not entitled to their attorneys' fees, expert fees, or other litigation expenses because the plaintiffs' case was not frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless. However, the defendants are entitled to most of the remaining costs reflected in their bill of costs.
Under federal law, “[e]ach litigant pays his own attorney's fees, win or lose, unless a statute or contract provides otherwise.” Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 253 (2010). But “Congress has created statutory exceptions to this general rule.” Veasey v. Abbott, 13 F.4th 362, 368 (5th Cir. 2021). For example, under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) in civil-rights proceedings, the court may discretionarily “allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.” Similarly, 52 U.S.C. § 10310(e) provides that “[i]n any action or proceeding to enforce the voting guarantees of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendment, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee, reasonable expert fees, and other reasonable litigation expenses as part of the costs.” These statutes “are ‘identically construed' because they share similar ‘language and purpose.'” Veasey, 13 F. 4th at 368 (quoting Davis v. Abbott, 781 F.3d 207, 213 n.6 (5th Cir. 2015)).
The Voting Rights Act “limits fee-shifting for prevailing defendants in civil-rights cases to instances where the ‘plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.'” Vaughan v. Lewisville Indep. Sch. Dist., 62 F.4th 199, 203 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978)). This “stringent standard applicable to defendants is intended to ensure that plaintiffs with uncertain but arguably meritorious claims are not altogether deterred from initiating litigation by the threat of incurring onerous legal fees should their claims fail.” Myers v. City of West Monroe, 211 F.3d 289, 292 n.1 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Aller v. N.Y. Bd. of Elections, 586 F.Supp. 603, 605 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)).
“Even when the law or the facts appear questionable or unfavorable at the outset, a party may have an entirely reasonable ground for bringing suit.” Christiansburg Garment Co., 434 U.S. at 422. Concerning frivolousness, a district court may consider several factors:
whether the plaintiff established a prima facie case, whether squarely controlling precedent foreclosed the plaintiff's legal argument, whether the plaintiff's evidence was so lacking that there is no basis from which to say the claims were not frivolous, whether the defendant offered to settle, and whether the plaintiff's claim was so obviously meritless that it was dismissed prior to trial.
Vaughan, 62 F.4th at 204-05 (cleaned up). It must also “resist the understandable temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning by concluding that, because a plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, his action must have been unreasonable or without foundation.” Christiansburg Garment Co., 434 U.S. at 421-22. The fact that a plaintiff ultimately loses “is not in itself a sufficient justification for the assessment of fees.” Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14 (1980).
At the onset, the plaintiffs contend that the defendants are not entitled to attorneys' fees because they never pleaded for them. Dkt. 85 at 5-6. Procedurally, this argument is a non-starter. The defendants never had an opportunity to plead for attorneys' fees because the court never ruled on their first responsive pleading-the Rule 12 motion to dismiss. See Dkt. 16. In procedural situations where a party could not have been required to request fees, the Fifth Circuit has allowed a party to seek them after the fact. See United Indus., Inc. v. Simon-Hartley Ltd., 91 F.3d 762, 765 & n.4 (5th Cir. 1996) ( Engel v. Teleprompter Corp., 732 F.2d 1238, 1240 (5th Cir. 1984)). The court will allow the defendants to seek an award of...
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