Pettus v. City of St. Louis
| Decision Date | 14 September 1959 |
| Docket Number | No. 46697,No. 2,46697,2 |
| Citation | 328 S.W.2d 636 |
| Parties | Thruston PETTUS, Bradford Blossom and William E. Guy, Trustees upon Dissolution of St. Louis Merchants Land Improvement Company, Respondents and Cross-Appellants, v. CITY OF ST. LOUIS, a Municipal Corporation, Appellant and Cross-Respondent, Ross Aviation Corporation, a Corporation, George Holtgrewe and Margaret Holtgrewe, Defendants |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Charles J. Dolan, Acting City Counselor, St. Louis, for appellant City of St. Louis.
Finley & Lucas, Wilder Lucas, St. Louis, for cross-appellants.
These are cross-appeals from a judgment for plaintiffs in their action to quiet title and in ejectment. The land lies in several tracts (designated as A to F, inclusive), contains in the aggregate approximately 48 acres, and is situate in the City of St. Louis. defendant City of St. Louis appeals from the judgment in its entirety; and plaintiffs appeal only 'on the amount of damages, and on the value of the monthly rents and profits' respectively awarded and fixed by the judgment in ejectment.
The city claims title to all of the property under certain tax deeds (twenty in number) from the collector of the city. It makes a further claim to the major portion of said property (tracts A, B and C, comprising 34.60 acres) by virtue of two sheriff's deeds given upon execution sales under benefit judgments in favor of the city in a certain condemnation proceeding.
The land in question was acquired in 1889 by St. Louis Merchants Land Improvement Company shortly after its incorporation in that year. The corporation underwent voluntary dissolution in 1911 by decree of the circuit court, which decree directed that certain persons (officers and directors) take charge of the remaining assets (these lands) and administer the same as trustees. These trustees having died, successors were on November 8, 1928, appointed by the circuit court to further administer the assets which continued to include the property now in question. Within sixteen years all of these successor trustees had died, and on March 5, 1948, the present trustees were appointed as successors to said deceased successor and original trustees.
The taxes were paid up to and including 1930, after which no further taxes were paid. In accordance with the provisions of the Jones-Munger Law, Laws 1933, pp. 425-449 1 (then applicable to the city), the collector of the City of St. Louis advertised for sale all of the real estate in question, announcing that he would offer it on November 5, 1936. The property was duly offered, but no bids were received. The following year the collector again advertised the real estate would be offered for sale on November 5, 1937. Again, no bids were received. The following year the collector again published a notice of the sale of the said lands for delinquent taxes, such sale to be held on November 12, 1938. At the sale held in conformity with such notice, the City of St. Louis was the sole bidder for such property. It bid $4.75 for each of the twenty parcels offered for sale. All of the real estate was sold to it on the payment to the collector of the total sum of $95, and certificates of purchase were delivered to the city.
On September 11, 1942, the collector delivered twenty collector's deeds to the City of St. Louis covering all of the land purchased by it at the sale held November 12, 1938. The deeds are admittedly in the form prescribed by statute, each bears the same date, September 11, 1942, and, except for descriptions, are alike. All of them were filed for record on October 21, 1942, and duly recorded.
This action was filed May 9, 1950, and in due time the city and its codefendants filed separate motions to dismiss, all based on the fact that it appeared from the face of plaintiffs' petition that they were seeking the recovery of lands sold for taxes, or to defeat or avoid a sale or conveyance of lands for taxes, and such action had not been commenced within three years from the time the tax deeds were recorded, and hence barred by the three years' special statute of limitations (§ 11177, R.S.1939, now Section 140.590, RSMo 1949 and V.A.M.S.). The statute reads as follows: 'Any suit or proceeding against the tax purchaser, his heirs or assigns, for the recovery of lands sold for taxes, or to defeat or avoid a sale or conveyance of lands for taxes, except in cases where the taxes have been paid or the land was not subject to taxation, or has been redeemed as provided by law, shall be commenced within three years from the time of recording the tax deed, and not thereafter; provided, that where the person claiming to own such land shall be an infant, or a person of unsound mind, then such suit may be brought at any time within two years after the removal of such disability.'
The motions were sustained, the petition dismissed with prejudice, and plaintiffs appealed to this court. On appeal the statute was held applicable so as to bar the suit as to the cancellation of the collector's tax deeds. On the theory that in suits under § 1684, R.S.1939; Section 527.150, RSMo 1949 and V.A.M.S., in relation to actions to ascertain interest and quiet title, 'a party setting up title in himself, as here, is entitled to an adjudication of his existing title, and if he have no title the court should so adjudge or decree,' and observing that '[p]laintiffs may be able to establish title notwithstanding the tax deeds,' this court reversed the judgment of dismissal, and remanded the cause with directions 'to hold the ruling on the special motions to dismiss in abeyance until the other issues presented in plaintiff's petition be submitted for final adjudication and judgment.' See Pettus v. City of St. Louis, 362 Mo. 603, 242 S.W.2d 723, 729.
After remand, plaintiffs filed in the trial court their fourth amended petition (on which trial was had) wherein they alleged in detail substantially the same facts concerning consideration ('so shockingly inadequate in amount as to constitute a fraud,' etc.), as contained in the petition before us on the former appeal, but adding the new allegation as to each tract that for such reason the deeds were 'void upon their face and upon the facts aforesaid.' It also contained, substantially, the other allegations of such former petition going to a great variety of matters other than that the deeds were void on their face. Such fourth amended petition occupies more than forty pages of the transcript.
The defendant relies heavily upon the former adjudication as controlling the disposition of the present appeal, on the theory, we suppose (although it is not so denominated nor developed as such in the argument), that the same became the law of the case. It will be seen by reference to the opinion that the matter raised and determined on the former appeal was that of whether the special three years' statute of limitations applied at all to quiet title suits involving cancellation of tax deeds under the Jones-Munger Law, and not whether the facts brought the case within the judicially imposed exception to such statute, namely, tax deeds void on their face, so as to entitle plaintiffs to cancellation of such deeds as a cloud upon their title. It is the latter question, as subsequently raised by amendment to the petition, with which we are presently concerned, and it not having been determined on the former appeal is therefore not foreclosed under the doctrine of law of the case.
A tax deed void on its face does not start the running of the three years' special statute of limitations, § 11177, R.S.1939, now § 140.590. Costello v. City of St. Louis, Mo., 262 S.W.2d 591, 595, 596; Mason v. Crowder, 85 Mo. 526; Pearce v. Tittsworth, 87 Mo. 635; Jamison v. Galloway, Mo., 254 S.W. 101.
The first question is whether it appears from the face of the deeds that the consideration paid at the tax sale is 'so unconscionably inadequate as to shock the conscience of the court' (to use the terminology of plaintiffs' petition), rendering the deeds void on their face, and hence insufficient to set the special three years' statute in motion, as held in Costello v. City of St. Louis, supra. The question of whether a sale to one of the governmental units to which taxes are due constitutes as to it an extinguishment of such taxes, and to that extent furnishes consideration for the sale in addition to the bid price which should be considered on the issue of adequacy, is not raised, so 'we will not of our own volition debate a question not mooted, but take the case as we find it.'
Here each of the twenty deeds expresses a consideration of $4.75 for the parcel conveyed by it, which parcels variously contained from 1.2 acres to 7 acres, except that two of the deeds conveyed less than an acre (one of them 50/100ths, and the other 40/100ths). Some of the deeds also show dimensions--frontages on streets varying from 100 feet to 660 feet by depths of from 371 feet to 583 feet, lying in subdivisions. To be sure, the deeds do not disclose the nature of the properties, their physical characteristics and surroundings, whether improved or not, etc. There was testimony from which the court found the value of the properties to be in excess of $171,000 at the time they were sold for taxes, interest and penalties aggregating $20,500. This testimony, however, avails plaintiffs nothing on the instant issue, and cannot be resorted to by us because the facts disclosed thereby do not appear upon the face of the deeds. The city does not undertake to defend the consideration, but takes the position that inadequacy does not...
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