Petty v. Griffith
| Decision Date | 12 November 1942 |
| Docket Number | 38093 |
| Citation | 165 S.W.2d 412 |
| Parties | PETTY v. GRIFFITH et al |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Bennett Cullison and Fred Louis, Jr., both of Harlan, Iowa, and W. L Mulvania, of Rockport, for appellant.
C. W Allen, of Rockport, for respondents.
BARRETT, Commissioner.
In the first count of this action the plaintiff seeks the court's construction of three warranty deeds and asks that the title to the real estate described in the deeds be quieted and the respective rights and interests of the parties plaintiff and defendant in the land be decreed. In the second count of this action the plaintiff requests that the land be partitioned.
Lucina B. Franklin and G. B. (Gobryas) Beal were brother and sister. Belle Ford Griffith was their half sister. The record does not disclose their ages but when this case was tried in 1940 Belle Ford Griffith was 79 years of age. Lucina B. Franklin had been married twice and Belle Ford Griffith had been married once but neither of them had children and both outlived their husbands. By his first wife G. B. Beal had two children, the plaintiff, Maude Petty, and one of the defendants, Myrtle Franklin. By his second wife he had five children who survived him and they are the defendants, Zelma Beal Ramsay, Ralph R. Beal, Allyn E. Beal, Dorothy Beal Glasgow and Jesse F. Beal. The latter's mother and G. B. Beal's second wife is Ella F. Beal, who is also a party defendant to this cause. At the time of the trial both Lucina B. Franklin died in February 1923 and G. B. Beal died in 1933.
Lucina B. Franklin was the owner of the land described in the three warranty deeds. She had purchased some of the land and some of it she had inherited from a deceased sister. The land is three or four separate farms consisting of over 900 acres of very valuable land in Atchison County.
Before her death in February 1923 Lucina B. Franklin executed three separate deeds conveying her title to the land and the solution of the present controversy depends upon the construction and interpretation to be given those deeds. More particularly, the question for determination is, what estate or title did she convey and create by the deeds?
The first deed ('Exhibit 1') is dated January 3, 1923 and recites that Lucina B. Franklin is the party of the first part and that Belle Ford Griffith is the party of the second part. It says: 'That the said party of the first part, in consideration of the sum of One Dollar and Love and affection * * * to her paid * * * does by these presents Grant, Bargain and Sell, Convey and Confirm, unto the said party of the second part, her heirs and assigns, the following described * * * land.' Following the description is this paragraph: 'The intention of grantor herein being to convey to be said Belle Ford Griffith, grantee herein, a life estate only, and at her death to revert to G. M. Beal of Fremont County, Iowa, and his legal heirs.'
The clause defining the estate granted (the habendum clause) recites that the grant is 'unto the party of the second part, her heirs and assigns, forever.' The deed recites the covenants usually contained in a warranty deed.
The second deed ('Exhibit 2'), conveying a different tract of land, is exactly like the first deed except for slight differences in the paragraph following the description. That paragraph in the second deed says: 'The intention of Grantor being to convey to the said Belle Ford Griffith, grantee herein, a life estate only, and at her death to revert to G. M. Beal of Fremont County, Iowa, and his legal heirs only.'
The third deed ('Exhibit 3') was between the same parties but it was executed on June 10, 1918. It is similar to the other deeds except it conveys 'an undivided one-half interest' in a tract of land and the clause following the description in the other deeds is made a part of the description in this deed. It says:
Did Lucina Franklin, by these deeds, convey her fee simple title in the land to Belle Ford Griffith? Or, did she convey Belle Ford Griffith a life estate only and convey the remainder in fee simple to the heirs of G. B. Beal?
The trial court concluded that the fee simple title was in Belle Ford Griffith and that the heirs of G. B. Beal had no interest whatever in the land by reason of these deeds. Belle Ford Griffith's argument in support of the trial court's decree is that the deeds constituted an absolute conveyance of the fee simple title to her and that the clause following the descriptions, not being in the clause in which the estate granted is usually defined, is repugnant, contradictory of the words of conveyance contained in the deeds and is, therefore, void. She says that G. B. Beal and his heirs had no interest in the land and consequently there could be no such thing as the title reverting to them. As to Beal and his heirs, she says there were no words of conveyance and, therefore, they are not parties to the deeds but strangers and the most that can be said for their claims is that the clauses following the descriptions indicated that the grantor intended to convey them some interest but failed to do so.
We agree with the respondent that the deeds use the language and terminology usually employed in conveying a fee simple title and that absent the clauses following the descriptions these deeds do constitute an absolute conveyance of the fee simple title. Tygard v. Hartwell, 204 Mo. 200, 102 S.W. 989; Triplett v. Triplett, 332 Mo. 870, 60 S.W.2d 13; Mo.R.S.A § 3496. We also agree with the respondent that the title could not 'revert' to G.B. Beal and his heirs. The word 'revert' to those skilled in conveyancing usually means that the instrument contains a clause so limiting the estate conveyed that there is a possibility of its terminating and reverting to the grantor; it is a reversionary interest, a defeasable fee simple estate, which could not exist here because G. B. Beal and his heirs were neither grantors nor owners and there are no words of defeasance in the deeds. 1 Restatement, Law of Property, Secs. 16, 44, 45. But see Keller v. Keller, 338 Mo. 731, 92 S.W.2d 157. Nor could there be any title or interest in G. B. Beal and his heirs by reservation or exception because the one reserves to the grantor some new interest out of the thing granted, while the other excludes from the operation of the grant some existing part of the estate, neither of which is attempted in this instance. See and compare 26 C.J.S., Deeds, §§ 137-140; 4 Tiffany, Real Property, Secs. 972-976; 4 Thompson, Real Property, Secs. 3458, 3483-3484; 16 Am.Jur., Secs. 298-304 and the annotations in 39 A.L.R. 128 and 129 A.L.R. 310.
We do not agree with the respondent that Beal and his heirs are not grantees in the deeds and, therefore, strangers. The present conveyances are not comparable to the cases in which a wife joined with her husband as a grantor of his land and reserved to themselves the rents and profits as long as both or either of them lived. In these cases the wife was not an owner of the real estate, her only interest being dower; consequently before she could acquire any interest in the real estate she must have been a grantee, which she did not purport to be, or previously have had some interest in the land. There the estate reserved is to the grantor-owner husband and is an estate measured by his life and the life of his wife (an estate pur autre vie). Lemon v. Lemon, 273 Mo. 484, 201 S.W. 103; Meador v. Ward, 303 Mo. 176, 260 S.W. 106; Logan's Adm'r v. Caldwell, 23 Mo. 372. The question in these cases was what estate, if any, was reserved to the grantors, or either of them, not who were the grantees and what estate was created in them.
It does not necessarily follow from the fact that one is not mentioned in the places or clauses of a deed in which grantees are usually named or indicated that he may not be or become a grantee. It is immaterial in what part of the conveyance the grantees' names appear as long as the parties' intention is clearly and plainly manifest as to who they are and the estate they are to receive. 26 C. J.S., Deeds, § 99; 16 Am.Jur., Secs. 66-88; 4 Tiffany, Real Property, Sec. 967. The rule as to the repugnant designation of parties is that 'All the language of a grant should be considered and effect given to it unless so repugnant or meaningless that it cannot be done, in which case the repugnant or meaningless portion may be rejected.' 18 C.J., Sec. 326; 26 C.J.S., Deeds, § 128.
Neither do we agree with the respondents' contention that the clause following the descriptions is necessarily contradictory of the estate previously conveyed and therefore, void for repugnancy. If repugnancy or irreconcilable conflict exists, of course, the clause in which estates are usually defined and granted would prevail over a subsequently conflicting clause. But, as the case is with the grantees so is it as to repugnancy in other respects, even if various clauses do conflict, yet if the intention of the parties may be gathered from the whole instrument, rather than from particular, segregated clauses, that intention will prevail and be given effect if possible and if it is not contrary to some positive rule of law. 26 C.J.S., Deeds, § 90; 2 Devlin, Deeds, Sec. 843a; Utter v. Sidman, 170 Mo.284, 70 S.W. 702; Leeper v. Leeper, 347; Keller v. Keller, 338 Mo. 731, 92 S.W.2d 157. ...
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